Part 8 (2/2)
In short, it seeher animals any mental state, or process, in which the ee is coy confirms the position in relation to the rest of the anined to man by comparative anatomy
As comparative anatomy is easily able to show that, physically,series of forhestprotoplasetable life; so, co science, and far short of her elder sister's growth, points to the same conclusion
In the absence of a distinct nervous systeht to look for its product, consciousness; and, even in those forms of aniher degree of development, than that exhibited by the system of the spinal cord and the foundation of the brain in ourselves, the arguy leaves the assumption of the existence of any form of consciousness unsupported With the super-addition of a nervous apparatus corresponding with the cerebrum in ourselves, it is allowable to suppose the appearance of the simplest states of consciousness, or the sensations; and it is conceivable that thesetheher, an apparatus of correlation ans becohest speechless animals is attained
It is a reacity that he perceived the importance of a branch of science which, even now, can hardly be said to exist; and that, in a ree, he sketches in bold outlines the chief features of coy
”any theory, by which we explain the operations of the understanding, or the origin and connexion of the passions in man, will acquire additional authority if we find that the same theory is requisite to explain the same phenomena in all other aniard to the hypothesis by which we have, in the foregoing discourse, endeavoured to account for all experis; and it is hoped that this new point of vieill serve to confirm all our former observations
”_First_, it sees from experience, and infer that the same events will always follow from the same causes By this principle they become acquainted with the radually, froe of the nature of fire, water, earth, stones, heights, depths, &c, and of the effects which result fro are here plainly distinguishable froacity of the old, who have learned, by long observation, to avoid what hurt theave ease or pleasure A horse that has been accustoht which he can leap, and will never attereyhound will trust the er, and will place himself so as to meet the hare in her doubles; nor are the conjectures which he for but his observation and experience
”This is still more evident from the effects of discipline and education on animals, who, by the proper application of rewards and punishht any course of action, the most contrary to their natural instincts and propensities Is it not experience which renders a dog apprehensive of pain when you menace him, or lift up the whip to beat him? Is it not even experience which makes him answer to his name, and infer from such an arbitrary sound that you mean him rather than any of his fellows, and intend to call him, when you pronounce it in a certain manner and with a certain tone and accent?
”In all these cases we may observe that the animal infers some fact beyond what imether founded on past experience, while the creature expects from the present object the same consequences which it has always found in its observation to result from similar objects
”_Secondly_, it is impossible that this inference of the ani, by which he concludes that like events must follow like objects, and that the course of nature will always be regular in its operations For if there be in reality any arguments of this nature they surely lie too abstruse for the observation of such is; since it may well eenius to discover and observe theuided in these inferences by reasoning; neither are children; neither are the generality of mankind in their ordinary actions and conclusions; neither are philosophers themselves, who, in all the active parts of life, are in the overned by the same maxims Nature must have provided soeneral use and application; nor can an operation of such i effects fro and arguard to ard to the brute creation; and the conclusion being once fir presuht to be universally admitted, without any exception or reserve It is custoes animals, from every object that strikes their senses, to infer its usual attendant, and carries their iination from the appearance of the one to conceive the other, in that particular manner which we denoiven of this operation in all the higher as well as lower classes of sensitive beings which fall under our notice and observation”--(IV pp
122-4)
It will be observed that Hume appears to contrast the ”inference of the ani in man” But it would be a complete misapprehension of his intention, if ere to suppose, that he thereby means to imply that there is any real difference between the two processes The ”inference of the aniu, in man is based upon potential beliefs of expectation, which are formed in the man exactly in the same way as in the animal But, in men endoith speech, the mental state which constitutes the potential belief is represented by a verbal proposition, and thus beconises as a belief The fallacy which Hume combats is, that the proposition, or verbal representative of a belief, has coarded as a reality, instead of as the ic, which deals with nothing but propositions, is supposed to be necessary in order to validate the natural fact symbolised by those propositions It is a fallacy si that money is the foundation of wealth, whereas it is only the wholly unessential sye which immediately follows that just quoted, Huht be turned to serious account against soh anie from observation, there are also inal hand of Nature, which much exceed the share of capacity they possess on ordinary occasions, and in which they iest practice and experience
These we deno very extraordinary and inexplicable by all the disquisitions of hu But our wonder will perhaps cease or di itself, which we possess in common with beasts, and on which the whole conduct of life depends, is nothing but a species of instinct or mechanical power, that acts in us unknown to ourselves, and in its chief operations is not directed by any such relations or comparison of ideas as are the proper objects of our intellectual faculties
”Though the instinct be different, yet still it is an instinct which teaches a man to avoid the fire, as much as that which teaches a bird, with such exactness, the art of incubation and the whole economy and order of its nursery”--(IV pp 125, 126)
The parallel here drawn between the ”avoidance of a fire” by a man and the incubatory instinct of a bird is inexact The man avoids fire when he has had experience of the pain produced by burning; but the bird incubates the first tis, and therefore before it has had any experience of incubation For the comparison to be admissible, it would be necessary that a man should avoid fire the first time he saw it, which is notoriously not the case
The terue and ill-defined It is co, which is not dictated by conscious reasoning, whether it is, or is not, the result of previous experience It is ”instinct” which leads a chicken just hatched to pick up a grain of corn; parental love is said to be ”instinctive”; the drowning man who catches at a straw does it ”instinctively”; and the hand that accidentally touches so hot is drawn back by ”instinct” Thus ”instinct” isfroan of consciousness need not be at all implicated, up to a complex combination of acts directed towards a definite end and accompanied by intense consciousness
But this loose employment of the ter; for it is wholly impossible to draw any line of de, on the flank of which a little drop of acid has been placed, rubs it off with the foot of the same side; and, if that foot be held, performs the same operation, at the cost of much effort, with the other foot, it certainly displays a curious instinct But it is no less true that the whole operation is a reflex operation of the spinal cord, which can be performed quite as hen the brain is destroyed; and bethich and siradations In like manner, when an infant takes the breast, it is impossible to say whether the action should be rather termed instinctive or reflex
What are usually called the instincts of animals are, however, acts of such a nature that, if they were perforeneration of a series of ideas and of inferences from them; and it is a curious, and apparently an insoluble, problees of the saive rise to ideas and inferences in ourselves When a chicken picks up a grain, for example, are there, firstly, certain sensations, accorain and its own body; secondly, a desire of the grain; thirdly, a volition to seize it?
Or, are only the sensational terms of the series actually represented in consciousness?
The latter seeh it must be admitted that the other alternative is possible But, in this case, the series of mental states which occurs is such as would be represented in language by a series of propositions, and would afford proof positive of the existence of innate ideas, in the Cartesian sense Indeed, aover the ht appeal to the fact as proof that, in the very first action of his life, he assuo, and of a relation between the two
In all seriousness, if the existence of instincts be granted, the possibility of the existence of innate ideas, in the ined by Descartes, must also be admitted In fact, Descartes, as we have soon, illustrates what he y of hereditary diseases or hereditary enerosity On the other hand, hereditary mental tendencies may justly be terht those special proclivities, which constitute e call genius, coory
The child who is impelled to draw as soon as it can hold a pencil; the Mozart who breaks out into music as early; the boy Bidder orked out thearithmetic; the boy Pascal who evolved Euclid out of his own consciousness: all these may be said to have been impelled by instinct, as enius, is distinct in kind fro within hi innate tendencies--which cultivation may improve, but which it can no s The analogy between a ood here also Art and industry et much music, of a sort, out of a penny whistle; but, when all is done, it has no chance against an organ The innate musical potentialities of the two are infinitely different
CHAPTER VI
LANGUAGE--PROPOSITIONS CONCERNING NECESSARY TRUTHS