Part 6 (2/2)
”Fro the _substance_ and _local conjunction_ of our perceptions we ible than the for the _cause_ of our perceptions Matter and motion, 'tis commonly said in the schools, however varied, are still matter and motion, and produce only a difference in the position and situation of objects Divide a body as often as you please, 'tis still body Place it in any figure, nothing ever results but figure, or the relation of parts Move it in any e of relation 'Tis absurd to iine thatbut merely motion in a circle; while motion in another direction, as in an ellipse, should also be a passion or lobular particles should becoular ones should afford a pleasure Now as these different shocks and variations and es of which matter is susceptible, and as these never afford us any idea of thought or perception, 'tis concluded to be iht can ever be caused byevidence of this argu in the world is more easy than to refute it We need only reflect upon what has been proved at large, that we are never sensible of any connexion between causes and effects, and that 'tis only by our experience of their constant conjunction we can arrive at any knowledge of this relation Now, as all objects which are not contrary are susceptible of a constant conjunction, and as no real objects are contrary, I have inferred from these principles (Part III -- 15) that, to consider the , and that we shall never discover a reason why any object reat, or however little, the resemblance may be betwixt the the cause of thought or perception For though there appear no ht, the case is the same with all other causes and effects Place one body of a pound weight on one end of a lever, and another body of the saht on the other end; you will never find in these bodies any principle of motion dependent on their distance froht and perception If you pretend, therefore, to prove, _a priori_, that such a position of bodies can never cause thought, because, turn it which way you will, it is nothing but a position of bodies: you , conclude that it can never produce motion, since there is no more apparent connection in the one than in the other But, as this latter conclusion is contrary to evident experience, and as 'tis possible we may have a like experience in the operations of the ht and motion, you reason too hastily when, from the mere consideration of the ideas, you conclude that 'tis iht, or a different position of parts give rise to a different passion or reflection Nay, 'tis not only possible we may have such an experience, but 'tis certain we have it; since every one e his thoughts and sentiments And should it be said that this depends on the union of soul and body, I would answer, that wethe substance of the ht; and that, confining ourselves to the latter question, we find, by the coht and motion are different from each other and by experience, that they are constantly united; which, being all the circumstances that enter into the idea of cause and effect, when applied to the operations of matter, we may certainly conclude that ht and perception”--(I pp 314-316)
The upshot of all this is, that the ”collection of perceptions,” which constitutes the mind, is really a systeht in antecedent changes of the matter of the brain, just as the ”collection of , is a systeht in the s
Hume, however, treats of this important topic only incidentally He seems to have had very little acquaintance even with such physiology as was current in his ti on this subject, hich I a but a very odd version of the physiological views of Descartes:--
”When I received the relations of _reseuity_, and _causation_, as principles of union a into their causes, 'twas more in prosecution of my first maxim, that we must in the end rest contented with experience, than for want of soht have displayed on that subject 'Twould have been easy to have inary dissection of the brain, and have shohy, upon our conception of any idea, the aniuous traces and rouse up the other ideas that are related to it But though I have neglected any advantage which Ithe relations of ideas, I am afraid I must here have recourse to it, in order to account for the mistakes that arise from these relations I shall therefore observe, that as theany idea it pleases; whenever it despatches the spirits into that region of the brain in which the idea is placed; these spirits always excite the idea, when they run precisely into the proper traces and rus to the idea But as their motion is seldom direct, and naturally turns a little to the one side or to the other; for this reason the aniuous traces, present other related ideas, in lieu of that which the e we are not always sensible of; but continuing still the saht, make use of the related idea which is presented to us and es, as if it were the same e demanded This is the cause of many ined, and as it would be easy to show, if there was occasion”--(I p 88)
Perhaps it is as well for Huical speculations of this sort did not arise But, while adeness of the language in which they are couched, it must in justice be remembered, that what are non as the eley of the nervous systehteenth century; and, as a further set off to Hurasped the fundamental truth, that the key to the comprehension of es of the nervous apparatus by which they are originated
Surely no one who is cognisant of the facts of the case, nowadays, doubts that the roots of psychology lie in the physiology of the nervous system What we call the operations of the mind are functions of the brain, and the materials of consciousness are products of cerebral activity Cabanis y when he said that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile; but the conception which that much-abused phrase embodies is, nevertheless, far more consistent with fact than the popular notion that the mind is a metaphysical entity seated in the head, but as independent of the brain as a telegraph operator is of his instrument
It is hardly necessary to point out that the doctrine just laid down is what is commonly called materialism In fact, I am not sure that the adjective ”crass,” which appears to have a special charm for rhetorical sciolists, would not be applied to it But it is, nevertheless, true that the doctrine contains nothing inconsistent with the purest idealis before):--
”'Tis not our body we perceive e regard our limbs and members, but certain i a real and corporeal existence to these impressions, or to their objects, is an act of the mind as difficult to explain as that [the external existence of objects] which we examine at present”--(I p 249)
Therefore, if we analyse the proposition that all mental phenomena are the effects or products of material phenomena, all that it means amounts to this; that whenever those states of consciousness which we call sensation, or eation will show good reason for the belief that they are preceded by those other phenoive the naes appear, in the long run, to bebut that of a change in the place and order of our sensations; just as our knowledge of s of which we assume it to be the cause
It has already been pointed out, that Hume must have admitted, and in fact does admit, the possibility that the o, the universe of things being merely the picture produced by the evolution of the phenomena of consciousness
For any deiven to the contrary effect, the ”collection of perceptions” which enerated by the Ego, unfolding its successive scenes on the background of the abyss of nothingness; as a firework, which is but cunningly arranged corows froures, and words, and cascades of devouring fire, and then vanishes into the darkness of the night
On the other hand, itthat can be proved to the contrary, therewhich is the cause of all our ih not likenesses, are sy, which we call the nervous systeebra of fact, based on those symbols A brain may be the machinery by which the material universe becomes conscious of itself But it is important to notice that, even if this conception of the universe and of the relation of consciousness to its other components should be true, we should, nevertheless, be still bound by the liuments of pure idealism The more completely the materialistic position is admitted, the easier is it to show that the idealistic position is unassailable, if the idealist confines hie
Hume deals with the questions whether all our ideas are derived from experience, or whether, on the contrary, more or fewer of them are innate, which so much exercised the mind of Locke, after a somewhat summary fashi+on, in a note to the second section of the _Inquiry_:--
”It is probable that no more was meant by those who denied innate ideas, than that all ideas were copies of our ih it must be confessed that the terms which they employed were not chosen with such caution, nor so exactly defined, as to prevent all mistakes about their doctrine For what is meant by _innate_? If innate be equivalent to natural, then all the perceptions and ideas of the mind must be allowed to be innate or natural, in whatever sense we take the latter word, whether in opposition to what is uncommon, artificial, or miraculous If by innate be meant contemporary with our birth, the dispute seems to be frivolous; nor is it worth while to inquire at what tiain, the word _idea_ seems to be commonly taken in a very loose sense by Locke and others, as standing for any of our perceptions, our sensations and passions, as well as thoughts Now in this sense I should desire to knohat can bethat self-love, or resentment of injuries, or the passion between the sexes is not innate?
”But ad these terms, _impressions_ and _ideas_, in the sense above explained, and understanding by _innate_ what is original or copied from no precedent perception, then we may assert that all our impressions are innate, and our ideas not innate”
It would seem that Hume did not think it worth while to acquire a comprehension of the real points at issue in the controversy which he thus carelessly dismisses
Yet Descartes has defined what he means by innate ideas with so ht to have been i ”innate,” he means that it exists potentially in the mind, before it is actually called into existence by whatever is its appropriate exciting cause
”I have never either thought or said,” he writes, ”that the mind has any need of innate ideas [_idees naturelles_] which are anything distinct fro that there are certain thoughts which arise neither from external objects nor from the deter; in order to mark the difference between the ideas or the notions which are the foruish them from the others, which may be called extraneous or voluntary, I have called them innate But I have used this terenerosity is innate in certain faravel, are innate in others; not that children born in these families are troubled with such diseases in their mother's womb; but because they are born with the disposition or the faculty of contracting the asserted that all our ideas come from observation or tradition, Descartes rehly erroneous is this assertion, that whoever has a proper comprehension of the action of our senses, and understands precisely the nature of that which is trans faculty, will rather affirht, are brought to us by the senses, so that there is nothing in our ideas which is other than innate in the , if only certain circu only to experience For exae that such and such ideas, now present in our s which are external to us; not in truth, that they have been sent into our ans of the senses; but because these organs have trans which has occasioned the mind, in virtue of its innate power, to for passes from external objects to the soul except certain motions of matter (_ures which they produce, are conceived by us as they exist in the sensory organs, as I have fully explained in my ”Dioptrics”; whence it follows that even the ideas of ures are innate (_naturellement en nous_) And, _a fortiori_, the ideas of pain, of colours, of sounds, and of all sis must be innate, in order that the mind may represent them to itself, on the occasion of certain motions of matter hich they have no resemblance”
Whoever denies what is, in fact, an inconceivable proposition, that sensations pass, as such, from the external world into the mind, must admit the conclusion here laid down by Descartes, that, strictly speaking, sensations, and _a fortiori_, all the other contents of the mind, are innate Or, to state the matter in accordance with the views previously expounded, that they are products of the inherent properties of the thinking organ, in which they lie potentially, before they are called into existence by their appropriate causes
But if all the contents of the mind are innate, what is meant by experience?