Part 5 (2/2)

When a red light flashes across the field of vision, there arises in the mind an ”impression of sensation”--which we call red It appears towhich ether independently of any other impression, or idea, as an individual existence It is perfectly conceivable that a sentient being should have no sense but vision, and that he should have spent his existence in absolute darkness, with the exception of one solitary flash of red light That ive him the impression under consideration; and the whole content of his consciousness ht be that impression; and, if he were endoiththe state of affairs, suppose a second flash of red light to follow the first If there were no memory of the latter, the state of the mind on the second occasion would simply be a repetition of that which occurred before There would be merely another impression

But suppose enerated; then, if the supposed sentient being were like ourselves, there ether new i of the _succession_ of the two i of their _similarity_

Yet a third case is conceivable Suppose two flashes of red light to occur together, then a third feeling ht arise which is neither succession nor similarity, but that which we call _co-existence_

These feelings, or their contraries, are the foundation of everything that we call a relation They are nodescribed than sensations are; and, as it appears to me, they are as little susceptible of analysis into sis of pleasure and pain, they are ultimate irresolvable facts of conscious experience; and, if we follow the principle of Hume's nomenclature, they must be called _impressions of relation_ But it must be remembered, that they differ fro the pre-existence of at least two of the latter Though devoid of the slightest reseenerated by theard them as a kind of impressions of impressions; or as the sensations of an inner sense, which takes cognizance of the materials furnished to it by the outer senses

Hunise the elementary character of impressions of relation; and, when he discusses relations, he falls into a chaos of confusion and self-contradiction

In the _Treatise_, for exauity in time and space, and cause and effect, are said to be the ”uniting principles a quality by which one idea naturally introduces another” Hume affirms that--

”These qualities produce an association a ideas, and upon the appearance of one idea naturally introduce another” They are ”the principles of union or cohesion aination, supply the place of that inseparable connection by which they are united in our memory Here is a kind of _attraction_, which, in the mental world, will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to show itself in as many and as various forms Its effects are everywhere conspicuous; but, as to its causes they are inal_ qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to explain”--(I p 29)

And at the end of this section Hust the effects of this union or association of ideas, there are none more remarkable than those coht and reasoning, and generally arise fro our simple ideas These complex ideas may be resolved into _relations_, _modes_, and _substances_”--(_Ibid_)

In the next section, which is devoted to _Relations_, they are spoken of as qualities ”by which two ideas are connected together in the iination,” or ”which make objects admit of comparison,” and seven kinds of relation are enumerated, namely, _resemblance_, _identity_, _space and tirees of quality_, _contrariety_, and _cause and effect_

To the reader of Hume, whose conceptions are usually so clear, definite, and consistent, it is as unsatisfactory as it is surprising to y in a s, for example, resemblance, is first called a ”quality of an idea,” and secondly a ”complex idea” Surely it cannot be both Ideas which have the qualities of ”reseuity, and cause and effect,” are said to ”attract one another” (save the h, in a subsequent part of the _Treatise_, Hureat effort is to prove that the relation of cause and effect is a particular case of the process of association; that is to say, is a result of the process of which it is supposed to be the cause Moreover, since, as Hu in ideas save copies of iuity, and so on, in the idea, must have existed in the impression of which that idea is a copy; and therefore they must be either sensations or emotions--from both of which classes they are excluded

In fact, in one place, Huht into the real nature of relations Speaking of equality, in the sense of a relation of quantity, he says--

”Since equality is a relation, it is not, strictly speaking, a property in the figures themselves, but arises merely from the comparison which the mind makes between them”--(I p 70)

That is to say, when two iures are present, there arises in the mind a _tertium quid_, which is the perception of equality On his own principles, Hu the ideas of reflection However, as we have seen, he expressly excludes everything but the eroup

It is necessary therefore to araphy of the mind” by the excision of one territory and the addition of another; and the elementary states of consciousness will stand thus:--

A IMPRESSIONS

A Sensations of _a_ Sht

_e_ Touch

_f_ Resistance (the muscular sense)

B Pleasure and Pain

C Relations

_a_ Co-existence

_b_ Succession

_c_ Similarity and dissimilarity

B IDEAS