Part 4 (2/2)
But there is more than a parallel, there is a close and intiy No one doubts that, at any rate, some mental states are dependent for their existence on the perforans There is no seeing without eyes, and no hearing without ears If the origin of the contents of the mind is truly a philosophical problem, then the philosopher who atte hient conception of his business than the physiologist, who thinks he can discuss locomotion, without an acquaintance with the principles of mechanics; or respiration, without soround we tery is entitled to the saation which elucidates the true relations of the one set of phenomena will discover those of the other Hence, as philosophy is, in great ical consequences of certain data established by psychology; and as psychology itself differs from physical science only in the nature of its subject-ation, it would seem to be an obvious conclusion, that philosophers are likely to be successful in their inquiries, in proportion as they are familiar with the application of scientific method to less abstruse subjects; just as it seems to require no elaborate demonstration, that an astronomer, ishes to comprehend the solar system, would do well to acquire a preliminary acquaintance with the elements of physics And it is accordant with this presumption, that the men who have made the most important positive additions to philosophy, such as Descartes, Spinoza, and Kant, not to mention more recent examples, have been deeply imbued with the spirit of physical science; and, in soely acquainted with its details On the other hand, the founder of Positivism no less admirably illustrates the connexion of scientific incapacity with philosophical incompetence In truth, the laboratory is the fore-court of the temple of philosophy; and whoso has not offered sacrifices and undergone purification there, has little chance of admission into the sanctuary
Obvious as these considerations nore the fact that their force is by no means universally adical and physiological training to the student of philosophy is denied, on the one hand, by the ”pureupon supposed necessary and universal truths, and assert that scientific observation is impossible unless such truths are already known or implied: which, to those who are not ”pure metaphysicians,” seems very much as if one should say that the fall of a stone cannot be observed, unless the law of gravitation is already in the mind of the observer
On the other hand, the Positivists, so far as they accept the teachings of their master, roundly assert, at any rate in words, that observation of theinherently iy is a chis of theology Nevertheless, if M Coic cerebrale,” except that which other people call ”psychology;” and how he knew anything about the functions of the brain, except by that very ”observation interieure,” which he declares to be an absurdity--it seems probable that he would have found it hard to escape the ady, he had been propounding solereatest nised the fact that philosophy is based upon psychology; and that the inquiry into the contents and the operations of the mind must be conducted upon the saation, if what he calls the ”moral philosopher” would attain results of as firm and definite a character as those which reward the ”natural philosopher”[14] The title of his first work, a ”_Treatise of Hu an Atte into Moral Subjects_,”
sufficiently indicates the point of view froarded philosophical problems; and he tells us in the preface, that his object has been to promote the construction of a ”science of man”
”'Tis evident that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature; and that, however wide any of them may seee or another
Even _Matheion_ are in some measure dependent on the science of MAN; since they lie under the cognizance of ed of by their powers and qualities 'Tis iht hly acquainted with the extent and force of hu, and could explain the nature of the ideas we es Toequally unknown to us with that of external bodies, it must be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers and qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and the observation of those particular effects which result froh we must endeavour to render all our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experi all effects from the sio beyond experience; and any hypothesis that pretends to discover the ultiht at first to be rejected as presumptuous and chi ultimate principles should be esteemed a defect in the science of man, I will venture to affirm, that it is a defect common to it with all the sciences, and all the arts, in which we can employ ourselves, whether they be such as are cultivated in the schools of the philosophers, or practised in the shops of the o beyond experience, or establish any principles which are not founded on that authority Moral philosophy has, indeed, this peculiar disadvantage, which is not found in natural, that in collecting its experiments, it cannot make them purposely, with premeditation, and after such aevery particular difficulty which may arise When I am at a loss to know the effects of one body upon another in any situation, I need only put them in that situation, and observe what results from it But should I endeavour to clear up in the sa myself in the same case with that which I consider, 'tis evident this reflection and premeditation would so disturb the operation of my natural principles, as must render it impossible to form any just conclusion frolean up our experiments in this science from a cautious observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common course of the world, by men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures Where experiments of this kind are judiciously collected and compared, we may hope to establish on them a science which will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility, to any other of human comprehension”--(I pp 7-11)
All science starts with hypotheses--in other words, with assumptions that are unproved, while they may be, and often are, erroneous; but which are better than nothing to the seeker after order in the ress of every science depends on the criticis off, that is, of their untrue or superfluous parts--until there remains only that exact verbal expression of as much as we know of the fact, and no more, which constitutes a perfect scientific theory
Philosophy has followed the saation Theby Descartes consisted in this: that he laid the foundation of modern philosophical criticism by his inquiry into the nature of certainty It is a clear result of the investigation started by Descartes, that there is one thing of which no doubt can be entertained, for he who should pretend to doubt it would thereby prove its existence; and that is the ; that is safe, even if all other kinds of certainty are merely more or less probable inferences Berkeley and Locke, each in his way, applied philosophical criticism in other directions; but they always, at any rate professedly, followed the Cartesianno propositions to be true but such as are clear, distinct, and evident, even while their arguments stripped off reat predecessor had left untouched No one has more clearly stated the aie of the fa_, which, perhaps, I ought to assulish readers, but which so probably is unknown to this full-craeneration that I venture to cite it:
”If by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding I can discover the powers thereof, how far they reach, to what things they are in any degree proportionate, and where they fail us, I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy s exceeding its comprehension: to stop when it is at the utnorance of those things which, upon examination, are proved to be beyond the reach of our capacities We should not then, perhaps, be so forward, out of an affectation of universal knowledge, to raise questions and perplex ourselves and others with disputes about things to which our understandings are not suited, and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear and distinct perception, or whereof (as it has, perhaps, too often happened) we have not any notion at all Men may find matter sufficient to busy their heads and eht, and satisfaction, if they will not boldly quarrel with their own constitution and throay the blessings their hands are filled with because they are not big enough to grasp everything We shall not have much reason to complain of the narrowness of our minds, if ill but employ them about what may be of use to us: for of that they are very capable: and it will be an unpardonable, as well as a childish peevishness, if we under-value the advantages of our knowledge, and neglect to iiven us, because there are sos that are set out of the reach of it It will be no excuse to an idle and untoward servant ould not attend to his business by candlelight, to plead that he had not broad sunshi+ne The candle that is set up in us shi+nes bright enough for all our purposes Our business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our conduct”[16]
Hume develops the same fundamental conception in a somewhat different way, and with a more definite indication of the practical benefits which may be expected from a critical philosophy The first and second parts of the twelfth section of the _Inquiry_ are devoted to a condemnation of excessive scepticism, or Pyrrhonism, hich Hume couples a caricature of the Cartesian doubt; but, in the third part, a certain ”ated scepticism” is recommended and adopted, under the title of ”acadee of the infir, even in its most perfect state, and when most accurate and cautious in its deterated_ scepticise to mankind, and which maybe the natural result of the PYRRHONIAN doubts and scruples, is the limitation of our inquiries to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of huination_ of hted hatever is re, without control, into the most distant parts of space and time in order to avoid the objects which custo all distant and high inquiries, confines itself to common life, and to such subjects as fall under daily practice and experience; leaving the more sublime topics to the embellishment of poets and orators, or to the arts of priests and politicians To bring us to so salutary a deter can be hly convinced of the force of the PYRRHONIAN doubt, and of the i power of natural instinct could free us from it Those who have a propensity to philosophy will still continue their researches; because they reflect, that, besides the i such an occupation, philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of common life, o beyond co as they consider the imperfection of those faculties which they employ, their narrow reach, and their inaccurate operations
While we cannot give a satisfactory reason e believe, after a thousand experiments, that a stone will fall or fire burn; can we ever satisfy ourselves concerning any deterin of worlds and the situation of nature from and to eternity?”--(IV pp 189--90)
But further, it is the business of criticisaries of philosophy, but to do the duty of police in the whole world of thought Wherever it espies sophistry or superstition they are to be bidden to stand; nay, they are to be followed to their very dens and there apprehended and exterminated, as Othello smothered Desdemona, ”else she'll betray more men”
Hume warms into eloquence as he sets forth the labours e of the Hercules of ”ated scepticism”
”Here, indeed, lies the justest and ainst a considerable part of metaphysics, that they are not properly a science, but arise either from the fruitless efforts of human vanity, which would penetrate into subjects utterly inaccessible to the understanding, or fro unable to defend the brambles to cover and protect their weakness Chased from the open country, these robbers fly into the forest, and lie in wait to break in upon every unguarded avenue of the ious fears and prejudices The stoutest antagonist, if he reh cowardice and folly, open the gates to the enely receive thens
”But is this a sufficient reason why philosophers should desist from such researches and leave superstition still in possession of her retreat? Is it not proper to draw an opposite conclusion, and perceive the necessity of carrying the war into the most secret recesses of the ene at once from these abstruse questions, is to inquire seriously into the nature of hu, and show, from an exact analysis of its powers and capacity, that it is by no means fitted for such reue, in order to live at ease ever after; and must cultivate true metaphysics with some care, in order to destroy the false and adulterated”--(IV pp 10, 11)
Near a century and a half has elapsed since these brave words were shaped by David Hu the war into the enens, it long languished for want of a good base of operations But since physical science, in the course of the last fifty years, has brought to the front an inexhaustible supply of heavy artillery of a new pattern, warranted to drive solid bolts of fact through the thickest skulls, things are looking better; though hardly s of the dawn of the happy day, when superstition and false metaphysics shall be no more and reasonable folks may ”live at ease,” are as yet discernible by the _enfants perdus_ of the outposts
If, in thus conceiving the object and the limitations of philosophy, Hume shows himself the spiritual child and continuator of the work of Locke, he appears no less plainly as the parent of Kant and as the protagonist of that nosticism,” from its profession of an incapacity to discover the indispensable conditions of either positive or negative knowledge, in ar, but philosophers of the uine sort, revel in the luxury of unqualified assurance
The aim of the _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_ is essentially the same as that of the _Treatise of Human Nature_, by which indeed Kant was led to develop that ”critical philosophy” hich his name and fame are indissolubly bound up: and, if the details of Kant's criticism differ from those of Hume, they coincide with them in their e of reality to the world of phenomena revealed to us by experience
The philosopher of Konigsberg epitomises the philosopher of Ninewells when he thus sureatest and perhaps the sole use of all philosophy of pure reason is, after all, anon for the enlargee], but as a discipline for its deli truth, has only theerror”[17]
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