Part 9 (1/2)

He trusted that no demands would bewould be done to recognize effectually the obligation of all to contribute to the co contributions of money as well as of men to the navy And Mr Brodrick for the War Office proposed that one-fourth of the existing colonial militias should be specially trained {201} and earestions rant 50,000 a year and Natal 35,000 to the maintenance of the navy, while Australia[3] and New Zealand increased their grants for the maintenance of the Australasian squadron respectively to 200,000 and 60,000 a year Canada declined to rant or promise of the kind desired Her representatives stated that their objections arose, not so much from the expense involved, as from a belief that acceptance of the proposals would entail an iovernreat a factor in the pronized, however, the need ofwealth and population of the country They were prepared, in the development of their own militia system, to take upon Canada the services formerly borne by the Imperial Govern a naval reserve on the coasts

Mr Brodrick's proposal to have a special body of troops earmarked for imperial service was endorsed by the sly rejected by the nation-states, Australia and Canada The latter countries were of the opinion 'that the best course to pursue was to endeavour to raise the standard of training for the general body of their forces, leaving it to the colony, when the need arose, to determine how and to what extent it should render assistance To establish a special force, set apart for general imperial service, and practically under the absolute control of the Iating frooverneneral ianization of their defence forces'

Thus, so far as the Doreater outlay for defence, they desired to make that outlay as they made all other expenditure, under the direction and control of their own Governments Itdecade,{203} this line? The reasons were ross vast continental wildernesses, a task more costly than outside opinion often realized, a task which rose to such proportions that the per capita burden of taxation on the Canadian becalishman for navy, army, social reform, and all other expenditure Then, too, there was the old colonialisht acquired under different conditions, which, by force of momentuh Canada had ceased to be a 'possession' and was e into nationhood, she awoke but slowly to the idea of taking up her own burden of defence There was the lack of any pressing danger The British navy was still unchallenged in its suprehbour as fast becoarded by so as much a protection in case of Gerh doubtless most Canadians, if put to the test, would have refused to accept such patronizing protection as that afforded by the Monroe Doctrine; the {204} day had not yet come, however, when the similar refusal of the South A, however benevolent, was to lead to the transfor quasi-alliance of pan-Aly advanced by Sir Charles Tupper and others, that if Canada were independent the United Kingdom would require not a shi+p the less to protect its world-wide trade True; and few Canadians saw the equal truth that in such a case Canada would require many a shi+p the more

And if it see from the experience of others could make it, that an independent Canada would have been involved in wars of her own, it was also certain, as an actual fact, that through her connection with Britain she had been involved in wars that were not her own All such ideas and forces not only ran counter to Mr Cha-block in the path of any rapid progress in defence upon national lines The unwillingness of the British authorities to sanction Do thepath

As to commercial relations, Mr Chamberlain {205} stated that his ideal was 'free trade within the Eainst all foreign countries This proposal met with no support None of the colonies was prepared to open its dom For the present, protection was their universal policy It was recommended, however, that those colonies which had not done so should follow Canada's exaoods, and that the United Kingdorant a preference to the colonies by exemption from or reduction of duties then or thereafter imposed Mr Chaiven by Canada The Canadianthe unfairness of his conclusion The preference, which had been increased to thirty-three and a third per cent, and made to apply specifically to Great Britain and to such other parts of the Empire as would reciprocate, had not only arrested the previous steady decline in irowth in these irant some increased preference if Britain would reciprocate These proposals for reciprocal {206} preference turned upon the fact that, as a war revenue measure, the British Govern a quarter upon wheat A few months later the tax was abolished, and reciprocal preference again beca the way in theof a resolution favouring cheap postage rates on newspapers and periodicals between different parts of the Empire

Already in 1898, Canada had lowered the rates on letters to any part of the Empire from five to two cents per half-ounce, and her example had been widely followed

For the much cry there was little wool Neither in trade nor in political relations had Mr Chaement, and in defence matters only small and precarious advance had been made towards centralization Mr Chamberlain did not conceal his disappointment In Sir Wilfrid Laurier he hadpurposes and beliefs, equally adroit in argument, and much better informed than himself in the lessons of the Empire's past and in the public opinion overseas on questions of the day He was plainly inclined to attribute {207} the policy of the Canadian pri this, Sir Wilfrid suggested that he should invite the other Canadian ministers to a private conference Mr Chaestion with alacrity; a dinner was arranged; and hours of discussion followed To his surprise Mr Chamberlain soon found that the four responsible Canadian ministers of the Crown, all of British stock, two of Nova Scotia and two of Ontario, took precisely the same stand that their French-Canadian leader had land, and were all determined to retain Canada's connection with the Empire

But, as Canadians first, they believed, as did Mr Chaan at home The outcome was that the colonial secretary perceived the hopelessness of endeavour along the lines of political or military centralization, and henceforth concentrated upon commerce The Chamberlain policy of imperial preferential trade, which eventually took shape as a can for protection, was a direct result of the Conference of 1902

It is not without interest to note that the policy of the Canadian prime minister as to {208} political and defence relations was not once called in question by the leader of the Opposition when parliament nextwill of the people of Canada, whether they willed aright or erringly

Wethese years between Canada and the neighbouring land which Canadians kneell

In 1896, when the Liberal Government took office, there still re hbour; and as yet there seerounds for hope that they could be discussed in an aain to power, and presently their new tariff out-M'Kinleyed the M'Kinley Act of 1890, raising the duties, which the Deher level than fore the provincial bumptiousness of the Ah there had been a reaction in the country from President Cleveland's fulminations of 1895 on the Venezuelan question--or to arouse towards Great Britain or Canada the deeper feelings of friendshi+p {209} which coue and common blood should have inspired Moreover, the special difficulty that faces all negotiations with the United States, the division of power between President and Congress, remained in full intensity, for President M'Kinley made the scrupulous observance of the constitutional limits of his authority the first article in his political creed In Canada a still rankling antagonism bred of the Venezuelan episode made the situation all the worse Yet the otiation ih Commission was appointed, which opened its sessions at Quebec in August 1898 Lord Herschell, representing the United Kingdom, acted as chairht, Sir Louis Davies, and John Charlton represented Canada

Sir James Winter sat for Newfoundland and Senator Fairbanks, Senator Gray, Congresse for the United States The Commission sat at Quebec until October and adjourned to ton in November There it continued its sessions and approached a solution of ive {210} per goods through in bond, to abolish the unneighbourly alien labour laws, to provide that Canadian sealers should give up their rights in Bering Sea for a e for a measure of reciprocity in natural products and in a limited list of manufactures But the question of the Alaskan boundary proved insoluble, and the Com and often uncertain border between Canada and the United States proper had been defined and accepted Only the boundary between Canada and Alaska remained in dispute There was a difference of opinion as to theof certain words in the treaty of 1825 which defined, or purported to define, the boundary between British and Russian Aave Russia a panhandle strip of coast half-way dohat is now British Coluht Alaska in 1867, the purchase of course included this strip of coast As British Colue of this barrier became seriously felt, and repeated attempts were made to have the boundary defined and, if possible, a port awarded to Canada The discovery of gold {211} in the Klondike in 1896 ent The treaty of 1825 provided that north of Portland Channel the boundary should follow the summit of the mountains parallel to the coast, and where these ues fros of the coast at ten leagues' distance Canada contended for an interpretation of this wording which would give her a harbour at the head of one of the fiords which ran far inland, while the United States, following the usual international doctrine that a disadvantage to your neighbour e to yourself, insisted that its spite fence should be as high and as gateless as possible

The main point of difference between the two countries was as to the way of settling the dispute The United States proposed a commission of three representatives fro, such a commission is perhaps most satisfactory, at least for a permanent body, as the experience of the Waterways Commission has since shown But for a temporary purpose, and in the spirit which then existed, the Canadian negotiators knew too well that such a board {212} could reach a decision only by the weakening of one of the British ed, therefore, that a board of three arbitrators should be appointed, one of them an international jurist of repute who should act as umpire This was the course which the United States had insisted upon in the case of Venezuela, but as sauce for the Venezuelan goose was not sauce for the Alaskan gander The United States asserted that the Canadian case had been trumped up in view of the Klondike discoveries, and would not accept any medium of settleht or wrong, the claim of Canada would be rejected

The deadlock in this issue proved hopeless, and the Commission's labours ended without definite result upon any point for the ti the statesmen of each country a better idea of the views and problems of the other, and had contributed not a little to the final solution or the final forgetting that the proble Mr, now Lord, Bryce's terton, reed upon were taken up and ereements, accepted by {213} both countries When the new era of neighbourliness dawned, a few years later, so ceased to have any more importance than the yard or two of land once in dispute between farmers who have since realized the folly of line-fence lawsuits

After the adjournreed upon a temporary Alaskan boundary-line for purposes of administration, and it was not until early in 1903 that a treaty for the settleed between Great Britain and the United States and accepted by Canada

By this treaty the American proposal of a commission of three reed to this plan with the greatest reluctance, urging to the last that arbitration with an outside uly, however, fairness was secured by a clause in the treaty which provided that the members should be 'impartial jurists of repute, who shall consider judicially the questions submitted to them, and each of whom shall first subscribe an oath that he will iuments and evidence {214} sub to his true judgreed to abandon its former position, that in any case territory then settled by Aiven up That the United States risked nothing by withdrawing this safeguard became clear when the American commissioners were named--Elihu Root, a member of President Roosevelt's Cabinet, which had declined to e, who had only a few months before declared the Canadian contention a manufactured and baseless claiton, the state which was eager to retain a monopoly of the Klondike trade

Undoubtedly these were able men, but not impartial jurists In the words of an Ahtfulness of Canada's claim are about the same as the prospect of a thaw in Hades'

The Doainst these appointments

The British Government expressed surprise, but held that it would be useless to protest, and suggested that it was best to follow this example and appoint British representatives {215} of a siestion, and carried out her part honourably by no as arbitrators, to sit with the lord chief justice of England, Lord Alverstone, Mr Justice Armour of the Canadian Supree of the Superior Court of Quebec Later, on the death of Mr Justice Armour, Mr (now Sir Allen) Aylesworth, KC, was appointed in his place

The case was admirably presented by both sides, and all the evidence clearly marshalled Late in October the decision of the tribunal was announced Aof Lord Alverstone and the three American members, had decided substantially in favour of the United States Sir Louis Jette and Mr Aylesworth declined to sign the award, and declared it in part a 'grotesque travesty of justice'

In Canada the decision met with a storm of disapproval which was much misunderstood abroad, in Great Britain and still more in the United States It was not the petulant outburst of a disappointed litigant