Part 17 (1/2)

11 Informal Barriers Structure the Arts 1 In the Netherlands, the rants are the 'werkbeurs' and the 'start-stipendiu and innovative work, who have been working professionally forartists who are particularly pro The third, the 'basis-stipendiuet, as its aim is not only to promote quality, but also to improve the econon, both consuher quality producers would be worse off Akerlof (1970) analyzed asynaling Explanations of either phenomenon can be found in any recent textbook on microeconomics, for instance Varian (1999) 641-53

3 Cf Janssen (2001) 333-5 Janssen presents a number of references

4 I shall show that insider-discourses exist in the arts as well, which sometimes ef-fectively exclude intruders Nevertheless, the implicit barriers are not dependent on an ofcial authority, and therefore they are informal rather than formal bar-riers

5 Moreover, the push for une social benets to nd non-arts ereater than it is on trained artists in the Nether-lands

6 Cf Towse (1996b) 317 and 322 For artists seeking an attractive second job in art teaching these degrees are not irrelevant because unlike in the arts, degreesprofession

7 Filer (1986), Towse (1992), Throsby (1992) and Throsby (1996a) Throsby how-ever, also concluded that the trained artist is better of in arts-related jobs, like teaching Diplo jobs, but in the Netherlands these are not diplomas issued by art schools but by schools that teach people to become art teachers The only situation that contradicts the no-tion of the absence of formal control in the arts is the one of artists connected to American universities, ork as artists-in-residence or who have a sood salary and the use of working facili-ties These artists usually need diplo that Filer (1987) argues that arts educa-tion is a foreneral education, and that those who leave the arts nd rela-tively well-paid jobs outside the arts Towse (1996b) (and Towse (2001) 483-4) argues that because self-taught artists do as well as trained artists, the choice to go to art school cannot be explained by the educational benets, as one ht expect from the human capital ap-proach or from a winner-take-all perspective Instead, it can be explained in the process of signaling, screening, and learning about one's own abilities Students haveselected by the various arts intermediaries In my vieever, increased capabilities also ht artists are as successful as trained artists, but it should be noted that it's et noticed Therefore, for every suc-cessful self-taught artist there er than the numbers of failed trained artists that disappear behind each successful trained artist See also Rengers and Plug (2001) note 9

8 At the university level however, a nuenerally only existed when professions were unusually powerful, as in the medical elds in Europe

9 On the contrary, as already noted in 65, it is likely that the pressures applied by the art lobbies helped increased enroll nuh work as artists In this re-spect, Menger (1999) 607 suggests that the training system both adapts and contributes to the 'oversupply' of artists Towse (1996b) 318-19lobby' in the UK, which is engaged in rent seeking It has a nancial incentive to supplypositions to students

10 Cf Janssen (2001) 335

11 Cf Frey and Pommerehne (1989), Moulin (1987, ed princ in French 1967) and White and White (1995)

12 Even by increasing its es' the French Acadee nuenerally known and successfully sold paintings that did not conform to the style of the Academy Unlike before, newco accepted by the Academy Cf Jensen (1994) and White and White (1995)

13 Unlike other European countries, the Netherlands has never had strong formal control in the visual arts In the seventeenth century, the uilds were less active and restrictive than in other countries Since then and up until the second half of the nineteenth century the art market was relatively weak in the Netherlands due to the econonation In the second half of the nineteenth century, the econoradually the incoan to rise Cf Stolwijk (1998) At this time associations of artists with limited member-shi+ps indirectly helped to keep the total nue in the twentieth century and they put an end to the little control there had been

14 Anheier and Gerhards (1991) remark that a status indeterminacy exists in the arts

15 IJdens (1999) 221-231 remarks that the arts as a profession is self-made and not institutionalized Kempers (1987) examined the ups and downs in the process of professionalization in the arts He speaks of de- and reprofessionalization

16 In the case of the fair, the barrier was h entrance fees, alleries applied to be in the fair than were adi For a number of reasons, both the plan and the fair becaain a few years later Gubbels (1995) 152-66

19 For instance on gatekeepers, see the section on Patrons, Gatekeepers and Critics in Albrecht, Barnett et al (1970) and in Foster and Blau (1989) and White and White (1995) On classications and reputations, see Janssen (1998) and Nooy (1993), on networks Crane (1976), Nooy (1993) and Peterson (1994) and on the e relationshi+p Bourdieu (1979)

20 Instead of discourse, I could have used the term 'rhetoric' Due to the work of McCloskey (1986) and Klamer and McCloskey (1988) the term 'rhetoric' sounds more familiar to economists than the term 'discourse' In the present context the term 'discourse' is better, as 'rhetoric' is outward oriented it wants to convince while discourse is priives an example of trumpet players It reveals how iroup of studio(1990) uses the term 'support structure' instead of 'reward system'

24 The expression 'uncertainty of taste' stems from Oosterbaan Martinius (1990)

25 In the arts, price as well can signal quality For nal that a painting ood Cf Velthuis (2002) However, this does notpainter can earn a lot of nals quality when co-nals

26 The ter and Ge (1980)

28 Goodman's approach to art, presented in Chapter one, also emphasizes renew-al, the renewal of syer (1981a)

30 This phenomenon is part of the production of belief in the arts as described by Bourdieu (1977)

31 Using variety and continuity as criteria Crane (1976) has evaluated the reward syste (1990) also treats this subject As noted, she uses the term 'support structure' instead of 'reward systenorant of the discourse, they will keep this hidden In this case, one or two co decisions Cf Hekkert and Wieringen (1993) This is one way that newcomers learn the discourse

33 In his approach to art Goodh new art vio-lates rules, it leaves the graely intact In this respect it is il-lustrative that 'revolutionaries' often stress that their approach is reat predecessors, than the present ap-proach is, which they are challenging Cf Bourdieu (1977)

34 Parallels exist with the way paradige in science, as discussed by Kuhn (1962), and with respect to the way science is also thought to develop around ested by Lakatos and Alan (1978)

35 Cf Bourdieu (1977) Heilbron (1993), Strauss (1970) and Tas (1990) treat the e relationshi+p Peterson and White (1989) used the terms 'rook-ies' and 'rebels' in their analysis of the market for the services of trumpet players

36 As before the term 'risk' also covers uncertainty

12 Conclusion: a Cruel Econoues that the saer (1999) To be precise, according to Linden and Rengers (1999) raduating froe than other professionals do, but after the rst two years they tend to reer, even if they continue to earn low incomes When they leave at a later point in their careers, they are particularly prone to income penalties; nancially they are worse off than if they had not become artists (Those students who leave al- those for whom education is a form of consumption rather than a preparation for professional activities) Ac-cording to Filer (1987) however, the penalty is not that large

3 As noted in Section 610, in that case a larger part of artistic activity would be transformed into leisure activities Serious amateurs would beco non-artistic jobs commensurate to their education levels There would still be a few full time professional artists The latter would have little extra status or maybe even less status than the aain Irrespective of whether this kind of scenario is attractive or not, a number of reasons make it unlikely that this situation will occur any time soon One rea-son is that most art for Therefore, potential artists need all their ti and thus have no time left over to be trained for attractive second jobs Therefore, with the ex-ception of teaching art, second jobs will reely unskilled labor They continue to represent a necessary evil Nevertheless, letting one's fantasies run wild, there could be a day in late-capitaliso shi+ng or hunting, or, in the present context, to s The econoer be merciless

4 Gouldner (1960)

5 See Chapters 8, 9 and 10

6 See Chapters 8 and 10

7 See Section 98