Part 10 (1/2)
It was reinforced by the large mollycoddle vote--the people who are soft physically and morally, or who have a twist in the as they can be so with safety to their bodies In addition there are the good people with no iht, who think ill not come, but that if it does coe element, typified by a Senator I knew personally who, in a public speech, in answer to a question as to ould do if America were suddenly assailed by a first-class military power, answered that ”ould build a battle-shi+p in every creek” Then, a and genuine fashi+on strive earnestly for peace, there are the foolish fanatics always to be found in such ait--the e in all reforetherthe decades i the Civil War as to put a stop to any serious effort to keep the Nation in a condition of reasonable military preparedness The representatives of this opinion then voted just as they nohen they vote against battle-shi+ps or against fortifying the Panah if we had been content to be weak, and, in view of our weakness, not to bluster But ere not content with such a policy We wished to enjoy the incoue and an unready hand
There was a very large elenorant of our h, unable to understand it; and another large ele to offensive talk about foreign nations Accordingly, too ress, found that the cheap and easy thing to do was to please the foolish peace people by keeping us weak, and to please the foolish violent people by passing denunciatory resolutions about international matters--resolutions which would have been i Their idea was to please both the mollycoddle vote and the vote of the international tail-twisters by upholding, with pretended ardor and ence, a National policy of peace with insult
I abhor unjust war I abhor injustice and bullying by the strong at the expense of the weak, whether a nations or individuals I abhor violence and bloodshed I believe that war should never be resorted to when, or so long as, it is honorably possible to avoid it I respect all h motives and with sanity and self-respect do all they can to avert war I advocate preparation for war in order to avert war; and I should never advocate war unless it were the only alternative to dishonor I describe the folly of which so uilty, in order that we ainst similar folly
We did not at the tin duties seriously, and as we combined bluster in speech with refusal to make any preparation whatsoever for action, ere not taken seriously in return Gradually a slight change for the better occurred, the writings of Captain Mahan playing no small part therein We built some modern cruisers to start with; the people who felt that battle-shi+ps icked co that the cruisers could be used ”to protect our commerce”--which they could not be, unless they had battle-shi+ps to back the vessels, and as there was a section of the public which regarded battle-shi+ps as possessing a na the new shi+ps ar them combine with exquisite nicety all the defects and none of the virtues of both types Then we got to the point of building battle-shi+ps But there still remained a public opinion, as old as the tiht that in the event of war all our proble except repel attack; an attitude about as sensible as that of a prize-fighter who expected to win by
To e class of well- people, we provided for the battle-shi+ps under the na thereby that we did not ht to have been, or with quite as ht to have had Then we decided to build real battle-shi+ps But there still re to the coast defense theory, and wecoast defense battle-shi+ps”--the fact that the na of very set real battle-shi+ps
Our ly and in fleet formation, and they had to be trained to use the neeapons of precision hich the shi+ps were armed Not a few of the older officers, kept in the service under our foolish rule of pure seniority promotion, were not competent for the task; but a proportion of the older officers were excellent, and this was true of aler officers They were naturally first-class men, trained in the admirable naval school at Annapolis They were overjoyed that at last they were given proper instrurew to handle these shi+ps individually in the best fashi+on They were fast learning to handle them in squadron and fleet formation; but when the ith Spain broke out, they had as yet hardly grasped the principles of an work as assistant Secretary of the Navy I became convinced that the ould coth until conditions in the island had becorace to us for per them to exist There is much that I sincerely admire about the Spanish character; and there are few entleovern her colonies on archaic principles which rendered her control of them incompatible with the advance of humanity and intolerable to the conscience of ed along for years with unspeakable horror, degradation, and misery It was not ”war” at all, butthose years, while we continued at ”peace,” several hundred times as many lives were lost, lives ofthe three hter and opened a career of peaceful progress to the Cubans Yet there were uided professional philanthropists who cared so much more for names than for facts that they preferred a ”peace” of continuous ht real peace Spain's humiliation was certain, anyhow; indeed, it was more certain without war than with it, for she could not per to the Cubans reat, because of the Cuban tobacco and sugar, and especially because of Cuba's relation to the projected Isthreater were our interests from the standpoint of humanity
Cuba was at our very doors It was a dreadful thing for us to sit supinely and watch her death agony It was our duty, even more from the standpoint of National honor than from the standpoint of National interest, to stop the devastation and destruction Because of these considerations I favored war; and to-day, when in retrospect it is easier to see things clearly, there are few humane and honorable men who do not believe that the as both just and necessary
The big financiers and the enerally ere susceptible to touch on thefor National honor if it conflicted even teainst the war The reed with them The newspapers controlled by, or run in the interests of, these two classes deprecated war, and did everything in their power to prevent any preparation for war As a whole the people in Congress were at that tiards international matters There were a few an, who did look ahead; and Senator H C Lodge, who throughout his quarter of a century of service in the Senate and House has ever stood forehted fearlessness and strict justice to others our national honor and interest; but ressmen were content to follow the worst of all possible courses, that is, to pass resolutions which made war more likely, and yet to decline to take measures which would enable us to meet the war if it did come
[] In a letter written me just before I became assistant Secretary, Senator Davis unburdened his mind about one of the foolish ”peace” proposals of that period; his letter running in part: ”I left the Senate Cha on a deal ofover the treaty by which the United States is to be bound to arbitrate its sovereign functions--for policies are nty
The aberrations of the social ression They represent reat orbit Tennyson knew this when he wrote that fine and noble 'Maud' I often read it, for to do so doesone of Poe's stories the letter continues: ”The world will coht Let him who believes in the decline of thethe recess or the noon hour Of course when American patriotism speaks out from its rank and file and demands action or expression, and when, thereupon, the 'business man,' so called, places his hand on his stack of reds as if he feared a policeame, and protests until American patriotism ceases to continue to speak as it had started to do--why, you and I get mad, and I swear I hope you will be with us here after March 4 We can then pass judge in hopes that I believe are prophetic”
However, in the Navy Departy and ability of soood tone of the service I soon found my natural friends and allies in such ht, Brownson, Schroeder, Bradford, Cowles, Cameron, Winslow, O'Neil, and others like them I used all the power there was inthe ather from every source infor positions
Sound naval opinion was overwhelly in favor of Dewey to co him, for I had been struck by an incident in his past career It was at a time when there was threat of trouble with Chile Deas off the Argentine, and was told to get ready to move to the other coast of South America If the move became necessary, he would have to have coal, and yet if he did not make the move, the coal would not be needed In such a case a ulations and coet authority for everything he does; and therefore he usually acco whatever, but is able to satisfy all individuals with red-tape ulations In a crisis, the man worth his salt is the man who meets the needs of the situation in whatever way is necessary Dewey purchased the coal and was ready to move at once if need arose The affair blew over; the need to move did not occur; and for soet into trouble over having purchased the coal, for our people are like al responsible officers under such conditions to decide at their own personal peril, no her up ultimately stood by Dewey
The incident made me feel that here was a man who could be relied upon to prepare in advance, and to act promptly, fearlessly, and on his own responsibility when the eet him put in command of the Asiatic fleet, the fleet where it wasthings back to the home authorities An officer senior to hi pushed by certain politicians who I knew had influence with the Navy Department and with the President I would have preferred to see Dewey get the appoint to any politician at all But while this was et hiet hie leniency should be observed toward the et hiuns There was a Senator, Proctor of Vermont, who I kneas close to McKinley, and as very ardent for the war, and desirous to have it fought in the ested to Dewey that he should enlist the services of Senator Proctor, which was accordingly done In a fortunate hour for the Nation, Deas given command of the Asiatic squadron
When the Maine was blown up in Havana Harbor, war became inevitable
A number of the peace-at-any-price men of course promptly assuation showed that the explosion was from outside And, in any event, it would have been impossible to prevent war The enlisted rew bored to the point of desertion in peace, becah pitch of efficiency, and crowds of fine young fellows, froed to enlist The navy officers showed alert ability and unwearied industry in getting things ready
There was one deficiency, however, which there was no tie to say, norant Our navy had no idea ho our standard of marksmanshi+p was We had not realized that the modern battle-shi+p had become such a co inbroadside guns themselves Almost the only man in the navy who fully realized this was our naval attache at Paris, Lieutenant Sihtfully backere in marksmanshi+p
I was ht was about the only other man as And as Sims proved to be ht the Spaniards how to shoot, and as the Spaniards proved to be enerally Sih I at first partly acquiesced in this view, I grew uneasy when I studied the small proportion of hits to shots made by our vessels in battle When I was President I took up the matter, and speedily became convinced that we needed to revolutionize our whole training inand introducing the new system; and to hi progress ress which un, at least three ti efficiency, in 1908, as it was in 1902 The shots that hit are the shots that count!
Like the people, the Govern to prepare for war, because so uidedon the war I did not in the least share this feeling, and whenever I was left as Acting Secretary I did everything in my power to put us in readiness I knew that in the event of war Dewey could be slipped like a wolf-hound froiven half a chance he would strike instantly and with telling effect; and I ive him that half-chance should be done I was in the closest touch with Senator Lodge throughout this period, and either consulted hi By the end of February I felt it was vital to send Dewey (as well as each of our other commanders ere not in home waters) instructions that would enable him to be in readiness for immediate action On the afternoon of Saturday, February 25, when I was Acting Secretary, Lodge called onthe order, which (as it was addressed to a ht stamp) was of much importance to the subsequent operations Adraphy:
”The first real step [as regards active naval preparations] was taken on February 25, when telegraphic instructions were sent to the Asiatic, European, and South Atlantic squadrons to rendezvous at certain convenient points where, should war break out, they would be e to the Asiatic squadron bore the signature of that assistant Secretary who had seized the opportunity while Acting Secretary to hasten preparations for a conflict which was inevitable As Mr Roosevelt reasoned, precautions for readiness would cost little in time of peace, and yet would be invaluable in case of war His cablegraton, February 25, '98
”'_Dewey, Hong Kong_:
”'Order the squadron, except the Monocacy, to Hong Kong Keep full of coal In the event of declaration of war Spain, your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in Philippine Islands Keep Olympia until further orders