Part 29 (1/2)
It has often been said by certain gentlemen ere associated with President Wilson on the other side that he was unyielding and dog a ”lone hand,” that he was secretive and exclusive, and that he ignored the members of the Peace Commission and the experts who accompanied him to the Conference
Contrary to this criticism, after an uninterrupted, continuous, and most intimate association with hiht me into close contact with hih which his administration and the nation passed, a time which threw upon the Chief Executive of the nation a task unparalleled in the history of the world, I wish to say that there is no franker or matic in his opinion than Woodrow Wilson In hiuidance is a passion Indeed, the only thing he resents is a lack of frankness upon the part of his friends, and no eously to act and to hold to his opinions after he has obtained the necessary information upon, which he bases his position It is his innate modesty and a certain kind of shyness that people ood fellow in the ordinary sense of that term His friendshi+p does not wear the cheap or tawdry trappings of the politician, but there is about it a depth of genuineness and sincerity, that while it does not overwhelm you, it wins you and holds you But the permanent consideration upon which this friendshi+p is based is sincerity and frankness
No reater handicaps than did Woodrow Wilson at Paris Repudiated by his own people in the Congressional elections; harassed on every side and at every turn by his political enemies, he still pursued the even tenor of his way and accoreatest odds
In the murky atmosphere of the Peace Conference, where every attitude of the President was grossly exaggerated, in order that his prestige e him fairly, but it is now possible in a calh the eyes of those ere actual participants with hireat assembly, onlookers, as it were, who saw every move and witnessed every play of the Peace Conference from the side lines, and who have not allowed petty ments
This testimony, which forms part of ”What Really Happened in Paris,”
edited by Edward M House and Charles Seyentlemen ere his friends and co-labourers and who daily conferred with him upon the momentous questions that came up for consideration at the Peace Conference
Mr Tho house of J P Morgan & Company, one of the representatives of the United States Treasury with the Aives the lie to the unfair criticisms uttered about the President, to the effect that he was exclusive, secretive, and refused to confer with those associated with hihout the Peace Conference said:
I aeneral, as to President Wilson's attitude at the Peace Conference He is accused of having been unwilling to consult his colleagues I never saw a man more ready and anxious to consult than he He has been accused of having been desirous to gain credit for hinore others I never saw a maniive theain would he say to Mr
Lloyd George or Mr Clemenceau: ”My expert here, Mr So-and-So, tells ht You will have to argue with hie my opinion” President Wilson undoubtedly had his disabilities Perhaps, in a trade, some of the other chiefs of state could have ”out-jockeyed” him; but it seldom reached such a situation, because President Wilson, by hisprecisely what he thought, would early disaruanized secretarial staff He did far too ht papers and docuated to some discreet aides He was, by all odds, the hardest worked ate more of his as not due to any inherent distrust he had of men--and certainly not any desire to ”run the whole show” hi how to delegate work on a large scale In execution, we all have a blind spot in some part of our eye President Wilson's was in his inability to use men; and inability, mind you, not a refusal On the contrary, when any one of us volunteered or insisted upon taking responsibility off his shoulders he was delighted Throughout the Peace Conference, Mr
Wilson never played politics I never witnessed an occasion when I saw him act frohest, and he clung to theeously Many of the so-called ”Liberals” in England have assailed Mr Wilson bitterly because, as they declare, he yielded too e, and to Mr Clemenceau But could he have failed to defer to them on questions in which no vital principle was involved? I well remember his declaration on the question, whether the Allies should refuse, for a period of five years during the time of France's recuperations to promise Germany reciprocal tariff provisions What Mr Wilson said to Mr Lloyd George and Mr Cleard the principle involved as an unwise one We believe it will coue you But when I see how France has suffered, how she has been devastated, her industries destroyed--who aned, wisely or unwisely, to assist in lifting France again to her feet”
The question has often been asked, whether the President freely consulted his experts on the other side, or ignored theentlemen who conferred with hiainst the President Charles Homer Haskins, Chief of the Division of Western Europe, a member of the American Peace Conference, answers this question in these words:
The President was anxious to have the exact facts before him in every situation Doubtless, there were a number of occasions when he could not consult with experts at a particular ht such advice, although he naturally had to use his own judgment whether that advice was to be adopted in any particular case
Answering this salas Wilson Johnson, Chief of the Division of Boundary Geography, and a member of the Peace Commission, says:
Whenever we, in our capacity as specialists, thought we had found soht to know about, and believed we could not get it across effectively in any other manner, we could ask for a personal conference with him He was, of course, a very busy man because, unlike the experts who usually had only one problem to consider, he had to do not only with all the territorial probleue of Nations, the economic problems, and many other aspects of the peace Despite this fact I wish to state that while I repeatedly asked for personal conferences with the President on this and certain other problems, he never failed to respond immediately with an appointment He had a private wire and on occasion he would call us at the Crillon to make appointments on his own initiative or to secure papers, maps, or other docuet that in one instance he calledfor some papers which I had promised to supply him, and which had not reached hie from this that he kept closely in touch with the problems he was called upon to consider
Another question that has been asked is: Did the President have an intie of the complicated questions that came before him like the Adriatic problelas Wilson Johnson in these words:
In answer to that question I will say that the President kept in constant touch with the experts on the Adriatic probleh the memoranda furnished by the experts but in other ways I can assure you that there was sent to him a voluminous quantity of material, and I want to say that e had personal discussions with him upon the question it immediately became apparent that he had studied these memoranda most carefully _It is only fair to say that of the details and intricacies of this most difficult proble command_
It has also been said that the President in his attitude toward Germany was ruthless, and yet we have the testimony of Mr Isaiah Bowman, Chief Territorial Adviser of the Peace Commission who, in answer to the direct question: ”Was there not a tiht break up because of the extreme policy of one of the Allies?” said: ”Yes, there were a nuht have broken up Alht have happened with so many nations represented, so many personalities and soto the fact that President Wilson has been charged on the one hand with outrageous concessions to the Allies and on the other hand that he had always been soft with the Geraria, let us see just how soft he was! On a certain day three of us were asked to call at the President's house, and on the followingat eleven o'clock we arrived President Wilson welcomed us in a very cordial et the idea that he is cold He does not make a fuss over you, but when you leave you feel that you havethat he is frank and altogether sincere He remarked: 'Gentlemen, I am in trouble and I have sent for you to help me out The matter is this: the French want the whole left bank of the Rhine I told M Clemenceau that I could not consent to such a solution of the problem He became very much excited and then demanded ownershi+p of the Saar Basin I told hiiving 300,000 Germans to France'
Whereupon President Wilson further said: 'I do not knohether I shall see M Cleain I do not knohether he will return to thethis afternoon In fact, I do not knohether the Peace Conference will continue M Clemenceau called me a pro-German and abruptly left the roo out a solution true to the principles we are standing for and to do justice to France, and I can only hope that France will ultimately accept a reasonable solution I want to be fair to M Cleht transfer to France of 300,000 Germans' A solution was finally found--the one that stands in the Treaty to-day”
A the last can and uttered by a senator of the United States, was that the President promised Premier Bratiano of Rumania to send United States troops to protect the new frontiers Mr Charles Seymour, a e in the folloay:
The evidence against it is overwhel the session indicate that nothing said by President Wilson could be construed into a promise to send United States troops abroad to protect frontiers The allegation is based upon the report of the interpreter, Mantoux, and a book by a journalist, Dr E W Dillon, called ”The Inside Story of the Peace Conference,” M Mantoux, though a brilliant and cultivated interpreter, whose work enorress of the Conference, did not take stenographic notes and his interpretations soinal Doctor Dillon's evidence is subject to suspicion, since his book is based upon gossip, and replete with errors of fact The stenographic report, on the other hand, is worthy of trust I have heard the President on more than one occasion explain to M Clee _that if troops were necessary to protect any troubled area, they must not look to the United States for assistance, for public opinion in this country would not per himself in his book testified to the open-mindedness and candour of the President in these words:
It had always been my practice as Secretary of State to speak to hiht he was reaching a wrong decision in regard to any eneral belief that Mr Wilson was not open-minded and that he was quick to resent any opposition however well founded I had not found hi the years we had been associated Except in a few instances he listened with consideration to arguments and apparently endeavoured to value them correctly
No men ever winced less under the criticism or bitter ridicule of his enemies than did Woodrow Wilson Whether the criticism was directed at him or at some member of his Cabinet, or, mayhap, at a subordinate like myself, for some act, statement, or even an indiscretion, he bore up under the criticism like a true sportsman I remember how manfully he met the storm of criticism that was poured upon him after the issuance of the faeously took the responsibility for the issuance of the order and stood by Doctor Garfield to the last
It will be recalled what a tremendous impression and reaction the Garfield order caused when it was published throughout the country Many about the President were greatly worried and afraid of the disastrous effect of it upon the country Cabinet officers rushed in upon him and endeavoured to persuade hi issued the order without consulting the Cabinet, but their remonstrances fell unheeded upon the President's ears I re the matter and called his attention to what appeared to me to be the calamitous results of the issuance of the Fuel Order
My letter to the President is as follows:
THE WHITE HOUSE, WAshi+NGTON
17 January, 1918