Part 18 (2/2)
My own duty toward thee of views and a patient and thorough co the objects we all have in view So far as islative action is concerned, no one will expect ard as inadequate or illusory If, as the outcoment and that of the Committee should prove to be irreconcilably different and a bill should be presented tothe essential things sought, it would o to the country on the merits But there is no reason to anticipate or fear such a result, unless we should ourselves take at the outset the position that only the plans of the Department are to be considered; and that position, it seems to ress will expect me to be as frank with them as I hope they will be withfor htfully frank conference with Mr Hay I have said to hi to consider any plan that would give us a national reserve under unmistakable national control, and would support any scheme if convinced of its adequacy and wise policy
More he has not asked or desired
Sincerely yours, WOODROW WILSON
HON LINDLEY M GARRISON, Secretary of War
It was clear from the President's letter and the attitude of Secretary Garrison that there was to be noof minds between the President and his Secretary of War on the matter of preparedness Their views could not be reconciled, and when the President refused to support Garrison's progranation, which the President under the circumstances readily accepted Immediately the friends of Garrison declared that the Adest man and that it was now on the way to destruction Neither the President nor his many friends, however, were disturbed by these direful predictions of disaster; and as the people pondered the President's letter of acceptance of Mr Garrison's resignation, wherein he showed his ownthe country and that Mr
Garrison showed petulance and iht of the country readily and quickly ca, was e national preparedness
Garrison had rendered distinguished service to the Administration and had won ton, by his open, frankwith public questions; but unfortunately for him he ept off his feet by the unstinted praise that cahout the country whenever it appeared that he was taking an attitude--especially in the two questions of major importance, preparedness and Mexico--that seemed to be at variance with the Administration's point of view
When the President's letter to Garrison was read and the contents fully understood it showed Garrison autocratic and unyielding, and the President open- to adopt any plan for preparedness that seeentle rebuke of Mr Garrison contained in the President's statement that he did not share Mr Garrison's opinion that thewith norant of them or of the military necessities of the nation,” completely won to the President the support of the members of that co for and obtaining their hearty cooperation and support Garrison's resignation, which at first blush appeared to be disastrous to the Ade, with the result that a national defence act was passed during the sureatly to the reat powers to the President over the railroads in the event of war and authorized the establishment of a council of national defence
Of course, the enemies of the President interpreted the episode as another exa men” and continued in the next breath to repeat their accusations that he was autocratic in his dealings with Congress, ignoring their own inconsistency It was precisely because the President respected the constitutional prerogatives of the Congress, and Mr Garrison did not, that the break caanda was resorted to to force the hand of the President in the matter of preparedness and to induce hiramme for universal ue, whose backers and supporters throughout the country were s and great parades throughout the country were part of this propaganda Whilethe politics that lay behind it, aided in this movement, it was easy to see that back of it was a sinister political purpose to embarrass and, if possible, to force the hand of the President One of the leaders of this movement was General Wood, who established, with the per Cae froave expression to his views of bitter antagonisly slothful attitude in urging his views on Congress with reference to the preparedness progra the people, to which the National Security League resorted, was dehout the country in the form of preparedness parades It was clear to us at the White House that these parades were part of an organized ramme of preparedness
The President and I had often discussed these de hiht affect opinion throughout the country in such a way as unreasonably to influence Congress for legislation so radical in its character as to be unnecessary and burdensome to the taxpayers of the country
Our Republican opponents on the outside were claireat political results frohty force in eested to the President that he ought to e in one of the parades himself Shortly after, the District of Columbia parade took place, and the President, upon my initiative, was invited to lead it The effect of the President's personal participation in this parade and in the New York parade held subsequently was quickly evident As soon as the an to feature the President leading the demonstrations, these parades beca into the ”front line” the President had cleverly outwitted his ene preparedness
CHAPTER XXIX
THE GREAT DECLARATION
In October, 1916, during the Presidential can, while the President was at Shadon, New Jersey, Ambassador Gerard, at the President's invitation, paid a visit to hieneral situation in Germany as to the submarine warfare He said that the restrictions as to submarines imposed by Germany's acceptance of the President's ulti burdensome and intolerable to the ing all kinds of pressure to bear upon the leaders of the Civil Governn Minister Von Jagow, to repudiate the undertaking Fro out of the controversy over the question of unrestricted submarine warfare, which Ambassador Gerard laid before hi a real crisis in our relations with Germany and that unless peace could be quickly obtained, the European struggle would soon enter upon a phasetwo years, with consequences highly dangerous to the interests of our country The passionate wish and deep desire of the President fro our energies and re neutral, hold ourselves in reserve as the onlyweek soht about by the ruthlessness of Germany made the prospect for the interposition of A memorandum prepared by me on January 4, 1916, of a conversation between the President andof the _Persia_ by a submarine, imperfectly sets forth his idea with reference to ith Ger I had a very interesting conversation with the President at the White House, ton and the country as far as I could ascertain with reference to the sinking of the _Persia_ by a submarine The other purpose of ht induce him to ht embarrass the President in the future
The President looked very well after his trip and seeh it was plainly evident that the _Persia_ affair rested heavily upon him My attitude toward thisthe line This did not seem to meet with a very hearty response fro for us to take action against any govern in possession of all the facts I replied that that was orous action as soon as all the facts were ascertained He agreed with an to tell hi in the country that there was a lack of leadershi+p, he stiffened up in his chair and said: ”Tuht now Ifinto war, I don't want to be President I have been away, and I have had lots of tietting into it, and I have made up my mind that I am more interested in the opinion that the country will have ofto express to- day Of course, I understand that the country wants action, and I intend to stand by the record I have made in all these cases, and take whatever action may be necessary, but I will not be rushed into war, no resss and proclai of the severance of diplomatic relations,--”You must know that when I consider this matter, I can only consider it as the forerunner of war
I believe that the sober-minded people of this country will applaud any efforts I may make without the loss of our honour to keep this country out of war” He said that if we took any precipitate action right now, it enerous fashi+on
The President, ten an, ”_He kept us out of War_” If it was possible to continue at peace on terms that would protect and conserve our national honour, he was determined to do so I recall how passionately he laid before Senator Tillman of South Carolina, chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, his desire to keep the nation out of war At the conclusion of the talk with the Senator, he said: ”But, Senator, it rests with Ger to the President, Senator Tillo around with a chip on our shoulder I am for peace, but I am not for peace at any damn price” This was really expressive of the President's attitude He earnestly desired peace, but he was not willing to remain at peace at the price of the nation's honour
Early in May, 1916, the President and I had conferred regarding the European situation and had discussed the possibility of our suggesting to both sides that they consider the United States as aabout a settle letter to the President with reference to the matter:
THE WHITE HOUSE, WAshi+NGTON
May 16, 1916
MY DEAR GOVERNOR:
As I have discussed with you on frequent occasions, it seems to me that the time is now at hand for you to act in the otiations may extend over a period of months Why should ait until thea discussion? Everybody admits that the resources of the nations involved cannot last through another year without suffering of an untold character It is now May Let us assume that everybody accepts your offer It would be physically iet co japan, in less than two months Then the discussion would perhaps last until the fall, nofor the ti all the parties that the time is now ripe, the whole business will require al which ti and certainly the chance of getting a truce would be better after the discussion had been in progress for son approached, the induceree on a truce on any terms would become more powerful each day