Part 17 (2/2)
Dr William E Dodd, in his book ”Woodrow Wilson and His Work,” has sensed the complicated situation in which the President found hi oods to Germany and even neutral countries Hoke Sed hiainst the blockade Representatives of the packers of Chicago and the farrythe autuainst all the ainst British interference with our cargoes for neutral ports” Every artificial device for increasing our trade with neutral countries was suggested by those who sought his aid and counsel in the matter Cotton of all the coed action by the President to help in the matter of cotton, the President tried to iress, the law of supply and demand was deeply affected and that the sales of cotton were necessarily restricted by reason of the closure of certainhis views upon the President, said: ”But you, Mr
President, can suspend the law of supply and dee, and you ran your head up against it, you et hurt”
Every sympathizer with Germany pursued the President relentlessly with insistent deht to book for the unreasonable character of the blockade which she was carrying on against our coh seas The President in every diploland, but these dehout the country who covertly sought to bring about a real breach between the two countries Even I felt that we should go further in our deo
The pressure upon us at the White House for satisfaction at the hands of England grew more intense with each day I recall a conversation I had with the President shortly before the Congressional elections when the President's political eneland and excoriating hi Germany to strict accountability for her actions This conversation was held while ere on board the President's train on our way to the West After dinner one evening I tactfully broached the subject of the British blockade and laid before the President the use our eneland My frank criticis tohi across the table atainst England in the matter of the blockade; I am aware also of the sinister political purpose that lies back of e radical action against England are thinking only of Ger of the world crisis that would inevitably occur should there be an actual breach at this tiland and A squarely atour clain Office to land, has placed every e be done, and soreat war crisis, iven a chance to adjust these e wrotethe details of a conference he had had with Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, to discuss our protests against the British blockade Mr Page described the room in which the conference was held, on the wall of which was hung as a memorial the fifteen-million-dollar check hich Great Britain paid the _Alabae pointed to this _Alabama_ check and said: 'If you don't stop these seizures, Sir Edward, sos like that' Sir Edward replied: 'That may be so, but ill pay every cent Of course, many of the restrictions we have laid down and which seriously interfere with your trade are unreasonable But Aht, as well as our own, to save the civilization of the world You dare not press us too far!'” Turning toour fight and you may well understand that I shall not, in the present state of the world's affairs, place obstacles in her way Many of our critics suggest ith England in order to force reparation in these land would result in a German triumph No matter what may happen to me personally in the next election, I will not take any action to e for her life and the life of the world Let those who claland understand this!”
While the critics of the President were busily engaged in e upon a ”shoith Great Britain over the blockade, the world was startled on May 7, 1915, by the news of the sinking of the _Lusitania_, off the coast of Ireland, resulting in the loss of many American lives A few days later ca at the fine stroke of the subedy
The President's critics who, a few days before, were assailing hi an iainst Germany, but not for a moment did the President waver before these clamorous demands To such an extent did he carry this attitude of calmness and steadiness of purpose that on ”the outside” the people felt that there was in hiedy of the _Lusitania_ Atwith hiic details of the sinking of the great shi+p in an effort to force his hands, so to speak, but he quickly checked what appeared to be my youthful impetuosity and said: ”Tumulty, it would be much wiser for us not to dwell too much upon these estion of coldness about him
In fact, he seemed to be deeply rettable and tragic affair At ti to ic items that daily appear in the newspapers about the _Lusitania_, I should see red in everything, and I am afraid that when I am called upon to act with reference to this situation I could not be just to any one I dare not act unjustly and cannot indulge s”
Evidently he saw that his turning away from the topic in this apparently indifferent way did not sit ith me Quickly he understood my dissatisfaction and said: ”I suppose you think I am cold and indifferent and little less than human, but, my dear fellow, you areabout this tragedy It has hung over ht itself civilized purpose so horrible a thing?”
At the tirave matter ere seated in the President's study in the White House I had never seen hi under the criticism that had been heaped upon him for his apparent inaction in theto me he said: ”Let me try to make my attitude in this matter plain to you, so that you at least will try to understand what lies in hts I am bound to consider in the most careful and cautious way the first step I shall take, because once having taken it I cannot withdraw from it I am bound to consider beforehand all the facts and circu of the _Lusitania_ and to calculate the effect upon the country of every incautious or unwiseof the country is now at fever heat and that it is ready to est, but I ah carefully the effect of radical action now based upon the present emotionalism of the people I am not sure whether the present eh to sustain any action I would suggest to Congress, and thus in case of failure we should be left without that fine backing and support so necessary to ress to-morrow and advocate ith Gerress would support me, but ould the country say as declared, and finally ca all of its horrors and bloody aftermath As the people pored over the casualty lists, would they not say: 'Why did Wilson move so fast in this matter?
Why didn't he try peaceably to settle this question with Gerer? Why was he so anxious to go to ith Gers of Great Britain in the matter of the blockade?' Were I to advise radical action noe should have nothing, I arets and heartbreaks The vastness of this country; its variegated eles bid us wait and withhold ourselves froainst Germany we must be certain that the whole country not only o forward to the end with enthusias, but in the last analysis I am the trustee of this nation, and the cost of it all o forward”
Then leaning closer to me, he said: ”It will not do for ainst Germany I must answer for the consequences of reat nations of Europe at war, engaged in a death grapple that may involve civilization My earnest hope and fervent prayer has been that America could withhold herself and remain out of this terrible ht ti about peace We are the only great nation now free to do this If we should go in, then the whole civilized world will become involved What a pretty mess it would be!
A and now she is surrendering the leadershi+p she occupies and becoedy! I ao to war Nothe way its people would respond to any deht be made upon them, need have fears or doubts as to what stand it would finally take But what I fearelse is the possibility of world bankruptcy that will inevitably follow our getting into this thing, Not only world chaos and bankruptcy, but all of the distempers, social, moral, and industrial, that will flow from this world cataclyserous ele out everythe cost and dispassionately deliberating upon every move”
In a speech delivered at Helena, Montana, he frankly spoke of the ”break down” of neutrality in these words:
In the Providence of God, the leadershi+p of this nation was intrusted tothose early years of the e were not in it I are through many subtle channels of the move that this country chiefly desired, the thing that youthat of course every loving woman had at her heart, was that we should keep out of the war, and we tried to persuade ourselves that the European business was not our business We tried to convince ourselves that no ation of duty rested upon us, and finally we found the currents of hureat consciousness elling up in us that this was not a local cause, that this was not a struggle which was to be confined to Europe, or confined to Asia, to which it had spread, but that it was so that involved the very fate of civilization; and there was one great nation in the world that could not afford to stay out of it There are gentle the ratification of this treaty who at that time taunted the Administration of the United States that it had lost touch with its international conscience They were eager to go in, and now that they have got in, and are caught in the whole network of human conscience, they want to break out and stay out We were caught in this thing by the action of a nation utterly unlike ourselves What I mean to say is that the German nation, the Gero into that war or not, did not know that it was going into it until its men were summoned to the colours I re at the Cabinet table in Washi+ngton I asked ues what their impression was of the opinion of the country before ent into the war, and I reues said to me: ”Mr
President, I think the people of the country would take your advice and do what you suggested” ”Why,” I said, ”that is not what I ao in with a whoop there is no use of their going in at all I do not want the on them I want to knohat the conscience of this country is speaking I want to knohat purpose is arising in the ard to this world situation” When I thought I heard that voice, it was then that I proposed to the Congress of the United States that we should include ourselves in the challenge that Ger to mankind
On May 10, 1915, he rettable and ht”
Unfortunately, the headlines of the papers carried only the phrase, ”Too proud to fight,” and little or no attention was paid to the context of the speech in which the phrase was lodged As aunusual about the character of this speech The phrase, ”Too proud to fight,” was simply expressive of the President's policy since the outbreak of the war It was not a new thought with hi, only in different words, in a speech delivered at a banquet of the associated Press in New York: ”My interest in the neutrality of the United States is not a petty desire to keep out of trouble I a sothis nation that no nation has ever yet got That is the distinction of absolute self- control and ht,” was simply expressive of the idea that was close to his heart: a reliance uponour difficulties with Germany other than a resort to war On our way to Philadelphia on the day of the delivery of this speech I read a copy of it which the President handed to ht,” I scented the political danger in it and warned him, but he declined to be adth of his position, na, or as the Bible states it, ”He that ruleth his own spirit is greater than he that taketh a city,” and trusted the people to understand his fullThe President himself was so above the petty tricks by which politicians wrest words fro that he sometimes incautiously played into the hands of this type of foe Nor did he fully realize that his gift for er It was an unfortunate phrase, ”Too proud to fight,” but none who thoughtfully read the context with unprejudiced randeur of the President's position
CHAPTER XXVIII
PREPAREDNESS
The feelings of the people throughout the country began to be aroused as they witnessed the outlawry of Ger with Aitation for preparedness to ress and the President were harassed by conflicting demands from every side immediately to ”put our house in order” and to set America safely on the road to national preparedness Theodore Roosevelt was cla universal compulsory military service and was ably aided by General Wood and Aded the adoption of conscription Secretary of War Garrison and Senator Chaon, were converted to this radical ly becaanda These gentlemen could see only the direct route to the accomplishment of the purpose they had in mind and were alike unmindful of the difficulties and obstacles that lay in the President's path To them it appeared that all it was necessary for the President to do was boldly to announce his programme of preparedness and serenely to await its approval at the hands of Congress They were unmindful of the difficulties of the situation and of the consummate tact that Would be required on the part of the President to induce Congress to turn away from the old volunteer systeht would transform America into an armed camp The President was bound to consider the stern actualities of the situation and to withhold hiorous insistence on any programme of preparedness that was not traditionally, funda the sa as to the practicableit The President early realized that the volunteer system was unsuited to our present needs and that it could not be quickly turned into an active force to answer eencies, but he was certain, also, that the people of the country ree to cut themselves away from the volunteer systeht to a successful conclusion The President felt that the old volunteer system was antiquated and not to be considered, but the duty lay upon him to convince the leaders of the Senate and House and the people that this was a fact This was no easy task to acco conscription could only, in his opinion, delay matters and embarrass the very purpose that lay in his ressional inaction, the President's mind was ”open and to let” on the question of what constituted the best ressive preparedness As President, he was bound to take cognizance of the deep- seated antagonism on the part of the American people to any system of military preparedness that had a compulsory feature as its basic element
It was the President's opinion that the people of a country so big and varied as America had to be convinced by alternative methods as to what, in the last analysis, was the best ression
While he was convinced that we had to be prepared and ready to ency, he was not to be rushed in thehis mind open to find the best and ht the average opinion of the country demanded in the way of preparedness