Volume II Part 5 (1/2)

Roger Keyes said then that the landings had come off, on the whole, A1

Our GHQ idea, which the Navy had shared, that the whole of the troops should be landed South of Lala Baba had been sound The 33rd Brigade had landed there without shot fired; the 32nd had been sharply, but not very seriously opposed; the Brigade (the 34th) which we, to meet the wish of the Corps, had tried to land for them opposite Hill 10 inside the Bay, instead of with the others as we had originally arranged, had only been able to find depth at the mouth of the Salt Lake; had suffered loss frorounding of soh the water and ade

Aspinall now turned up He was in a fever; said our chances were being throith both hands and that he had already cabled e nor Aspinall's had reached me[5]

Not another moment was to be lost, so Keyes took us both in his motor boat to HMS _Jonquil_ to see Stopford He (Stopford) seeoing well Mahon with so Kiretch Tepe Sirt There had been a very stiff fight in the darkness at Lala Baba and next ht so hard on a little mound called Hill 10 that he (Stopford) had been afraid ere not going to be able to take it at all However, it had been taken, but there was great confusion and hours of delay in deploying for the attack of the foothills They were easily carried in the end but by that time the men were so thirsty and tired that they did not follow up the beaten enemy

”And where are they now?” I asked

”There,” he replied, ”along the foot of the hills,” and he pointed out the line, north to south

”But they held that line, more or less, yesterday,” I said

”Yes,” said Stopford, and he went on to explain that the Brigadiers had been called upon to gain what ground they could without serious fighting but that, actually, they had not yet occupied any do tactical point The et water up to theuns as quickly as he had hoped Therefore, he had decided to postpone the occupation of the ridge (which

”A regular battle is just exactly e are here for” hat I was inclined to say, but what I did say was that most of this was news to me; that he should have instantly informed me of his decision that he could not obey my cabled order of yesterday afternoon to ”push on rapidly” Stopford replied that he had only made up his ot back froe when I arrived

Noas to be done? The Turks were so quiet it seemed tothe beaches, and inland too, no end of our ets

The artillery which had so long annoyed Anzac used to fire froe of where our le shell was being fired

Either, the enee to save thelu Tepe was so weak and shaken that they were avoiding any ht precipitate a conflict

I said to Stopford, ”We et Islu Tepe and Tekke Tepe _now_!” To this he raised objections He doubted whether the troops had got their water yet; he and Reed were agreed we ought to get uns ashore; the co worked out for the ; orders would all have to be re-written He added that, whilst agreeing withon, there were ainst it, especially the attitude of his Generals who had told hiht to myself of the many, many tiht that same _non possumus_; of the old days when half the victory lay in the er, thirst and sleeplessness to push along A cruel, pitiless business, but so is war itself Was it not the greatest of soldiers who said his Marshals could always find ten good reasons for putting off an attack till next day!

So I said I would like to see the GOC Division and the Brigadiers personally so as to get a better grip of things than we could on board shi+p in harbour Stopford agreed; nothing, he said, would please him more than if I could succeed where he had failed, but would I excuse hi me; he had not been very fit; he had just returned fro a chance He pointed out Hammersley's Headquarters about 400 yards off and said he, Haades

So I nipped down the _Jonquil's_ ladder; tu motor boat and with him and Aspinall we simply shot across the water to Lala Baba Every moment was priceless I had not been five minutes on the _Jonquil_ and in another tith Hammersley

Under the low cliffs by the sea was a small half-moon of beach about 100 by 40 yards At the North end of the half-ive ave me much the same story as Stopford The 9th West Yorks and 6th Yorks had done A1 stor and counter-adier had not been able to get a grip of his Battalions to throw them at it in proper unison and form A delay of precious hours had been caused in the attack on Yilghin Burnu by a Brigadier anted to go forward finding hiht it better to hold back At present all was peaceful and he expected a Staff Officer at anythe exact disposition of his troops He could not, he feared, point eneral line held followed the under features of the hills

Malcolm, GSO1, was then called and came up fro up orders for next 's attack I told both Officers that there had never been a greater crisis in any battle than the one taking place as we spoke They were naturally pleased at having got ashore and to have defeated the Turks on the shore, but they must not fly aith the idea that with ti would pan out very nicely On the contrary, it was ihts before the eneuns they had carried off and before they received the reinforce at that very uess: it _was_ so: our aeroplanes had spotted Turks ht be too late now; anyway our in was of the narrowest

Hammersley assuredto thirst, had been the only reason why he had not walked on to Ishin Burnu had been carried, there was nothing to prevent the occupation of the heights as the Turks had been beat, but no one could fight against thirst

I asked him how the water question stood He said it had been solved by the landing of er any serious supply trouble All the troops were noatered, fed and rested They had been told they should gain as eneral action, but they had not, in fact, ain e forthwith Let the Brigade-Majors, I said, pick out a few of their freshest coht now

Haet any of his troops under weigh before daylight nextThe units were scattered; no reconnaissance had been ly and blind; it would be iet orders round the whole Division in time to let the junior ranks study them

Hammersley's points were made in a proper and soldierly manner Every General of experience would be with hier rapidly approaching us; already casting its shadow upon us, which, to hed every secondary objection Weup them to-day; the Lord only kneould be the price of the the Turks to their own front, but from Asia and Bulair the ene themselves in on the crest no number of Turks would be able to shi+ft theot there first? If, as Colonel Malcolet orders round the Division in ti statement--was there no body of troops--no Divisional reserve--no nothing--which could be used for the purpose of ly, there was no reserve! Never, in allhad I been faced with ideas like these I have seen attack orders dictated to a Division from the saddle in less than five minutes Here was a victorious Division, rested and watered, said to be unable to bestir itself, even feebly, with less than twelve hours' notice! This hat I felt and although I did not say it probably I looked it, for Malcol that although the Irish and the 33rd and 34th Brigades could not be set in ade, which was concentrated round about Sulajik, would be ready toup my mind I did so, and told Haade to advance _at once and dig theade could fix their they wouldadvance easy for their comrades and would be able to interfere with and delay the Turkish reinforceht try and debouch between the two Anafartas during the night or march down upon Suvla froht be soround it was clear to half an eye that Tekke Tepe was the key to the whole Suvla Bay area If by dawn, I said, even one Coht we should have the whip hand of the ene

Hammersley said he understood my order and that the advance should be put in hand at once Malcolm hurried off; I left a little before 630 and went, _via_ the _Chatham_, back to the _Triad_ The _Arno_ had by now come in, but de Robeck has kindly asked me not to shi+ft quarters if Anzac and helles troubles will perht at Suvla

All was dead quiet ashore till 11 p nothing, felt sure the Brigade hadthemselves in

Captain Brody dined The scraps of news picked up fro Brodrick, confir inside Suvla Bay along the narrow strip of land West of the Salt Lake The attacks on Hill 10 went to pieces, not against the Turks, but by mishap The first assault made by one or two Companies succeeded, but the assailants were taken for Turks and were attacked in turn and driven off by others of ouraffair

If there was hesitation and imental folk atoned and there wereon the part of battalions and companies