Volume I Part 20 (1/2)

_10th June, 1915 I but sheer hard work The sailors the sareed that we uns and shell

After all, any outsider would think it a plain sailing h--a demand, that is to say, frounned and shell supplied on the same scale as the foro Simpson-Baikie has been specially sent to us by Lord K, who has a high opinion of his , studious and scientific officer Well, Baikie says that to put hi he wants another forty-eight 18-pounders; eight 5-inch hows; eight 45 hows; eight 6-inch; four 92 hows; four anti-aircraft guns and a thousand rounds a un; these ”wants” he puts down as an absolute minimum

He also wishes hts of four ht for patrol work; the other two for spotting

There is no use enraging people for nothing and ”nothing” I am sure would be the result of this demand were it shot in quite nakedly But I have pressed Baikie's vital points home all the same, _vide_ attached:--

”(No MF 316)

”Your No 5088 After a further consideration of the aht of the expenditure on the 4th and 5th June, I would like to point out that I have only the norh actually I have five divisions here Consequently, each ofin Flanders Any counAlso a comparison based on numbers of troops would prove to be beside the point, for conditions cannot be identical Therefore, as I know you will do your best for me and thus leave me contented with the decision you arrive at, I prefer to state frankly what amount I consider necessary This amount is at least 30 rounds a day for 18-pr

and 45 howitzer already ashore, and I hope that a supply on this scale inning to prove insufficient for their task, for the enemy have apparently no lack of a Therefore I hope that the new divisions may be sent out with the full complement of artillery, but, if this is done, the ammunition supply for the artillery of the fresh divisions need only be on the normal scale

”Since the above ritten, I have received a report that the enemy has been reinforced by 1,300 Ger is accounted for by this fact”

As to our Air Service, the way this feud between Admiralty and War Office has worked itself out in the field is si The War Office wash their hands of the air entirely (at the Dardanelles) I cannot put h the machines are wanted for overland tactics--a fatal blind alley All I could do I did this afternoon when the Adood stiff walk afterwards

_11th June, 1915 Imbros_ Sailed over to Anzac with Braithwaite Took Birdwood's views upon the outline of our plan (which originated between hiainst the Turks To do his share, _durch und durch_ (God forgive o through froive hies on these crests of Sari Bair which doean The destroyers next took us to Cape helles where I held a po at Ar present as well as Birdwood and Braithwaite Everyone keen and sanguine Many estions; warm approval of the broad lines of the scheht Birdie back to Anzac and then returned to Iood day's work Half the battle to find that my Corps Commanders are so keen They are all sworn to the closest secrecy; have been told that our lives depend upon their discretion I have shown them my MF 300 of the 7th June so as to let the trusted with a plan which is too hest

Every General I renades

The Anzacs are very et no more bombs for their six japanese trench o to put this very strongly to the War Office After all, bos to make if the tails of the manufacturers are well twisted

_12th June, 1915 Imbros_ Stayed in camp where de Robeck came to see me I wonder what K is likely to do about Mahon and about aht 17 rounds per gun per day good enough, and that he was going to give me as much, there were several qualifications to our pleasure, but ere_ pleased, because apart froet more stuff

But we have not yet tasted this new French ration of 17 rounds per gun

Are we too insistent? I think not One dozen small field howitzer shells, of 45 calibre, save one British life by taking two Turkish lives And although the 45 are ant the old 5-inch are none so bad Where would we be noonder, had not Haldane against Press, Public and four soldiers out of five stuck to his guns and insisted on creating those 145 batteries of Territorial Field Artillery?

A depressing wire in fro doubt as to whether they will be able tounits coear, supplies,out here froland Should we be forced to redistribute men and material on arrival, we are in for another spell of delay

Altogether I have been very busy on cables to-day The War Office having jogged ain about the Bulair scheh the whole series of pros and cons with the Adative Three quarters of the objections are naval; either directly--want of harbours, etc; or indirectly--as involving three lines of small craft to supply three separate military forces The number of small craft required are not in existence

_13th June, 1915 Is about the coastline above the Narrows I have replied:

”Your first question as to the fortification of the coast towards Gallipoli can be satisfactorily answered only by the Navy as naval aeroplane observation is the only means by which I can find out about the coast fortifications From time to time it has been reported that torpedo tubes have been placed at the ara Point These are matters on which I presu to him to make sure as he is away to-day at Mudros I will ask hi the coast fortifications you mention, to see if it can be ascertained whether your informant's report is correct, but there are but few aeroplanes and the fee have are constantly required for spotting for artillery, photographing trenches, and for reconnaissances of the troops i forced by War Office questions to say rathercable tookI hope it is too technical to effect a lodgossips:--

”(No MF 328) From General Sir Ian Hamilton to War Office With reference to your No 5441, cipher From the outset I have fully realized that the question of cutting off forces defending the Peninsula lay at the heart of raphs 2 and 7 ofAustralian and New Zealand Ar I still consider, as indicated therein, that the best andenemy's communications is to push forward to the south-east from Australian and New Zealand Army Corps

”The attempt to stop Bulair communications further North than the Australian and New Zealand Arive the Turks too uns An advance of little more than two miles in a south-eastern direction would enable us to command the land communications between Bulair and Kilid Bahr This, in turn, would render Ak Bashi+ Liman useless to the enemy as a port of disembarkation for either Chanak or Constantinople It would enable us,communication with the Asiatic shore, since Kilia Liuns

”It was these considerations which decided inally to land at Australian and New Zealand Army Corps position, and in spite of the difficulties of advancing thence, I see no reason to expect that a new point of departure would ed by circu forward towards Achi Baba so as to clear my main port of disembarkation of shell fire I only await the promised reinforcements, however, to enable me to take the next step in the prosecution of my main plan from the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps

”I cannot extend the present Australian position until they arrive See my No MF 300, as to estimate of troops required, and e at Australian and New Zealand Army Corps If I succeed the enemy's communications _via_ Bulair and, with the Navy's help, _via_ Asiatic coast should both be closed, as far as possible, by the one operation If, in addition, submarines can stop sea communications with Constantinople the probleard to supplies and ammunition which can be obtained by the eneha are normally important centres of collection of food supplies, both cereals and meat, and since the Panderma-Chanak road is adequate, it would be possible to provision the peninsula froreat supply depot at Chanak where there are steaht craft If land communications were blocked near Bulair, aht by sea to Panderma, and thence by road to Chanak or by sea direct to Kilid Bahr

”Either for supplies or a supply by sea e number of shallow craft available at Rodosto, Chanak, Constantinople and Panderood advance south-east frouns, plus the submarines, should be able to make all traffic from the Asiatic shore very difficult for the enemy

”It is vitally important that future developments should be kept absolutely secret I inal landing was known to hardly anyone here before the shi+ps sailed, yet the date was cabled to the Turks fro and could not, therefore, get clear of camp till 11 o'clock when I boarded the destroyer _Grampus_, and sailed for helles Lunched with Hunter-Weston at his Headquarters, and then walked out along the new road being built under the cliffs from ”W” Beach to Gurkha Gully On the way I stopped at the 29th Divisional Headquarters where I ade were bathing In the beautiful hot afternoon weather the men were happy as sandboys Their own mothers would hardly know thes or else stark naked, with pipes in theirthe time of day to a lot of these boys, I cli to inspect some of the East Lancashi+re Division in their rest trenches