Volume I Part 6 (2/2)

Maxwell left at 4 pm for Cairo I have pressed hiade and told him of my conversation with cox hiade are to co attack on the Canal any nored my direct appeal to him shows he would not approve, etc, etc, etc All this is just the line I myself would probably take--I admit it--if asked by another General to part with e on Maxwell for ement At the last he consented to cable K direct on the point his are quite certain; the Brigade are not wanted in Egypt Old ca up of the wells must put the lid on to any move across the desert until the winter rains, and, apart from this, how in the name of the beard of their own false prophet can the Turks attack Egypt whilst we are at the gates of Constantinople?

But if the Brigade are not wanted on the Canal, we are bound to be the better for them at the Dardanelles, whatever course matters there may take Concentration is the cue! The German or japanese General Staffs would tumble to these truths and act upon the can overcoainst another, whereby K of K keeps all reins in his hands and remains sole arbiter between them

Birdwood has just turned up We're off to- hi K's elbow about cox and his Gurkhas

_7th April, 1915 SS ”Arcadian” 10 pood-bye

On my way down to the harbour I overhauled the assyrian Jewish Refugee Mule Corps at the Wardian Ca shocker, ”The Man-killers of Tsavo,” finds assyrians andto tabloid bipeds and quadrupeds into ”The Zion Corps” The h I did not notice that their cohorts were gleaold, they may help us to those habiliround bait to entice the big Jew journalists and bankers towards our cause; the former will lend us the colour, the latter the coin Anyway, so far as I can, I ive the chosen people a chance

Got aboard at 515, but owing to so up our tanks with fresh water, we are held up and won't get off until to-nat into the ointment of the General, be sure there are ten thousand flies stinking the ointment of the troops

_8th April, 1915 SS ”Arcadian”_ Sailing free to the Northwards A fine day and a smooth sea What would not Richard Coeur de Lion or Napoleon have given for the _Arcadian_ to take the harbour a letter was brought out to us by a launch:

”UNION CLUB, ”ALEXANDRIA

”The following telephone received froe re cox, I will do my best tothe seaplanes arriving here in _Ganges_? I have wired to Admiral de Robeck, I want them badly, so please help me if you can

”_Forwarded by_ ADMIRAL ROBINSON”

Cutlet for cutlet! I wish it had occurred to me sooner to do a deal with some aeroplanes But, then I have none No matter: I should have proypt and Mudros are not one but two Maxwell and I are co-equal allies; _not_ a combine under a Boss!

CHAPTER IV

CLEARING FOR ACTION

_9th April, 1915 SS ”Arcadian”_ Isles of the Aegean; one reat shi+p steareat adventure--why do I walk up and down the deck feeling a ton's weight of trouble weighing down upon my shoulders? Never till to-day has solicitude become painful This is the fault of Birdwood, Hunter-Weston and Paris I read their ”appreciations of the situation”

soo, but until to-day I have not had the unbroken hour needed to digest theainst any charge of vacillation At our first o for the South of the Gallipoli Peninsula

Now he has, in fact, very round under the influence of a new consideration, ”(which I only learned after leaving Leuns or howitzers on the Asiatic side which could actually command our transports should they anchor off Morto Bay” ”As I told you,” he says, ”after thinking it out thoroughly, I was convinced our best plan would be to go for the South of the Gallipoli Peninsula,”

but now he continues, he finds his Staff ”all see somewhere between Saros Bay and Enos For this I have no use, as though I think we should doubtless be able to effect a landing there pretty easily, yet I do not see that we shall be any 'forrarder' by doing so We ht put ourselves in front of the Bulair Lines, but there would be far less object in attacking the South-ith the Navy only partially able to help us, than by working up from the other end with the Navy on either flank”

Birdwood hi on the Asiatic side, for preference somewhere South of Tenedos The attractive part of his idea is that if we did this the Turks must withdraw most of their ive the Navy just the opportunity they require forthe Narrows forthwith They know they can give the superstition of old Forts being stronger than new shi+ps its quietus if only they can clear a passage through the minefield There are forts and forts, shi+ps and shi+ps, no doubt But from e have done already the sailors know that our shi+ps here can knock out those forts here But first they uns which protect the minefield froht dominate the Peninsula froests that anyway, if we are beaten off in our attempt to land on the Peninsula weDisembarkation plans already ht ht perhaps even think of this--if we try the other first and can't pull it off?”

Inthe shortest, most direct route to my objective, the Narrows

First, because ”I have no roving commission to conquer Asia Minor” My instructions deny me the whole of that country when they lay down as a principle that ”The occupation of the Asiatic side by ly deprecated”