Volume I Part 3 (2/2)
_20th March, 1915_ _HMS ”Franconia” Mudros Harbour_ Stormy weather, and even here, inside Mudros harbour, touch with the shore is cut off
After I was asleep last night, an answer ca and to the point He says, ”You know e e military operations on the Gallipoli Peninsula by your troops are necessary to clear the way, those operations must be undertaken after careful consideration of the local defences and es on the Admiral
_21st March, 1915_ _HMS ”Franconia”_ A talk with Admiral Wemyss and General d'Amade Weet to work again as quickly as they can Wemyss is Senior Naval Officer at the Dardanelles and is much liked by everyone He has put his seniority in his pocket and is under his junior--fighting first, rank afterwards!
A letter from de Robeck, dated ”QE the 19th,” has only just come to hand:--
”Our men were splendid and thank heaven our loss of life was quite sh the French lost over 100 men when _Bouvet_ struck a mine
”How our shi+ps struck mines in an area that was reported clear and swept the previous night I do not know, unless they were floating mines started from the Narrows!
”I was sad to lose shi+ps and my heart aches when one thinks of it; one must do what one is told and take risks or othere cannot win We are all getting ready for another 'go' and not in the least beaten or downhearted The big forts were silenced for a long ti well, until _Bouvet_ struck a e we did, I don't know, there were big explosions in the Forts!”
Little Birdie, non up into a grand General, turned up at 3 pm I was enchanted to see his to talk over Although the confidence of the sailors seems quite unshaken by the events of the 18th, Birdie seems to have made up hisand that we have no ti But then he did not see the battle and cannot, therefore, gauge the extent to which the Turkish Forts were beaten
_22nd March, 1915_ _HMS ”Franconia”_ At 10 am we had another Conference on board the _Queen Elizabeth_
Present:--
Admiral de Robeck, Admiral Wemyss, General Birdwood, General Braithwaite, Captain Pollen, Myself
The moment we sat down de Robeck told us _he was now quite clear he could not get through without the help of all my troops_
Before ever ent aboard Braithwaite, Birdwood and I had agreed that, whatever we landsht think, wefor or against land operations or amphibious operations until the sailors themselves turned to us and said they had abandoned the idea of forcing the passage by naval operations alone
They have done so The fat (that is us) is fairly in the fire
No doubt we had our views Birdie andmines with million pound shi+ps The hesitants who always make hay in foul weather had been extra active since the sinking of the three h with the loss of another battleshi+p or two--how the devil would our troopshi+ps be able to follow? And the store shi+ps? And the colliers?
This hadthe battle I had cabled that the chances of the Navy pushi+ng through on their oere hardly fair fighting chances, but, since then, de Robeck, the man who should know, had said twice that he _did_ think there was a fair fighting chance Had he stuck to that opinion at the conference, then I was ready, as a soldier, to ht of military croaks about troopshi+ps
Constantinople must surrender, revolt or scuttle within a very few hours of our battleshi+ps entering the Marmora Memories of one or two obsolete six inchers at Ladysmith helped me to feel as Constantinople would feel when her rail and sea communications were cut and a rain of shell fell upon the penned-in populace froood wind that nest of iniquity would go up like Sodo sheet of flame
But once the Adh without help, there was no foothold left for the views of a landsman
So there was no discussion At once we turned our faces to the land scheme Very sketchy; how could it be otherwise? On the Ger on Gallipoli would have been in e and a pail of water By the British systeed to concoct ically and tactically ouron to one ot to see it through
But, in anisation and administration our way is the way of Colney Hatch
Here am I still minus my Adjutant-General; ed with settling the basic question of whether the Ar in the world to guide me beyond my own experience and that of my Chief of the General Staff, whose sphere of work and experience lies quite outside these administrative matters I can see that Leht of Braithwaite's advice and my own hasty study of the map Almost incredible really, we should have to decide so tremendous an administrative problem off the reel and without any Administrative Staff But time presses, the responsibility cannot be shi+rked, and so I have cabled K that Leet shi+p-shape at Alexandria although, thereby, I upset every previous arrangeineers, trenchthings are going less swiht they would, I have had to hardenasked forover froade of Gurkhas to complete Birdwood's New Zealand Division Last, and worst, I have had to risk the fury of the QMG to the Forces by telling the War Office that their transports are so loaded (water carts in one shi+p; water cart horses in another; guns in one shi+p; li tools anyhow) that they must be emptied and reloaded before we can land under fire
These points were touched upon at the Conference I told theence folk fix the numbers of the enemy now at the Dardanelles as 40,000 on the Gallipoli Peninsula with a reserve of 30,000 behind Bulair: on the Asiatic side of the Straits there are at least a Division, but there _may_ be several Divisions The Admiral's information tallies and, so Birdie says, does that of the Aruns of the Fleet can sweep the eneue of the Peninsula from Achi Baba Southwards is moonshi+ne My trump card turns out to be the Joker; best of all cards only it don't happen to be included in this particular pack!
As ideas for getting round this prickly proble with it were put forward The sailors say so built, and probably by now are built, for the purpose of a landing in the North: they would carry five hundred men; had bullet-proof bulwarks and are to work under their own gas engines If I can possibly get a petition for these through to Winston ould very likely be lent so under fire will be child's play to what it will be otherwise But the cable et to Winston: if it falls into the hands of Fisher it fails, as the sailors tell es us every rope's end or ha'porth of tar that finds its way out here
Rotten luck to have cutto Winston: still I see no way out of it: with K jealous as a tiger--what can I do? Also, although the sailors want me to pull this particular chestnut out of the fire, it is just as well they should know I a to speak to their Boss even under the htened of Fisher: so I then and there drafted this to K
fro under fire will be the most critical as well as the most vital of the whole operations If the Admiralty will ihters difficulty and duration of this phase will be cut down to at least one half The lighters should each be capable of conveying 400 to 500 men or 30 to 40 horses They should be protected by bullet-proof armour”