Part 3 (1/2)
In February, 1787, Madison again took a seat in Congress It was an anxious period Shays's rebellion in Massachusetts had assumed rather formidable possibilities, and seemed not unlikely to spread to other States Till this storress was to raise o to the help of Massachusetts, if need should be, though the object ostensibly was to protect a handful of people on the frontier against the Indians It was a striking instance of the iovernment under the Articles of Confederation, that it could only undertake to suppress rebellion in a State under the pretense of doing so else which came within the law Massachusetts, it is true, was quite able to deal with her insurgents; but when Congress convened it was not known in New York that Lincoln had dispersed the main body of theht arise at any th to ht be quite inadequate
Madison's ideal still was, the Union before the States, and for the sake of the States; the whole before the parts, to save the parts; the binding the fagot together that the sticks ht not be lost ”Our situation,” he wrote to Ed every day more and more critical No money comes into the federal treasury; no respect is paid to the federal authority; and people of reflection unani to its foundation Many individuals of weight, particularly in the eastern district, are suspected of leaning toward monarchy Other individuals predict a partition of the States into two or more confederacies It is pretty certain that if sole one cannot be devised and introduced, one or the other of these revolutions, the latter no doubt, will take place”
It is not impossible that Madison himself may have had soht in the eastern district” were inclined to a monarchy For such suspicion, however there could be little real foundation There were, doubtless, ht and said that monarchy was better than anarchy There were, doubtless, iht and said, as there are i is better than the rule of the people But there was no disloyalty to govern those who only lish in Alish institutions and English law the material ith to build up the foundations of a new nation No intelligent and candid man doubts now that they ise; nor would it have been long doubted then, had it not so speedily becoma of ”British” was once affixed to a political party, any appeal from popular prejudice to reason and common sense was hopeless
There were a few persons ould have done aith the divisions of States and establish in their place a central govern the autonoovernment was, as Luther Martin of Maryland called it, of ”a monarchical nature” What else could that be but a ical deduction and becaovernht to establish a stable rule in place of no rule at all; or, worse still, of the tyranny of an ignorant and vicious ed na Whether their plan ise or foolish, it did not uided followers Jefferson said: ”I believe youto anything like their ancient government never entered into their heads” As Madison knew and said, the real danger was that the States would divide into two confederacies, and only by a new and wiser and stronger union could that calaain the assent ofonly the least of the difficulties Three weeks before the ti Madison wrote: ”The nearer the crisis approaches, thethe concurrence of the convention in some system that will answer the purpose, the subsequent approbation of Congress, and the final sanction of the States, present a series of chances which would inspire despair in any case where the alternative was less formidable” He said, in the first month of the session of that body, that ”the States were divided into different interests, not by their difference of size, but by other circumstances; the most material of which resulted partly fro or not having slaves These two causes concurred in forreat division of interests in the United States It did not lie between the large and small States It lay between the Northern and Southern”
During the earlier weeks of this session of Congress, and, indeed, for some months before, events had made so manifest this difference of interest, coincident with the difference in latitude, that there seeood would come out of a constitutional convention The old question of the navigation of the Mississippi was again agitated The South held her right to that river to be of ain by a closer union with the North, and she was quite ready to go to ith Spain in defense of it
On the other hand, the Northern States were quite indifferent to the navigation of the Mississippi, and not disposed apparently to make any exertion or sacrifice to secure it Just now they were anxious to secure a commercial treaty with Spain; but Spain insisted, as a preliminary condition, that the United States should relinquish all claiation upon a river whose mouths ithin Spanish territory In the Northern mind there was no doubt of the value of trade with Spain; and there was a good deal of doubt whether there was anything worth contending for in the right to sail upon a river running through a wilderness where, as yet, there were few inhabitants, and hardly any trade worth talking about More than that, there was unquestionably a not uncommon belief at the North and East that the settlement and prosperity of the West would be at the expense of the Atlantic States
Perhaps that view of the matter was not loudly insisted upon; but many were none the less persuaded that, if population was attracted ard by the hope of acquiring rich and cheap lands, prosperity and poould go with it At any rate, those of this way of thinking were not inclined to forego a certain good for that which would profit the harm
For these reasons, spoken and unspoken, the Northern , for the sake of a commercial treaty, to concede to Spain the exclusive control of the Mississippi But to pacify the South it was proposed that the concession to Spain should be for only five and twenty years If at the end of that period the navigation of the Mississippi should be worth contending for, the question could be reopened The South was, of course, rather exasperated than pacified by such a proposition The navigation of the river had not only a certain value to theh for not parting with it even for a limited period Concessions noould ht the ht for, it would lessen the chance of success to put off the fighting five and twenty years Indeed, it could not be put off, for as already begun in a s voyages down the river, and the Americans had retaliated upon some petty Spanish settlements Spain, moreover, seemed at first no more inclined to listen to coland watched this controversy with interest She had no expectation of recovering for herself the Floridas, which she had lost in the war of the Revolution, and had finally ceded to Spain by the treaty of 1783; but she was quite willing to see that power get into trouble on the Mississippi question, andthat it should threaten the peace and union of the States Her own boundary line west of the Alleghanies ht possibly be extended far south of the Great Lakes, if the Northern and Southern States should divide into two confederacies; but, apart fro that threatened to check the growth of her late colonies
Fortunately, however, the question was disposed of, before the Constitutional Convention met at Philadelphia, by the failure to secure a treaty The Spanishresistance, to accept as a coation of the river for five and twenty years; but Mr Jay, illing, could he have had his way, to concede anything, found at that stage of the negotiations he could not coress to secure a treaty even in that modified forress in August, 1786, by the vote of seven Northern States against five Southern This, it was assumed, repealed a resolution of the year before, and authorized the secretary to ust, 1785, had been passed by the votes of nine States, and was in confirmation of a provision of the Articles of Confederation declaring that ”no treaties with foreign powers should be entered into but by the assent of nine States” The minority contended that such a resolution could not be repealed by the vote of only seven States, for that would be to violate a fundamental condition of the Articles of Confederation It is easy to see now that there ought not to have been a difference a honorable men on such a point as that Nevertheless Mr Jay, supported by soest Northern men, held that the votes of seven States could be made, in a roundabout way, to authorize an act which the Constitution declared should never be lawful except with the assent of nine States So the secretary went on with his negotiations and came to terms with the Spanish minister
In April the secretary was called upon to report to Congress as the position of these negotiations Then it first publicly appeared that a treaty was actually agreed upon which gave up the right to the Mississippi for a quarter of a century But it was also speedily made plain by various parliamentary motions that the seven votes, which the friends of such a treaty had relied upon, had fallen from seven--even could that number in the end have been of use--to, at best, four The New Jersey delegates had been instructed not to consent to the surrender of the Aate froed the vote of that State; and Rhode Island had also gone over to the other side ”It was considered, on the whole,”
wrote Madison, ”that the project for shutting the Mississippi was at an end”
These details are not unimportant Forty-five years afterward Madison wrote that ”his ress at this ti of Mr Jay's project for shutting the Mississippi” Probably it had occurred to nobody then that within less than twenty years the Province of Louisiana would belong to the United States, when their right to the navigation of the river could be no longer disputed But so long as both its banks froree of latitude southward to the Gulf ren territory, it was of the last importance to the Southern States, whose territory extended to the Mississippi, that the right of way should not be surrendered If a treaty with Spain could be carried that gave up this right, and the Southern States should be compelled to choose between the loss of the Mississippi and the loss of the Union, there could be little doubt as to what their choice would be It was not a question to be postponed till after the Philadelphia Convention had convened; if not disposed of before, the convention ht as well not , show great anxiety
He was glad to know that the South was of one mind on this subject and would not yield an inch He was quite confident that his own State would take the lead, as she soon did, in the firm avowal of Southern opinion
But he rejoiced that the question did not coislature till after the act was passed to send delegates to the Philadelphia Convention That he looked upon as a point gained, and the delegates were presently appointed; but he still despaired of any good co the Mississippi” could be first got rid of
In a recent work[9] Mr Madison is represented as having ”struck a bargain” with the Kentucky delegates to the Virginia asse to the Mississippi question, provided the delegates froinia--would vote for the representation of Virginia at Philadelphia A ”bargain”
i for another, and Madison had no convictions in favor of closing the Mississippi to exchange for a service rendered on behalf of a ain was necessary It was not easy to find anybody in Virginia who needed to be persuaded that the right to the Mississippi must not be surrendered Madison wrote to Monroe in October, 1786, that it would ”be defended by the legislature with as er is that too ainst the federal councils” His only apprehension was lest the Mississippi question should come up in the assembly before the report from the Annapolis Convention should be disposed of, for if that were accepted the appointates to Philadelphia was assured ”I hope,” he wrote to Washi+ngton in November, ”the report will be called for before the business of the Mississippi begins to ferment”
It happened as he wished ”The recoain a week later, ”in favor of a general revision of the federal systereed to” (the emphasis is his own) He afterward reported to Jefferson ”that the project for bartering the Mississippi to Spain was brought before the asse measure had been adopted” There was neither delay nor difficulty in securing the unani the ress to oppose any concession to Spain
But Madison's anxiety was not in the least relieved by the speedy appointates to the Philadelphia Convention; for, he wrote presently to Washi+ngton, ”I am entirely convinced, from what I observe here (at Richress can be reversed, the hopes of carrying this State into a proper federal system will be demolished” He had already said, in the same letter, that the resolutions on the Mississippi question had been ”agreed to unaniates,” and three days before the letter ritten the delegates to Philadelphia had been appointed
FOOTNOTE:
[Footnote 9: _A History of the People of the United States_ Vol i By John Bach McMaster]
CHAPTER VII
THE CONStitUTIONAL CONVENTION
Mr Madison is called ”the Father of the Constitution” A paper written by hiinia, before theof the Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia, and was inia plan,” as it was called, out of which the Constitution was evolved In another way his naotten so long as the other is res of the convention, in which his own part was so active and conspicuous, we know most that we do or ever can know of the perplexities and trials, the concessions and triumphs, the acts of wisdo together time has shown to have been one of the important events in the history of mankind