Part 42 (1/1)

The writer pauses here to contrast our own situation, and I summarize his points We have a slobe, and adravely defective system We have no settled theory of national defence, and no coive us one The e of civilian controversy Co-operation between the army and navy is not studied and practised; much less do there exist any plans, worthy of the name, for the repulse of an invasion, or any readiness worth considering for the prompt equipency We have a great and, in h for the interests it insures, and with equally defective institutions; not built oran utterly inadequate reserve of men, all classes of which would be absorbed at the very outset, without a vestige of preparation for the enrolment of volunteers; distracted by theour colossal e a brain, not merely for the smooth control of its oieldy mechanism, but for the study of rival aims and systems We have no North Sea naval base, no North Sea Fleet, and no North Sea policy Lastly, we stand in a highly dangerous economical position

The writer then deals with the method of invasion, and rejects the obvious one at once, that of sending forth a fleet of transports from one or more of the North Sea ports He co Emden (the nearest to our shores) the port of departure I mention this because, since his own scheme was adopted, it is instructive to note that E by the inspired German press, when the subject was ed across the trail His objections to the North Sea ports apply, he remarks, in reality to all schemes of invasion, whether the conditions be favourable or not One is that secrecy is rendered impossible--and secrecy is vital The collection of the transports would be known in England weeks before the hour was ripe for striking; for all large ports are cosmopolitan and sith potential spies In Germany's case, moreover, suitable shi+ps are none too plentiful, and the nue deduction from her mercantileThis land No other objective is even considered Now the difficulty of transshi+pping and landing troops by boats from transports anchored in deep water, in a safe, swift, and orderly fashi+on, on an open beach, is enorht cause a hue is the most important of all It is imperative that the invaders should seize and proed line of country, to serve as an initial base This once done, they can use other resources; they can bring up transports, land cavalry and heavy guns, pour in stores, and advance But unless this is done, they are impotent, be their sea-coical alternative is then propounded: to despatch an ar sea-going lighters, towed by powerful but shallow-draught tugs, under escort of a powerful co the flotilla, at high tide, if possible, straight upon the shore

Such an expedition could be prepared in absolute secrecy, by turning to account the natural features of the Gerreat port was to be concerned in any way All that was required was sufficient depth of water to float the lighters and tugs; and this is supplied by seven insignificant strea from the Frisian littoral, and already furnished with sates, with one exception, namely, the tidal creek at Norden; for this, it appeared, was one of the chosen seven, and not, as 'Carruthers' supposed, Hilgenriedersiel, which, if you remember, he had no time to visit, and which has, in fact, no stream of any value at all, and no harbour All of these streaenerally canalized; ostensibly with a commercial end, for purposes of traffic with the islands, which are growing health resorts during a lianized under seven distinct sub-divisions--not too great a number in view of its cumbrous character Seawards, the whole of the coast is veiled by the fringe of islands and the zone of shoals Landwards, the loop of railway round the Frisian peninsula would form the line of communication in rear of the seven streams Esens was to be the local centre of adrew to maturity, but not till then

Every detail for the movement of troops under the seven different heads was to be arranged for with secrecy and exactitude many months in advance, and fro would leak out, but care was to be taken that anything that did do so should be attributed to defensivethe establish the Frisian coast; in fact, the same machinery was to be used, and its conversion for offence concealed up to the latest possible moment The same precautions were to be taken in the preliminary work on the spot There, four men only (it was calculated) need be in full possession of the secret One was to represent the I) Another (Bohme) was to superintend the six canals and the construction of the lighters The functions of the third were twofold He was to organize what I may call the local labour--that is, the helpers required for es, and, ation of the seven flotillas through the corresponding channels to the open sea He hly acquainted with the coast, of a social standing not ers and fishermen, and he ht ht duties, lists to which the conscription authorities could when required, give instant legal effect His other function was to police the coast for spies, and to report anything suspicious to von Bruning, ould never be far away On the whole I think that they found the grie, the writer designates himself, the promoter of the scheme, the indispensable link between the two nations He undertakes to furnish reliable inforland, as to the hydrography of the coast selected for the landing, as to the supplies available in its vicinity, and the strategic points to be seized He proposes to be guide-in-chief to the expedition during transit And in the meantime (when not otherwise employed) he was to reside at Norderney, in close touch with the other three, and controlling the cos which were to throw dust in the eyes of the curious [Memmert, by the way, is not mentioned in this memorandu', and proceeds to consider this question in detail I cannot follow hih it is, and shall say at once that he reduces possible landing-places to two, the flats on the Essex coast between Foulness and Brightlingsea, and the Wash--with a decided preference for the latter assuot wind of an invasion at all, would expect transports to be employed, he chooses the sort of spot which they would be least likely to defend, and which, nevertheless, was suitable to the character of the flotillas, and siion they started from There is such a spot on the Lincolnshi+re coast, on the north side of the Wash, _[See Map A]_ known as East Holland It is low-lying land, dyked against the sea, and bordered like Frisia with sand-flats which dry off at loater It is easy of access from the east, by way of Boston Deeps, a deep-water channel for parallel to the shore for ten ainst the swell from the east (the only quarter to be feared); and the Deeps behind it, where there is an average depth of thirty-four feet at loater, would foruns would co that this is just the case where Gere over British shi+ps of the saht to navigate such waters without peril, if, indeed, they could enter this roadstead at all, for there is a bar at thetides The for in the North Sea, are just within thedistance of the orous raid on which is, the writer urges, the true policy of an invader He reports positively that there exist (in a proper military sense) no preparations whatever to meet such an attack East Holland is also the nearest point on the British shores to Ger the coast of Norfolk; much nearer, indeed, than the Essex flats alluded to, and reached by a siate, like the mouth of the Channel and the estuary of the Thames from Harards The distance is 240 sea-hly, fro The time estimated for transit after the flotillas had been assembled outside the islands is from thirty to thirty-four hours

Embarkation is the next topic This could and must be effected in one tide At the six _siels_ there was awhich the water was high enough At Norden a rather longer time was available But this should be a order and were punctually set in h water occurs approximately at the same time at all seven outlets, the difference between the two farthest apart, Carolinensiel and Greetsiel, being only half an hour

Lastly, the special risks attendant on such an expedition are dispassionately weighed X--, though keenly anxious to recouine spirit There are no ree coland by Germany Any such atteues that the advantages of his h the risks, and that most of the risks themselves would attach equally to any other ht overtake the expedition Yes; but if transports were used transhi+pht with the sareater peril But transports could stand off and wait Delay is fatal in any case; unswerving prohters would be in danger of foundering? Beside the point; if the end is worth gaining the risks must be faced Soldiers' lives are sacrificed in tens of thousands on battlefields The flotilla would be de transit by the assault of a few torpedo-boats? Granted; but the same would apply to a fleet of transports, with the added certainty that one lucky shot would send to the bottom ten times the number of soldiers, with less hope of rescue In both cases reliance ilance of the escort It is adht well loith triumph, that if by any ood tiht boats, which could elude the Gerst the flotillas while they were still in process of leaving the siels; it is admitted that in that case the expedition was doomed But it is held that such an event was not to be feared Reckless pluck is abundant in the British Navy, but expert knowledge of the tides and shoals in these waters is utterly lacking The British charts are of no value, and there is no evidence (he reports) that the subject has been studied in any way by the British Admiralty Let me remark here, that I believe Mr 'Davies's' views, as expressed in the earlier chapters, when they were still areat estuaries, are all absolutely sound The 'channel theory', though it only bore indirectly on the grand issue before them, was true, and should be laid to heart, or I should not have wasted space on it

One word more, in conclusion There is an axiom, much in fashi+on now, that there is no fear of an invasion of the British Isles, because if we lose command of the sea, we can be starved--a cheaper and surer way of reducing us to submission It is a loose, valueless axio an article of faith It i to be won or lost definitely; that we may have it to-day and lose it for ever to- like an even struggle the co in the balance for an indefinite tireat odds, it would probably be impossible for our enemies so to bar the avenues of our commerce, so to blockade the ports of our extensive coast-line, and so to overco us, as to bring us to our knees in less than two years, during which ti froain co short of a successful invasion could finally compel us to make peace Our hearts are stout, we hope; but facts are facts; and a successful raid, such as that here sketched, if you will think out its consequences, must appal the stoutest heart It was checkmated, but others may be conceived In any case, we know the way in which they look at these things in Germany

Postscript (March 1903)

IT so happens that while this book was in the press a number of measures have been taken by the Governers which are alluded to above A Coiven to it was a truly extraordinary coned to supplant A site on the Forth has been selected for a new North Sea naval base--an excellent if tardy decision; for ten years or so e becomes in any sense a 'base' A North Sea fleet has also been created--another good measure; but it should be remembered that its shi+ps are notthe principal German squadrons under the circu Couely in favour of a Volunteer Reserve There is nowhat this recommendation will lead to; let us hope not to the fiasco of the last badly conceived experi patent that the tilishmen systematically either for the sea or for the rifle?