Part 20 (1/2)
2 Vide ”Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects,” art. 4.
3 On the Formation of Images, _vide supr._ ch. iii. 1, pp. 27, 28.
4 Liberty of Prophesying, -- 2.
5 This pa.s.sage is already quoted in my ”Essay on Development of Doctrine,” vi. 1, -- 2.
6 Gambier on Moral Evidence, p. 6.
7 ”Supernaturalis mentis a.s.sensus, rebus fidei exhibitus, c.u.m praecipue dependeat a gratia Dei intrinsecus mentem illuminante et commovente, potest esse, et est, major quocunque a.s.sensu cert.i.tudini naturali praest.i.to, seu ex motivis naturalibus orto,” &c.-Dmouski, Inst.i.t. t.
i. p. 28.
8 ”Hoc [viz. multo certior est h.o.m.o de eo quod audit a Deo qui falli non potest, quam de eo quod videt propria ratione qua falli potest]
intelligendum est de cert.i.tudine fidei secundum appretiationem, non secundum intentionem; nam saepe contingit, ut scientia clarius percipiatur ab intellectu, atque ut connexio scientiae c.u.m veritate magis appareat, quam connexio fidei c.u.m eadem; cognitiones enim naturales, utpote captui nostro accommodatae, magis animum quietant, delectant, et veluti. satiant.”-Scavini, Theol. Moral. t. ii. p.
428.
9 ”Suppono enim, veritatem fidei non esse certiorem veritate metaphysica aut geometrica quoad modum a.s.sensionis, sed tantum quoad modum adhaesionis; quia utrinque intellectus absolute sine modo limitante a.s.sent.i.tur. Sola autem adhaesio voluntatis diversa est; quia in actu fidei gratia seu habitus infusus roborat intellectum et voluntatem, ne tam facile mutentur aut perturbentur.”-Amort, Theol.
t. i. p. 312.
”Haec distinctio cert.i.tudinis [ex diversitate motivorum] extrinsecam tantum differentiam importat, c.u.m omnis naturalis cert.i.tudo, formaliter spectata, sit aequalis; debet enim essentialiter erroris periculum amovere, exclusio autem periculi erroris in indivisibili consist.i.t; aut enim babetur aut non habetur.”-Dmouski, ibid. p. 27.
10 ”Fides est certior omni veritate naturali, etiam geometrice aut metaphysice certa; idque non solum cert.i.tudine adhaesionis sed etiam a.s.sentionis.... Intellectus sent.i.t se in multis veritatibus etiam metaphysice certis posse per objectiones perturbari, e. g. si legat scepticos.... E contra circa ea, quae constat esse revelata a Deo, nullus potest perturbari.”-Amort, ibid. p. 367.
11 ii. n. 154. _Vide_ Note at the end of the volume.
12 I have a.s.sumed throughout this Section that all verbal argumentation is ultimately syllogistic; and in consequence that it ever requires universal propositions and comes short of concrete fact. A friend refers me to the dispute between Des Cartes and Ga.s.sendi, the latter maintaining against the former that ”Cogito ergo sum” implies the universal ”All who think exist.” I should deny this with Des Cartes; but I should say (as indeed he said), that his dictum was not an argument, but was the expression of a ratiocinative instinct, as I explain below under the head of ”Natural Logic.”
As to the instance ”Brutes are not men; therefore men are not brutes,” there seems to me no consequence here, neither a _praeter_ nor a _propter_, but a tautology. And as to ”It was either Tom or d.i.c.k that did it; it was not d.i.c.k, ergo,” this may be referred to the one great principle on which all logical reasoning is founded, but really it ought not to be accounted an inference any more than if I broke a biscuit, flung half away, and then said of the other half, ”This is what remains.” It does but state a fact. So, when the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd proposition of Euclid II. is put before the eyes in a diagram, a boy, before he yet has learned to reason, sees with his eyes the fact of the thesis, and this _seeing_ it even makes it difficult for him to master the mathematical proof. Here, then, a _fact_ is stated in the form of an _argument_.
However, I have inserted parentheses at pp. 277 and 283, in order to say ”transeat” to the question.
13 ”Aids to Reflection,” p. 59, ed. 1839.
14 Taylor's Translation, p. 131.
15 Ibid. pp. 108-110.
16 Ibid. pp. 429-436.
17 ”North and South.”
18 Serm. xi. init.
_ 19 Vide supr._ ch. v. -- 1, pp. 109, 113.
20 Pp. 84, 85.
21 ”a.n.a.logy,” pp. 329, 330, ed. 1836.
22 Ibid. p. 278.