Part 7 (1/2)

CHAPTER XI

WHY FREDERICKSBURG WAS LOST

I promised to give my convictions relative to the responsibility for the disaster of Fredericksburg, and I might as well do it here.

Recalling the fact heretofore stated that we seemed to have been thrown against Marye's Heights to be sacrificed; that we were not ordered to charge their works, but to advance and maintain a line of battle-fire where such a thing was absolutely impossible, I come to the inquiry, what was the character and purpose of the movement and why did it fail?

So thoroughly impressed was I that there was something radically wrong about it, that I determined to solve that question if possible, and so made a study of the subject at that time and later after my return home.

I had personal friends in the First and Sixth Corps, which had operated on the extreme left, and I discussed with them the movements that day.

Finally, after my return home, I got access to Covode's congressional reports on the conduct of the war covering that campaign, and from all these sources learned what I then and now believe to be substantially the facts about that campaign. The army was divided into three grand divisions, composed of two army corps each, namely, the Second and Ninth, the right grand division, commanded by Sumner; the First and Sixth, the left grand division, commanded by Franklin, and the Third and Fifth, the centre, commanded by Hooker. The plan of battle was to hold Lee's army at Fredericksburg by a ”feint in force” (which means an attack sufficiently strong to deceive the enemy into the belief that it is the real or main attack) at that point, whilst the left grand division was to throw a pontoon bridge across the river three miles below and turn his flank (_i.e._, get behind them) in the rear of Marye's Heights. For this purpose the left grand division was to advance and attack vigorously. If successful, Lee would then have been between Franklin's forces on the left and our own on the right, with every possibility of being crushed. Hooker was to hold his division in readiness to support either wing. Had this plan been carried out, our work at the right would, at its conception, have been as it appeared to be, a mad sacrifice of men, but with an opportunity later on of pus.h.i.+ng forward and reaping a victory. In that event, our position would have made us a tremendous factor in the result.

Now how was the plan carried out? The student will be puzzled on finding such a paucity of records concerning this disastrous movement. The official doc.u.ments are remarkable for what they do not contain. A study of Covode's reports on the conduct of the war will, I think, justify my conclusions, viz., that the disaster of Fredericksburg was due not to accident, nor to a faulty plan of battle, but to a failure of the left grand division to perform the vital part a.s.signed to it. My information gained at the time was that Franklin was to remain concealed until the signal for our attack came; then he was to cross over and attack vigorously, a military expression, meaning to put all possible vigor and power into the movement. The signal was given as our attack began.

Whatever force may have crossed the river at that time, my information was that the division known as the Pennsylvania Reserve, now numbering probably not more than six thousand men, under General Meade, was the only body of troops which made a determined attack on Lee's right, in support of our work in front of Marye's Heights. Realizing the opportunity, General Meade pushed forward with his usual vigor and, though meeting strenuous opposition, soon found himself well in Lee's rear, but without support. He sent back aide after aide to hurry forward the supporting lines, but without avail, finally galloping back himself.

He found General Birney resting near the bridge with his division. An eye-witness[E] to Meade's interview with Birney says the language of General Meade as he upbraided Birney for not coming to his support was enough to ”almost make the stones creep;” that Meade was almost wild with rage as he saw the golden opportunity slipping away and the slaughter of his men going for naught. He said Birney responded that he agreed with General Meade fully, and was ready and most anxious to come to his support, but that his orders were peremptory to await further orders in his present position: that he had been for an hour trying to find General Franklin to obtain permission to move forward. This loss of time and want of support to Meade's charge changed a possible victory into a fearful disaster. This was substantially the testimony of Major-General Reynolds, commanding the First Corps, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War. Burnside rode down to the left and vigorously expostulated with Franklin for his failure to carry out his orders, and peremptorily ordered him to make the attack as originally directed, whilst he repeated the movement at the right. It was now considerably after noon, and this order was undoubtedly a mistake. The plan of battle had been revealed, and there was practically no hope of success. Had the left grand division vigorously performed its part in the earlier movement, can any one doubt the result? I cannot think so. Had Meade, Reynolds, or Hanc.o.c.k been in command on the left that day, I feel confident that Fredericksburg would have been recorded a glorious victory instead of a horrible slaughter.

Now, why did the left grand division fail to make the attack as ordered?

Halleck, in his report on the operations at Fredericksburg, says ”alleged misunderstanding of orders.” Here is his language:

”It was intended that Franklin's grand division, consisting of the corps of Reynolds (First) and Smith (Sixth), should attack the enemy's right and turn his position on the heights in the rear of Fredericksburg, while Sumner and Hooker attacked him in front. But by some alleged misunderstanding of orders Franklin's operations were limited to a mere reconnoissance, and the direct attacks of Sumner and Hooker were unsupported.” ”Rebellion Records,” vol. xxi., page 47.

Is the theory of a misunderstanding of orders tenable? The records show that on the 11th of December, two days before the battle, Burnside ordered his division commanders to so dispose their troops as to bring them within easy reach of Fredericksburg, and that on that day at twelve o'clock noon these officers were ordered to meet him personally at his head-quarters for final instructions. There are no records of what those instructions were, but is it credible that either general retired from that conference with a misunderstanding as to the plan of battle or of his own part in it? Certain it is that neither Sumner nor Hooker misunderstood.

And the excuse said to have been made by Franklin, that he did not deem the attack on the left practicable, is not consistent with the idea of misunderstanding. Otherwise, why did he attack at all? General Halleck's guarded language clearly indicates where he placed the responsibility for that disaster, and that he did not credit the ”misunderstanding of orders” theory. It is plainly evident Burnside did not accept that excuse, as appears from his celebrated Order No. 8, issued a month later, relieving Franklin, Smith, Newton, Cochran, and Ferrero, and stating as his reason that ”it being evident that these officers can be of no further service to this army,”--the first named being the commander of the left grand division, the second the commander of the Sixth Corps, and the others subordinate commanders in that wing of the army. General Burnside explained to the Committee on the Conduct of the War[F] that in asking the President to approve this order, and making that a condition upon which he would consent to remain at the head of the army, he had explicitly stated, ”that was the only condition on which he could command the Army of the Potomac.” In other words, he could not command that army with those officers as his subordinates. The inference that there had been insubordination is inevitable. It was the current belief amongst us officers of the army that the battle of Fredericksburg had been lost through a want of hearty co-operation, if not direct disobedience of orders, on the part of the officer commanding on the left that day, and some of his subordinates, and that this was due to a spirit of jealousy. McClellan had but recently been removed from the command of the army, and the officers relieved were strong personal friends and partisans of the latter. Again, Burnside, his successor, was alleged to be junior in actual rank to Franklin. Whether either of these facts supplied the motives for the jealousy which lost that battle, if such was true, the judgment day alone will reveal. It is devoutly to be hoped that the light of that day will relieve the terrible disaster of Fredericksburg of this awful shadow, and that nothing worse than a ”misunderstanding of orders” was responsible for it.

That Order No. 8 was disapproved at Was.h.i.+ngton, and General Burnside promptly tendered his resignation of the command of the Army of the Potomac. He felt that he had not received and was not likely to receive the cordial and hearty support of all his subordinate officers, and under those circ.u.mstances he did not want the responsibility of command.

He expressed himself as anxious to serve his country and willing to work anywhere it might please the President to place him. He was not relieved, however, until a month or so later. In writing the foregoing I know that many brave men will take exception. I would say, however, that I have made a somewhat careful study of the subject from an absolutely unprejudiced stand-point, and such are the conclusions I reached, and they were shared by many of my fellow-officers who were in that campaign. The losses in this battle amount to nearly one-third the troops actually engaged, a most remarkable fact, and which stamps this engagement as one of the bloodiest in all history. Burnside reports his loss as twelve hundred and eighty-four killed and nine thousand six hundred wounded, making a total loss, including the missing, of twelve thousand six hundred and fifty-three. Of this loss the right grand division (the Second and Ninth Corps) lost five thousand three hundred and eleven. The left grand division, Franklin's (First and Sixth Corps, which numbered considerably more than the right grand division), lost three thousand four hundred and sixty-two, and most of this was sustained in the second attack in the afternoon. These facts sustain the belief above referred to in the army, that the main attack in the morning on the left was not what it should have been, and was the cause of the disaster.

A remarkable fact connected with this loss is the great number of wounded as compared with the killed. Usually the former exceeds the latter in the proportion of three and four to one, but at Fredericksburg it was nearly nine to one. How this is to be explained I never understood, unless it be that most of the casualties were from exploding sh.e.l.ls. The minute fragments of a sh.e.l.l scatter very widely and wound, whilst there are fewer of the large pieces which kill. For example, the sh.e.l.l that exploded in the front of our second company, as it was turning to enter the street leading out towards Marye's Heights, previously described, knocked out ten men, only one of whom was instantly killed. It is safe to estimate that of the nine thousand six hundred reported as wounded, one-third died or were permanently disabled therefrom.

To show how quickly troops can recover from such a shock as the disaster of Fredericksburg, the Second Corps had a grand review back of Falmouth the second week after the battle. Major-General Edwin V. Sumner, commanding the right grand division, was the reviewing officer. I have spoken before of this distinguished officer. This was his farewell to the Second Corps, which he had long commanded and to which he was greatly attached, a sentiment which was most cordially reciprocated by the men. He was now probably the oldest in years of all the officers in the army, yet still vigorous, intrepid, and efficient. He was relieved from active command in the field and a.s.signed to the command of the Department of the Ohio, but a few months later died peacefully at his home in New York. Is it not singular that this old hero should have escaped the numberless missiles of death in all the battles through which he had pa.s.sed, so soon to succ.u.mb in the quietude of retirement?

Our regiment had present at this review but few over two hundred men, and the other regiments were proportionally small, so that the corps was scarcely larger than a good-sized division, yet it appeared in splendid condition. Its depleted numbers and battle-scarred flags alone told the story of its recent experiences. The following week our regiment was detailed for a ten-days' tour of picket duty, and was encamped some distance above Falmouth in a pretty grove. This change of service was a welcome one to the men in many respects, for there was better foraging opportunities, and there was also considerable excitement attending this service in the presence of the enemy. The Rappahannock River was the dividing line of the two armies, and their respective pickets lined its banks. At this time the two lines were kept as far as possible concealed from each other, though there was practically no picket firing. Later on the two lines were posted in full view of each other, and by agreement under a ”flag of truce” all picket firing was strictly forbidden.

Thereafter, although forbidden, there was more or less conversation carried on between the two lines.

CHAPTER XII

LOST COLORS RECOVERED

In addition to our heavy loss of men at Fredericksburg was the loss of our colors, the stand whose staff had been shot away in my hand as described in a former chapter.

It can be well understood that we felt very keenly the loss of our flag, although we knew that it had been most honorably lost. It was known to have been brought off the field in the night by Corporal William I. D.

Parks, Company H, one of the color-guard, who was mortally wounded, and left by him in a church used as a temporary hospital. Corporal Parks was removed to a hospital at Was.h.i.+ngton, where he died shortly afterwards, and the colors mysteriously disappeared. The act of this color-bearer in crawling off the field with his colors, wounded as he was to the death, was a deed of heroism that has few parallels. We made every effort to find the flag, but without success, and had concluded that it must have been left in Fredericksburg, and so fallen into the hands of the enemy, when a couple of weeks after the battle, on returning from a ride down to Falmouth, I noticed a regiment of our troops having dress parade. I rode near them, and my attention was at once attracted to the fact that they paraded three stands of colors, a most unusual circ.u.mstance. My suspicion was at once aroused that here were our lost colors. Riding closer, my joy was great on recognizing our number and letters on their bullet-and sh.e.l.l-tattered folds, ”132 P. V.” Anger immediately succeeded my joy as I saw that our precious colors were being paraded as a sort of trophy. This flag, under whose folds so many of our brave men had fallen, and which had been so heroically rescued from the field, exhibited to the army and the world as a trophy of the battle by another regiment! It was, in effect, a public proclamation of our cowardice and dishonor and of their prowess in possessing what we had failed to hold and guard, our sacred colors. It stung me to the quick. I do not remember ever to have been more beside myself with anger. It was with difficulty that I contained myself until their ceremony was over, when I rode up to the colonel, in the presence of all his officers, and in a voice which must have betrayed my emotion, demanded to know why he was parading our colors. His reply was, ”Those are the colors of a d----d runaway regiment which my men picked up on the battle-field of Fredericksburg.” My hair and whiskers were somewhat hot in color those days, and I have not kept a record of my language to that colonel for the next few minutes. I sincerely hope the recording angel has not.

Still, I am sure it was the explosion of a righteous indignation.