Part 5 (1/2)
[Ill.u.s.tration: Battle at Vicksburg.]
Vicksburg is four hundred miles above New Orleans, four hundred below Memphis. The river, after pursuing its irregular course for the latter distance through the alluvial bottom lands, turns to the northeast five miles before reaching the Vicksburg bluffs. When it encounters them it sweeps abruptly round, continuing its course southwest, parallel to the first reach; leaving between the two a narrow tongue of low land, from three-quarters to one mile wide. The bluffs at their greatest elevation, just below the point where the river first touches them, are two hundred and sixty feet high; not perpendicular, but sloping down close to the water, their nearness to which continues, with diminis.h.i.+ng elevation, for two miles, where the town of Vicksburg is reached. They then gradually recede, their height at the same time decreasing by degrees to one hundred and fifty feet.
The position was by nature the strongest on the river. The height of the banks, with the narrowness and peculiar winding of the stream, placed the batteries on the hill-sides above the reach of guns on s.h.i.+pboard. At the time of Farragut's first attack, though not nearly so strongly and regularly fortified as afterward, there were in position twenty six[9] guns, viz.: two X-inch, one IX-inch, four VIII-inch, five 42- and two 24-pounder smooth-bores, and seven 32-, two 24-, one 18-, and two 12-pounder rifled guns. Of these, one IX-inch, three VIII-inch, and the 18-pounder rifle were planted at the highest point of the bluffs above the town, in the bend, where they had a raking fire upon the s.h.i.+ps before and after they pa.s.sed their front. Just above these the four 24-pounders were placed.[10] Half a mile below the town was a water battery,[11] about fifty feet above the river, mounting two rifled 32s, and four 42s. The eleven other guns were placed along the crest of the hills below the town, scattered over a distance of a mile or more, so that it was hard for the s.h.i.+ps to make out their exact position. The distance from end to end of the siege batteries was about three miles, and as the current was running at the rate of three knots, while the speed of the fleet was not over eight, three-quarters of an hour at least was needed for each s.h.i.+p to pa.s.s by the front of the works. The upper batteries followed them for at least twenty minutes longer. Besides the siege guns, field batteries in the town, and moving from place to place, took part in the action; and a heavy fire was kept up on the vessels from the rifle-pits near the turn.
On the 26th and 27th of June the schooners were placed in position, nine on the east and eight on the west bank. Bomb practice began on the 26th and was continued through the 27th. On the evening of the latter day Commander Porter notified the admiral that he was ready to cover the pa.s.sage of the fleet.
At 2 A.M. of the 28th the signal was made, and at three the fleet was under way. The vessels advanced in two columns, the Richmond, Hartford, and Brooklyn in the order named, forming the starboard column, with intervals between them long enough to allow two gunboats to fire through. The port column was composed of the Iroquois, the leading s.h.i.+p, and the Oneida, ahead of the Richmond on her port bow, the Wissahickon and Sciota between the Richmond and the Hartford, the Winona and Pinola between the flag-s.h.i.+p and the Brooklyn, and in the rear, on the port quarter of the Brooklyn, the Kennebec and the Katahdin. At four o'clock the mortars opened fire, and at the same moment the enemy, the vessels of the fleet replying as their guns bore. As the Hartford pa.s.sed, the steamers of the mortar flotilla, Octorara, Miami, Jackson, Westfield, Clifton, Harriet Lane, and Owasco, moved up on her starboard quarter, engaging under way the water battery, at a distance of twelve hundred to fifteen hundred yards, and maintaining this position till the fleet had pa.s.sed. The leading vessels, as far as and including the Pinola, continued on, silencing the batteries when fairly exposed to their broadsides, but suffering more or less severely before and after. The prescribed order was not accurately observed, the lack of good pilots leading the s.h.i.+ps to hug the bank on the town side, where the sh.o.r.e was known to be bold, and throwing them into line ahead; the distances also lengthened out somewhat, which lessened the mutual support.
The flag-s.h.i.+p moved slowly, and even stopped for a time to wait for the vessels in the rear; seeing which, Captain Palmer, of the Iroquois, who had reached the turn, also stopped his s.h.i.+p, and let her drift down close to the Hartford to draw a part of the enemy's fire, and to reinforce that of the flag-officer. The upper batteries, like all the others, were silent while the s.h.i.+ps lay in front of them; but as soon as the Hartford and Iroquois moved up they returned to their guns, and followed the rear of the fleet with a spiteful fire till out of range.
The cannonade of the enemy could at no time have been said to be discontinued along the line. The Brooklyn, with the two gunboats following, stopped when above the mortar-steamers, and engaged the batteries within range at a great disadvantage; those ahead having a more or less raking fire upon them. The three remained there for two hours and then retired, the remainder of the fleet having pa.s.sed on beyond and anch.o.r.ed above, at 6 A.M.
Having thus obeyed his orders, the flag-officer reported that the forts had been pa.s.sed and could be pa.s.sed again as often as necessary, a pledge frequently redeemed afterward; but he added, ”it will not be easy to do more than silence the batteries for a time.” The feat had been performed with the steady gallantry that characterized all the similar attempts on the river. Notwithstanding the swift adverse current, the full power of the vessels was not exerted. The loss was 15 killed and 30 wounded, eight of the former being among the crew of the Clifton, which received a shot in her boiler, scalding all but one of the forward powder division. The Confederates reported that none of their guns had been injured, and they mention no casualties.
The action of the three commanders that failed to pa.s.s was severely censured by the flag-officer; nor is it surprising that he should have felt annoyed at finding his fleet separated, with the enemy's batteries between them. It seems clear, however, that the smoke was for a time so thick as to prevent the Brooklyn from seeing that the flag-s.h.i.+p had kept on, while the language of the flag-officer's written order governing the engagement was explicit. It read thus: ”When the vessels reach the bend of the river, should the enemy continue the action, the s.h.i.+ps and Iroquois and Oneida will stop their engines and drop down the river again, keeping up the fire until directed otherwise.” In view of these facts, Captain Craven was certainly justified in maintaining his position until he saw that the flag-s.h.i.+p had pa.s.sed; then it may be doubtful whether the flag-officer's action had not countermanded his orders. The question will be differently answered by different persons; probably the greater number of officers would reply that the next two hours, spent in a stationary position under the batteries, would have been better employed in running by and rejoining the fleet. The error of judgment, if it was one, was bitterly paid for in the mortification caused to a skilful and gallant officer by the censure of the most distinguished seaman of the war.
Above Vicksburg the flag-officer communicated with one of the rams under Lieutenant-Colonel Ellet, who undertook to forward his communications to Davis and Halleck. The s.h.i.+ps were then anch.o.r.ed.
On the 1st of July Davis's fleet arrived. On the 9th an order was received from Was.h.i.+ngton for Commander Porter to proceed to Hampton Roads with twelve mortar-schooners. The next morning he sailed in the Octorara with the schooners in company. On the way down he not only had experience of the increasing difficulty of navigation from the falling of the water, but also his active mind ascertained the extent of the traffic by way of the Red River, and its worth to the Confederacy; as also the subsidiary value of the Atchafalaya Bayou, which, extending through the delta of the Mississippi from the Red River to the Gulf, was then an open highway for the introduction of foreign supplies, as well as the transport of native products. The object and scope of the next year's campaign are plainly indicated in a letter of his addressed to Farragut during his trip down the river.
It was unfortunate that an attempt was not made to hold at once the bluffs below the point where those two highways meet, and blockade them both, instead of wasting time at Vicksburg when there was not then strength enough to hold on.
FOOTNOTES:
[2] For particulars of batteries, see Appendix.
[3] For detailed account of these batteries, see Appendix.
[4] These threw projectiles weighing from sixty to eighty pounds.
[5] Mitch.e.l.l's conduct was approved by a Naval Court of Inquiry.
Higgins, who was most emphatic in his condemnation, could not appear as a witness, the War Department not being willing to spare him from his duties. The difference was one of judgment and, perhaps, of temperament. From Higgins's character it is likely that, had he commanded the naval forces, the Louisiana would either have done more work or come to a different end. As the old proverb says, ”He would have made a spoon or spoiled the horn.”
[6] As this feat has been usually ascribed to the Mana.s.sas, it may be well to say that the statement in the text rests on the testimony of the commander of the ram, as well as other evidence.
[7] There were two Jacksons, the naval steamer Jackson and the River Defence boat Stonewall Jackson.
[8] Colonel Lovell of the Confederate army, who was ordnance and disbursing officer of the River Defence Fleet, and had been twelve years an officer in the United States Navy, testified there was no organization, no discipline, and little or no drill of the crews. He offered to employ a naval officer to drill them, but it does not appear that the offer was accepted. He also testified that he had examined the Ellet ram, Queen of the West, and considered most of the River Defence boats better fitted for their work. The night before the fight, one of them, with Grant, captain of the Quitman, went on board the Mana.s.sas, and there told Warley that they were under n.o.body's orders but those of the Secretary of War, and they were there to show naval officers how to fight. There is plenty of evidence to the same effect. It was impossible to do anything with them.
[9] Quarterly Return of the ordnance officer of the post, June 30, 1862.
[10] The writer is inclined to think these were not ready on June 28th, but were the _new_ battery mentioned in Union and Confederate reports of July 15th.
[11] This, known to the fleet as the hospital battery, was commanded by Captain Todd, a brother-in-law of President Lincoln.
CHAPTER IV.
THE RECOIL FROM VICKSBURG.
The position now occupied by the combined fleets of Farragut and Davis was from three to four miles below the mouth of the Yazoo River, near the neck of the long tongue of land opposite Vicksburg. The armed vessels were anch.o.r.ed on the east side, the transports tied up to the opposite bank. It was known that up the Yazoo was an ironclad ram, similar to one that had been building at Memphis when the capture of that city led to its destruction. The one now in the Yazoo, called the Arkansas, had been taken away barely in time to escape the same fate, and, being yet unfinished, had been towed to her present position. She was about 180 feet long by 30 feet beam, of from 800 to 1,000 tons burden, with a casemate resembling that of other river ironclads, excepting that the ends only were inclined, the sides being in continuation of the sides of the vessel. The deck carrying the guns was about six feet above water. The armor was of railroad iron dovetailed together, the rails running up and down on the inclined ends and horizontally along the sides. The iron thus arranged formed nearly a solid ma.s.s, about three inches thick, heavily backed with timber; and in the casemate between the ports there was a further backing of compressed cotton bales firmly braced. The cotton was covered within by a light sheathing of wood, as a guard against fire.
Her battery of ten guns was disposed as follows: in the bow, two heavy VIII-inch columbiads; in the stern, two 6.4-inch rifles; and in broadside two 6.4-inch rifles, two 32-pounder smooth-bores and two IX-inch Dahlgren sh.e.l.l-guns. The hull proper was light and poorly built. She had twin screws, but the engines were too light, and were moreover badly constructed, and therefore continually breaking down.
Owing to this defect, she sometimes went on sh.o.r.e, and the commanding officer could not feel sure of her obeying his will at any moment.