Part 9 (2/2)

We have spoken above of the spiritual person as diverse from, superior to, and superinduced upon, the animal nature. This is his _position_ in the logical order. We have also spoken of him as submerged under the animal nature, as enslaved to the flesh. By such figures do we strive to express the awfully degraded _condition_ in which every human being is born into the world. And mark, this is simply a natural degradation. Let us then, as philosophers, carry our examination one step farther and ask: In this state of things what would be the fitting occupation of the spiritual person. Is it that ”continuous adjustment”? He turns from it with loathing. Already he has served the ”flesh” a long and grievous bondage. Manifestly, then, he should struggle with all his might to regain his normal condition to become naturally good as well as morally good,--he should fill his soul with thoughts of G.o.d, and then he should make every rational exertion to induce others to follow in his footsteps.

We attain, then, a far different result from Mr. Spencer. ”The highest achievements of science” for us, our ”truth,” guiding us ”to successful action,” is that pure _a priori_ truth, the eternal law of G.o.d which is written in us, and given to us for our guidance to what is truly ”successful action,”--the accordance of our wills with the will of G.o.d.

What we now reach, and what yet remains to be considered of this chapter, is that pa.s.sage in which Mr. Spencer enounces, as he believes, a new principle of philosophy, a principle which will symmetrize and complete the Hamiltonian system, and thus establish it as the true and final science for mankind. Since we do not view this principle in the same light with Mr. Spencer, and especially since it is our intention to turn it upon what he has heretofore written, and demolish that with it, there might arise a feeling in many minds that the whole pa.s.sage should be quoted, that there might be no doubt as to his meaning. This we should willingly do, did our s.p.a.ce permit. Yet it seems not in the least necessary. That part of the pa.s.sage which contains the gist of the subject, followed by a candid epitome of his arguments and ill.u.s.trations, would appear to be ample for a fair and sufficiently full presentation of his theory, and for a basis upon which we might safely build our criticism. These then will be given.

”There still remains the final question--What must we say concerning that which transcends knowledge? Are we to rest wholly in the consciousness of phenomena? Is the result of inquiry to exclude utterly from our minds everything but the relative; or must we also believe in something beyond the relative?

”The answer of pure logic is held to be, that by the limits of our intelligence we are rigorously confined within the relative; and that anything transcending the relative can be thought of only as a pure negation, or as a non-existence. 'The _absolute_ is conceived merely by a negation of conceivability,' writes Sir William Hamilton. 'The _Absolute_ and the _Infinite_,' says Mr. Mansel, 'are thus, like the _Inconceivable_ and the _Imperceptible_, names indicating, not an object of thought or of consciousness at all, but the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible.' From each of which extracts may be deduced the conclusion, that, since reason cannot warrant us in affirming the positive existence of what is cognizable only as a negation, we cannot rationally affirm the positive existence of anything beyond phenomena.

”Unavoidable as this conclusion seems, it involves, I think, a grave error. If the premiss be granted, the inference must doubtless be admitted; but the premiss, in the form presented by Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel, is not strictly true. Though, in the foregoing pages, the arguments used by these writers to show that the Absolute is unknowable, have been approvingly quoted; and though these arguments have been enforced by others equally thoroughgoing, yet there remains to be stated a qualification, which saves us from that scepticism otherwise necessitated. It is not to be denied that so long as we confine ourselves to the purely logical aspect of the question, the propositions quoted above must be accepted in their entirety; but when we contemplate its more general, or psychological aspect, we find that these propositions are imperfect statements of the truth; omitting, or rather excluding, as they do, an all-important fact. To speak specifically:--Besides that _definite_ consciousness of which Logic formulates the laws, there is also an _indefinite_ consciousness which cannot be formulated. Besides complete thoughts, and besides the thoughts which, though incomplete, admit of completion, there are thoughts which it is impossible to complete, and yet which are still real, in the sense that they are normal affections of the intellect.

”Observe in the first place, that every one of the arguments by which the relativity of our knowledge is demonstrated, distinctly postulates the positive existence of something beyond the relative. To say that we cannot know the Absolute, is, by implication, to affirm that there _is_ an Absolute. In the very denial of our power to learn _what_ the Absolute is, there lies hidden the a.s.sumption _that_ it is; and the making of this a.s.sumption proves that the Absolute has been present to the mind, not as a nothing but as a something. Similarly with every step in the reasoning by which this doctrine is upheld. The Noumenon, everywhere named as the ant.i.thesis of the Phenomenon, is throughout necessarily thought of as an actuality. It is rigorously impossible to conceive that our knowledge is a knowledge of Appearances only, without at the same time conceiving a Reality of which they are appearances; for appearance without reality is unthinkable.” After carrying on this train of argument a little further, he reaches this just and decisive result.

”Clearly, then, the very demonstration that a _definite_ consciousness of the Absolute is impossible to us, unavoidably presupposes an indefinite consciousness of it.” Carrying the argument further, he says: ”Perhaps the best way of showing that, by the necessary conditions of thought, we are obliged to form a positive though vague consciousness of this which transcends distinct consciousness, is to a.n.a.lyze our conception of the ant.i.thesis between Relative and Absolute.” He follows the presentation of certain ”antinomies of thought” with an extract from Sir William Hamilton's words, in which the logician enounces his doctrine that in ”correlatives” ”the positive alone is real, the negative is only an abstraction of the other”; or, in other words, the one gives a substance of some kind in the mind, the other gives simply nothingness, void, absolute negation. Criticizing this, Mr. Spencer is unquestionably right in saying: ”Now the a.s.sertion that of such contradictories 'the negative is _only_ an abstraction of the other'--'is _nothing else_ than its negation'--is not true. In such correlatives as Equal and Unequal, it is obvious enough that the negative concept contains something besides the negation of the positive one; for the things of which equality is denied are not abolished from consciousness by the denial. And the fact overlooked by Sir William Hamilton is, that the like holds, even with those correlatives of which the negative is inconceivable, in the strict sense of the word.”

Proceeding with his argument, he establishes, by ample ill.u.s.tration, the fact that a ”something const.i.tutes our consciousness of the Non-relative or Absolute.” He afterwards shows plainly by quotations, ”that both Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel do,” in certain places, ”distinctly imply that our consciousness of the Absolute, indefinite though it is, is positive not negative.” Further on he argues thus: ”Though Philosophy condemns successively each attempted conception of the Absolute; though it proves to us that the Absolute is not this, nor that, nor that; though in obedience to it we negative, one after another, each idea as it arises; yet as we cannot expel the entire contents of consciousness, there ever remains behind an element which pa.s.ses into new shapes. The continual negation of each particular form and limit simply results in the more or less complete abstraction of all forms and limits, and so ends in an indefinite consciousness of the unformed and unlimited.”

Thus he brings us to ”the ultimate difficulty--How can there possibly be const.i.tuted a consciousness of the unformed and unlimited, when, by its very nature, consciousness is possible only under forms and limits?”

This he accounts for by by hypostatizing a ”raw material” in consciousness which is, must be, present. He presents his conclusion as follows: ”By its very nature, therefore, this ultimate mental element is at once necessarily indefinite and necessarily indestructible. Our consciousness of the unconditioned being literally the unconditioned consciousness, or raw material of thought, to which in thinking we give definite forms, it follows that an ever-present sense of real existence is the very basis of our intelligence.” ...

”To sum up this somewhat too elaborate argument:--We have seen how, in the very a.s.sertion that all our knowledge, properly so called, is Relative, there is involved the a.s.sertion that there exists a Non-relative. We have seen how, in each step of the argument by which this doctrine is established, the same a.s.sumption is made. We have seen how, from the very necessity of thinking in relations, it follows that the Relative itself is inconceivable, except as related to a real Non-relative. We have seen that, unless a real Non-relative or Absolute be postulated, the Relative itself becomes absolute, and so brings the argument to a contradiction. And on contemplating the process of thought, we have equally seen how impossible it is to get rid of the consciousness of an actuality lying behind appearances; and how, from this impossibility, results our indestructible belief in that actuality.”

The approval which has been accorded to certain of the arguments adduced by Mr. Spencer in favor of his especial point, that the Absolute is a positive somewhat in consciousness, and to that point as established, must not be supposed to apply also to that hypothesis of ”indefinite consciousness” by which he attempts to reconcile this position with his former teachings. On the contrary, it will be our purpose hereafter to show that this hypothesis is a complete fallacy.

As against the positions taken by Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel, Mr. Spencer's argument may unquestionably be deemed decisive. Admitting the logical accuracy of their reasoning, he very justly turns from the logical to the psychological aspect of the subject, takes exception to their premiss, shows conclusively that it is fallacious, and gives an approximate, though unfortunately a very partial and defective presentation of the truth. Indeed, the main issue which must now be made with him is whether the position he has here taken, and which he puts forth as that peculiar element in his philosophical system, that new truth, which shall harmonize Hamiltonian Limitism with the facts of human nature, is not, when carried to its logical results, in diametrical and irreconcilable antagonism to that whole system, and all that he has before written, and so does not annihilate them. It will be our present endeavor to show that such is the result.

Perhaps we cannot better examine Mr. Spencer's theory than, first, to take up what we believe to be the element of truth in it, and carry out this to its logical results; and afterwards to present what seem to be the elements of error, and show them to be such.

1. ”We are obliged to form a positive though vague consciousness of”

”the Absolute.” Without criticizing his use here of consciousness as if it were a faculty of knowledge, and remembering that we cannot have a consciousness of anything without having a knowledge commensurate with that consciousness, we will see that Mr. Spencer's a.s.sertion is tantamount to saying, We have a positive knowledge that the Absolute is.

It does not seem that he himself can disallow this. Grant this, and our whole system follows, as does also the fallacy of his own. Our argument will proceed thus. Logic is the science of the pure laws of thought, and is mathematically accurate, and is absolute. Being such, it is law for all intellect, for G.o.d as well as man. But three positions can be taken.

Either it is true for the Deity, or else it is false for him, or else it has no reference to him. In the last instance G.o.d is Chaos; in the second he and man are in organic contradiction, and he created man so; the first is the one now advocated. The second and third hypotheses refute themselves in the statement of them. Nothing remains but the position taken that the laws of Logic lie equally on G.o.d and man. One of those laws is, that, if any a.s.sertion is true, all that is logically involved in it is true; in other words, all truth is in absolute and perfect harmony. This is fundamental to the possibility of Logic. Now apply this law to the psychological premiss of Mr. Spencer, that we have a positive knowledge that the Absolute is. A better form of expression would be, The absolute Being is. It follows then that he is in a _mode_, has a _formal_ being. But three hypotheses are possible. He is in no mode, he is in one mode; he is in all modes. If he is in no mode, there is no form, no order, no law for his being; which is to say, he is Chaos. Chaos is not G.o.d, for Chaos cannot organize an orderly being, and men are orderly beings, and were created. If he is in all modes, he is in a state of utter contradiction. G.o.d ”is all in every part.” He is then all infinite, and all finite. Infinity and finiteness are contradictory and mutually exclusive qualities. G.o.d is wholly possessed of contradictory and mutually exclusive qualities, which is more than unthinkable--it is absurd. He is, must be, then, in one mode. Let us pause here for a moment and observe that we have clearly established, from Mr. Spencer's own premiss, the fact that G.o.d _is limited_. He must be in one mode to the exclusion of all other modes. He is limited then by the necessity to be what he is; and if he could become what he is not, he would not have been absolute. Since he is absolute, he is, to the exclusion of the possibility of any other independent Being. Other beings are, and must therefore be, dependent on and subordinate to him.

Since he is superior to all other beings he must be in the highest possible mode of being. Personality is the highest possible mode of being. This will appear from the following considerations. A person, possesses the reason and law of his action, and the capacity to act, within himself, and is thus a _final cause_. No higher form of being than this can be needed, and so by the law of parsimony a hypothesis of any other must be excluded. G.o.d is then a person.

We have now brought the argument to that point where its connection with the system advocated in this treatise is manifest. If the links are well wrought, and the chain complete, not only is this system firmly grounded upon Mr. Spencer's premiss, but, as was intimated on an early page, he has in this his special point given partial utterance to what, once established, involves the fallacy not only of all he has written before, but as well of the whole Limitist Philosophy. It remains now to remark upon the errors in his form of expressing the truth.

2. Mr. Spencer's error is twofold. He treats of consciousness as a faculty of knowledge. He speaks of a ”vague,” an ”indefinite consciousness.” Let us examine these in their order.

_a._ He treats of consciousness as a faculty of knowledge. In this he uses the term in the inexact, careless, popular manner, rather than with due precision. As has been observed on a former page, consciousness is the light in which the person sees his faculties act. Thus some feeling is affected. This feeling is cognized by the intellectual faculty, and of this the person is conscious. Hence it is an elliptical expression to say ”I am conscious of the feeling.” The full form being ”I am conscious that I know the feeling.” Thus is it with all man's activities. Applying this to the case in hand, it appears, not that we are conscious of the Absolute, but that we are conscious that the proper intellectual faculty, the Pure Reason, presents what absoluteness is, and that the absolute Person is, and through this presentation--intuition--the spiritual person knows these facts. We repeat, then, our position: consciousness is the indivisible unity, the light in which the person sees all his faculties and capacities act; and so is to be considered as different in kind from them all as the peculiar and unique endowment of a spiritual person.

_b._ Mr. Spencer speaks of a ”vague,” an ”indefinite consciousness.” The expression ”vague consciousness” being a popular and very common one, deserves a careful examination, and this we hope to give it, keeping in mind meantime the position already attained.

The phrase is used in some such connection as this, ”I have a vague or undefined consciousness of impending evil.” Let us a.n.a.lyze this experience. In doing so it will be observed that the consciousness, or rather the seeing by the person in the light of consciousness, is positive, clear, and definite, and is the apprehension of a feeling.

Again, the feeling is positive and distinct; it is a feeling of dread, of threatening danger. What, then, is vague--is undefined? This. That cause which produces the feeling lies without the reach of the cognitive faculties, and of course cannot be known; because what produces the feeling is unknown, the intellectual apprehension experiences a sense of vagueness; and this it instinctively carries over and applies to the feeling. Yet really the sense of vagueness arises from an ignorance of the cause of the feeling. Strictly speaking, then, it is not consciousness that is vague; and so Mr. Spencer's ”_indefinite_ consciousness, which cannot be formulated,” has no foundation in fact.

But this may be shown by another line of thought. Consciousness is commensurate with knowledge, _i. e._, man can have no knowledge except he is conscious of that knowledge; neither can he have any consciousness except he knows that the consciousness is, and what the consciousness is, _i. e._, what he is conscious of. Now all knowledge is definite; it is only ignorance that is indefinite. When we say that our knowledge of an object is indefinite, we mean that we partly know its characteristics, and are partly ignorant of them. Thus then also the result above stated follows; and what Mr. Spencer calls ”_indefinite_ consciousness” is a ”_definite_ consciousness” that we partly know, and are partly ignorant of the object under consideration.

In the last paragraph but one, of the chapter now under consideration, Mr. Spencer makes a most extraordinary a.s.sertion respecting consciousness, which, when examined in the light of the positions we have advocated, affords another decisive evidence of the fallacy of his theory. We quote it again, that the reader may not miss of giving it full attention. ”By its very nature, therefore, this ultimate mental element is at once necessarily indefinite and necessarily indestructible. Our consciousness of the unconditioned being literally _the unconditioned consciousness_, or _raw material of thought_, to which in thinking we give definite forms, it follows that an ever-present sense of real existence is the very basis of our intelligence.” Upon reading this pa.s.sage, the question spontaneously arises, What does the writer mean? and it is a question which is not so easily answered. More than one interpretation may be a.s.signed, as will appear upon examination. A problem is given. To find what the ”raw material of thought” is. Since man has thoughts, there must be in him the ”raw material of thought”--the crude thought-ore which he smelts down in the blast-furnace of the Understanding, giving forth in its stead the refined metal--exact thought. We must then proceed to attain our answer by a.n.a.lyzing man's natural organization.

Since man is a complex, const.i.tuted being, there is necessarily a logical order to the parts which are combined in the complexity. He may be considered as a substance in which a const.i.tution inheres, _i. e._, which is organized according to a _set_ of fixed laws, and that set of laws may be stated in their logical order. It is sufficient, however, for our purpose to consider him as an organized substance, the organization being such that he is a person--a selfhood, _self-active_ and capable of self-examination. The raw material of _all_ the activities of such a person is this organized substance. Take away the substance, and there remains only the set of laws as _abstract_ ideas.

Again, take away the set of laws, and the substance is simple, unorganized substance. In the combining of the two the person becomes.

These, then, are all there is of the person, and therefore in these must the raw material be. From this position it follows directly that any capacity or faculty, or, in general, every activity of the person, is the substance acting in accordance with the law which determines that form of the activity. To explain the term, form of activity. There is a _set_ of laws. Each law, by itself, is a simple law, and is incapable of organizing a substance into a being. But when these laws are considered, as they naturally stand in the Divine Reason, in relation to each other, it is seen that this, their standing together, const.i.tutes ideals, or forms of being and activity. To ill.u.s.trate from an earthly object. The law of gravitation alone could not organize a Universe; neither could the law of cohesion, nor of centripetal, nor centrifugal force, nor any other one law. All these laws must be acting together,--or rather all these laws must stand together in perfect harmony, according to their own nature, thus const.i.tuting an ideal form, in accordance with which G.o.d may create this Universe. For an ill.u.s.tration of our topic in its highest form, the reader is referred to those pages of Dr. Hickok's ”Rational Psychology,” where he a.n.a.lyzes personality into its elements of Spontaneity, Autonomy, and Liberty. From that examination it is sufficiently evident that either of these alone cannot organize a person, but that all three must be present in order to const.i.tute such a being. There are, then, various forms of activity in the person, as Reason, Sensibility, and Will, in each of which the organized substance acts in a mode or form, and this form is determined by the set of organizing laws. Consciousness also is such a form. The ”raw material of thought,” then, must be this substance considered under the peculiar form of activity which we call consciousness, but _before the substance thus formulated has been awakened into activity by those circ.u.mstances which are naturally suited to it, for bringing it into action_. Now, by the very terms of the statement it is evident that the substance thus organized in this form, or, to use the common term, consciousness considered apart from and prior to its activity, can never be known _by experience_, i. e., _we can never be conscious of an unconscious state_.

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