Part 6 (1/2)

In proceeding with our examination, all the defects which were formerly noticed as belonging to the system of the Limitists will here be found plainly observable. Following his teacher, Mr. Mansel holds the Understanding to be the highest faculty of the human intellect, and the consequent corollary that a judgment is its highest form of knowledge.

The word ”conceive” he therefore uses as expressive of the act of the mind in grasping together various marks into a concept, when that word and act of mind are utterly irrelevant to the object to which he applies them; and hence they can have no meaning as used. We shall see him speak of ”starting from the divine, and reasoning down to the human”; or of ”starting from the human, and reasoning up to the divine”; where, upon the hypothesis that the two are entirely diverse, no reasoning process, based upon either one, can reach the other. On the other hand, if any knowledge of G.o.d is possible to the created mind, it is only on the ground that there is a similarity, an exact likeness in certain respects, between the two; in other words, that the Creator plainly declared a simple fact, in literal language, when he said, ”G.o.d made man in his own image.” If man's mind is wholly unlike G.o.d's mind, he cannot know truth as G.o.d knows it. And if the human intellect is thus faulty, man cannot be the subject of a moral government, for every subject of a moral government is amenable to law. In order to be so amenable, he must know the law _as it is_. No phantasmagoria of law, no silhouette will do. It must be immediately seen, and known to be binding. Truth is _one_. He, then, who sees it as it is, and knows it to be binding, sees it as G.o.d sees it, and feels the same obligation that G.o.d feels. And such an one must man be if he is a moral agent. Whether he is such an agent or not, we will not argue here; since all governments and laws of society are founded upon the hypothesis that he is, it may well be a.s.sumed as granted.

Of the ”three terms, familiar as household words,” which Mr. Mansel, in his second lecture, proceeds to examine, it is to be said, that ”First Cause,” if properly mentioned at all, should have been put last; and that ”Infinite” and ”Absolute” are not pertinent to Cause, but to Person. So then when we consider ”the Deity as He is,” we consider him, not as Cause, for this is _incidental_, but as the infinite and absolute Person, for these three marks are _essential_. Further, these last-mentioned terms express ideas in the Reason; while the term Cause expresses ”an _a priori_ Element of connection, and thus a primitive understanding-conception.” Hardly more satisfactory than his use of the term Cause is his definition of the terms absolute and infinite. He defines ”the Absolute” to be ”that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other Being,” when it is rather the exclusion of the possibility of any other Being. Again, he defines ”the Infinite” to be ”that which is free from all possible limitation; that than which a greater is inconceivable; and which, consequently, can receive no additional attribute or mode of existence which it had not from all eternity.” ”That which” means the thing which, for which is neuter. Mr. Mansel's infinite is, then, the _Thing_. This _Thing_ ”is free from all possible limitation.” How can that be when the Being he thus defines is, must be, necessarily existent, and so is bound by one of the greatest of limitations, the inability to cease to be. But some light may be thrown upon his use of the term ”limitation” by the subsequent portions of his definition. The Thing ”which is free from all possible limitation” is ”that than which a greater is inconceivable.”

Moreover, this greatest of all possible things possesses all possible ”attributes,” and is in every possible ”mode of existence” ”from all eternity.” Respecting the phrase ”than which a greater is inconceivable,” two suppositions may be made. Either there may be a thing ”greater” than, and diverse from, all other things; or there may be a thing greater than, and including all, other things. Probably the latter is Mr. Mansel's thought; but it is Materialistic Pantheism. This Being must be in every ”mode of existence” ”from all eternity.”

Personality is a ”mode of existence”; therefore this Being must forever have been in that mode. But impersonality is also a mode of existence, therefore this Being must forever have been in that mode. Yet again these two modes are contradictory and mutually exclusive; then this Being must have been from all eternity in two contradictory and mutually exclusive modes of existence! Is further remark necessary to show that Mr. Mansel's definition is thoroughly vitiated by the understanding-conception that infinity is amount, and is, therefore, utterly worthless? Can there be a thing so great as to be without limits? Has greatness anything to do with infinity? Manifestly not. It becomes necessary, then, to recur to and amplify those definitions which we have already given to the terms he uses.

Absoluteness and infinity are qualities of the necessary Being.

Absoluteness is that quality of the necessary Being by which he is endowed with self-existence, self-dependence, and totality. Or in other words, having this quality, he is wholly independent of any other being; and also the possibility of the existence of any other independent Being is excluded; and so he is the Complete, the Final, upon whom all possible beings must depend.

Infinity is that quality of the necessary Being which gives him universality in the totality. It expresses the fact, that he possesses all possible endowments in perfection.

Possessing these qualities, that Being is free from any external restraint or limitation; but those restraints and limitations, which his very const.i.tuting elements themselves impose, are not removed by these qualities. For instance, the possession of Love, Mercy, Justice, Wisdom, Power, and the like, are essential to G.o.d's entirety; and the possession of them in _perfect harmony_ is essential to his perfectness in the entirety. This fact of perfect harmony, exact balance, bars him from the _undue_ exercise of any one of his attributes; or, concisely, his perfection restrains him from being imperfect. We revert, then, to the fundamental distinction, attained heretofore, between improper limitations, or those which are involved in perfection; and proper limitations, or those which are involved in deficiency and dependence; and applying it here, we see that those limitations, which we speak of as belonging to G.o.d, are not indicative of a lack, but rather are necessarily incidental to that possession of all possible perfection which const.i.tutes him the Ultimate.

In this view infinity can have no relevancy to ”number.” It is not that G.o.d has one, or one million endowments. It asks no question about the number; and cares not for it. It is satisfied in the a.s.sertion that he possesses _all that are possible_, and in perfect harmony. It is, further, an idea, not a concept. It must be intuited, for it cannot be ”conceived.” No a.n.a.logy of ”line” or ”surface” has any pertinence; because these are concepts, belonging wholly in the Understanding and Sense, where no idea can come. Yet it may be, _is_, the quality of an intelligence endowed with a limited number of attributes;--for there can be no number without limitation, since the phrase unlimited number is a contradiction of terms;--but this limitation involves no lack, because there are no ”others,” which can be ”thereby related to it, as cognate or opposite modes of consciousness.” Without doubt it is, in a certain sense, true, that ”the metaphysical representation of the Deity, as absolute and infinite, must necessarily, as the profoundest metaphysicians have acknowledged, amount to nothing less than the sum of all reality.” This sense is that all reality is by him, and for him, and from him; and is utterly dependent upon him. But Hegel's conclusion by no means follows, in which he says: ”What kind of an Absolute Being is that which does not contain in itself all that is actual, even evil included.” This is founded upon the suppressed premiss, that such a Being _must_ do what he does, and his creatures _must_ do what they do; and so evil must come. This much only can be admitted, and this may be admitted, without derogating aught from G.o.d's perfectness: viz., that he sees in the ideals of his Reason _how_ his laws may be violated, and so, how sin may and will be in this moral system; but it is a perversion of words to say that this knowledge on the part of G.o.d is evil.

The knowing how a moral agent may break the perfect law, is involved in the knowing how such agent may keep that law. But the fact of the knowledge does not involve any whit of consent to the act of violation.

On the other hand, it may, does, become the ground for the putting forth of every wise effort to prevent that act. Again; evil is produced by those persons whom G.o.d has made, who violate his moral laws. He being perfectly wise and perfectly good, for perfectly wise and good reasons sustains them in the ability to sin. There can be, in the nature of things, no persons at all, without this ability to sin. But G.o.d does not direct them to sin; neither when they do sin does any stain fall upon him for sustaining their existence during their sinning. That definition of the term absolute, upon which Hegel bases his a.s.sertion, is one fit only for the Sense and Understanding; as if G.o.d was the physical sum of all existence. It is Materialistic Pantheism. But by observing the definitions and distinctions, which have been heretofore laid down, it may be readily seen how an actual mode of existence, as that of finite person, may be denied to G.o.d, and no lack be indicated thereby. Hegel's blasphemy may, then, be answered as follows: G.o.d is the infinite and absolute spiritual Person. Personality is the form of his being. The form cannot be empty. Organized essence fills the form. Infinity and absoluteness are _qualities_ of the Person as thus organized. The quality of absoluteness, for instance, as transfusing the essence, is the endowment of pure independence, and involves the exclusion of the possibility of any other independent Being, and the possession of the ability to create every possible dependent being. In so far, then, as Hegel's a.s.sertion means that no being can exist, and do evil, except he is created and sustained by the Deity, it is true. But in so far as it means--and this is undoubtedly what Hegel did mean--that G.o.d must be the efficient author of sin, that, forced by the iron rod of Fate, he must produce evil, the a.s.sertion is utterly false, and could only have been uttered by one who, having dwelt all his life in the gloomy cave of the Understanding, possessed not even a tolerably correct notion of the true nature of the subject he had in hand,--the character of G.o.d. From the above considerations it is apparent that all the requirements of the Reason are fulfilled when it is a.s.serted that all things--the Universe--are dependent upon G.o.d; and he is utterly independent.

The paragraphs next succeeding, which have been quoted with entire approbation by Mr. Herbert Spencer, are thoroughly vitiated by their author's indefensible a.s.sumption, that cause is ”indispensable” to our idea of the Deity. As was remarked above, the notion of cause is incidental. The Deity may or may not become a cause, as he shall decide. But he has no choice as to whether he shall be a person or not.

Hence we may freely admit that ”the cause, as such, exists only in relation to its effect: the cause is a cause of the effect; the effect is an effect of the cause.” It is also true that ”the conception”--idea--”of the Absolute implies a possible existence out of all relation.” The position we have taken is in advance of this, for we say, involves an actual existence out of all relation. Introducing, then, not ”the idea of succession in time,” but the idea of the logical order, we rightly say, ”the Absolute exists first by itself, and afterwards becomes a Cause.” Nor are we here ”checked by the third conception, that of the Infinite.” ”Causation is a possible mode of existence,” and yet ”that which exists without causing” is infinite. How is this? It is thus. Infinity is the universality of perfect endowment.

Now, taking as the point of departure the first creative nisus or effort of the Deity, this is true. Before that act he was perfect in every possible endowment, and accorded his choice thereto. He was able to create, but did not, for a good and sufficient reason. In and after that act, he was still perfect as before. That act then involved no _essential_ change in G.o.d. But he was in one mode of being before, and in another mode of being in and after that act. Yet he was equally perfect, and equally blessed, before as after. What then follows? This: that there was some good and sufficient reason why before that act he should be a potential creator, and in that act he should become an actual creator: and this reason preserves the perfection, _i. e._ the infinity of G.o.d, equally in both modes. When, then, Mr. Mansel says, ”if Causation is a possible mode of existence, that which exists without causing is not infinite, that which becomes a cause has pa.s.sed beyond its former limits,” his utterance is prompted by that pantheistic understanding-conception of G.o.d, which thinks him the sum of all that was, and is, and ever shall be, or can be; and that in all this, he is _actual_. On the other hand, as we have seen, all that is required to fulfil the idea of infinity is, that the Being, whom it qualifies, possesses all fulness, has all the forms and springs of being in himself. It is optional with him whether he will create or not; and his remaining out of all relation, or his creating a Universe, and thus establis.h.i.+ng relations to and for himself, in no way affect his essential nature, _i. e._ his infinity. He is a person, possessing all possible endowments, and in this does his infinity consist. In this view, ”creation at any particular moment of time” is seen to be the only possible hypothesis by which to account for the Universe. Such a _Person_, the necessary Being, must have been in existence before the Universe; and his first act in producing that Universe would mark the first moment of time. No ”alternative of Pantheism” is, can be, presented to the advocates of this theory. On the other hand, that scheme is seen to be both impossible and absurd.

One cannot disagree with Mr. Mansel, when in the next paragraph he says, that, ”supposing the Absolute to become a cause, it will follow that it operates by means of free will and consciousness.” But the difficulties which he then raises lie only in the Understanding, and may be explained thus. Always in G.o.d's consciousness _the subject and object are identical_. All that G.o.d is, is always present to his Eye. Hence all relations always appear subordinate to, and dependent upon him; and it is a misapprehension of the true idea to suppose, that any relation which falls _in idea_ within him, and only becomes actual at his will, is any proper limitation. Both subject and object are thus absolute, being identical; and yet there is no contradiction.

The difficulty is further raised that there cannot be in the absolute Being any interrelations, as of attributes among themselves, or of attributes to the Being. This arises from an erroneous definition of the term absolute. The definition heretofore given in this treatise presents no such difficulty. The possession of these attributes and interrelations is essential to the exclusion by then possessor of another independent Being; and it is a perversion to so use a quality which is essential to a being, that it shall militate against the consistency of his being what he must be. If then ”the almost unanimous voice of philosophy, in p.r.o.nouncing that the absolute is both one and simple,” uses the term ”simple” in the same sense that it would have when applied to the idea of moral obligation, viz., that it is una.n.a.lyzable, then that voice is wrong, just as thoroughly as the voice of antiquity in favor of the Ptolemaic system of Astronomy was wrong; and is to be treated as that was. On such questions _opinions_ have no weight. The search is after a knowledge which is sure, and which every man may have within himself. We land, then, in no ”inextricable dilemma.” The absolute Person we see to be conscious; and to possess complexity in unity, universality in totality. By an immediate intuition we know him as primarily out of all relation, plurality, difference, and likeness; and yet as having, of his own self, established the Universe, which is still entirely dependent upon him; from which he differs, and with which he is not identified.

Again Mr. Mansel says: ”A mental attribute to be conceived as infinite, must be in actual exercise on every possible object: otherwise it is potential only, with regard to those on which it is not exercised; and an unrealized potentiality is a limitation.” With our interpretation the a.s.sertion is true and contains no puzzle. Every mental attribute of the Deity is most a.s.suredly ”in actual exercise,” upon every one of its ”possible objects” _as ideas_. But the objects are not therefore actual.

Neither is there any need that they should ever become so. He sees them just as clearly, and knows them just as thoroughly as ideals, as he does as actual objects. All ideal objects are ”unrealized potentialities”; and yet they are the opposite of limitations proper. But this sentence, as an expression of the thought which Mr. Mansel seemingly wished to convey, is vitiated by the presence of that understanding-conception that infinity is amount, which must be actual. Once regard infinity as _quality_ of the necessarily existent Person, and it directly follows that this or that act, of that Person, in no way disturbs that infinity.

The quality conditions the acting being; but the act of that being cannot limit the quality. The quality is, that the act may be; not the reverse. Hence the questions arising from the interrelations of Power and Goodness, Justice and Mercy, are solved at once. Infinity as quality, not amount, pervades them all, and holds them all in perfect harmony, adjusting each to each, in a melody more beautiful than that of the spheres. Even ”the existence of Evil” is ”compatible with that of”

this ”perfectly good Being.” He does not will that it shall be; neither does he will that it shall not be. If he willed that it should not be, and it was, then he would be ”thwarted”; but only on such a hypothesis can the conclusion follow. But he does will that certain creatures shall be, who, though dependent upon him for existence and sustenance, are, like him, final causes,--the final arbiters of their own destinies, who in the choice of ends are unrestrained, and may choose good or ill. He made these creatures, knowing that some of them would choose wrong, and so evil would be: but _he_ did not will the evil. He only willed the conditions upon which evil was possible, and placed all proper bars to prevent the evil; and the _a priori_ facts of his immutable perfection in endowments, and of his untarnished holiness, are decisive of the consequent fact, that, in willing those conditions, G.o.d did the very best possible deed. If it be further a.s.serted that the fact, that the Being who possesses all possible endowments in perfection could not wisely prevent sin, is a limitation; and, further, that it were better to have prevented sin by an unwise act than to have permitted it by a wise act; it can only be replied: This is the same as to say, that it is essential to G.o.d's perfection that he be imperfect; or, that it was better for the perfect Being to violate his Self than to permit sin. If any one in his thinking chooses to accept of such alternatives, there remains no ground of argument with him; but only ”a certain fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation which shall devour the adversary.”

Carrying on his presentation of difficulties, Mr. Mansel further remarks: ”Let us however suppose for an instant, that these difficulties are surmounted, and the existence of the Absolute securely established on the testimony of reason. Still we have not succeeded in reconciling this idea with that of a Cause: we have done nothing towards explaining how the absolute can give rise to the relative, the infinite to the finite. If the condition of causal activity is a higher state than that of quiescence, the absolute, whether acting voluntarily or involuntarily, has pa.s.sed from a condition of comparative imperfection to one of comparative perfection; and therefore was not originally perfect. If the state of activity is an inferior state to that of quiescence, the Absolute, in becoming a cause, has lost its original perfection.” On this topic we can but repeat the argument heretofore adduced. Let the supposition be entertained that perfection does not belong to a state, but to G.o.d's nature, to what G.o.d _is_, as ground for what G.o.d does, and standing in the logical order before his act; and it will directly appear that a state of quiescence or a state of activity in no way modifies his perfection. What G.o.d is, remains permanent and perfect, and his acts are only manifestations of that permanent and perfect. It follows, then, taking the first moment of time as the point of departure, that, before that point, G.o.d was in a state of complete blessedness, and that after that point he was also in such a state; and, further, that while these two states are equal, there is not ”complete indifference,” because there was a reason, clearly seen by the Divine mind, why the pa.s.sage from quiescence to activity should be when it was, and as it was, and that this reason having been acknowledged in his conduct, gives to the two states equality, and yet differentiates the one from the other.

”Again, how can the Relative be conceived as coming into being?” It cannot be _conceived_ at all. The faculty of the mind by which it forms a concept--the discursive Understanding--is impotent to conceive what cannot be conceived--the act of creation. The changes of matter can be concluded into a system, but not the power by which the matter came to be, and the changes were produced. If the how is known at all, it must be seen. The laws of the process must be intuited, as also the process as logically according with those laws. The following is believed to be an intelligible account of the process, and an answer to the above question. The absolute and infinite Person possesses as _a priori_ organic elements of his being, all possible endowments in perfect harmony. Hence all laws, and all possible combinations of laws, are at once and always present before the Eye of his Reason, which is thus const.i.tuted Universal Genius. These combinations may be conveniently named ideal forms. They arise spontaneously, being in no way dependent upon his will, but are rather _a priori_ conditional of any creative activity. So, too, they harmoniously arrange themselves into systems,--archetypes of what may be, some of which may appear n.o.bler, and others inferior. This Person, being such as we have stated, possesses also as endowment all power, and thereby excludes the possibility of there being any ”_other_” power. This power is adequate to do all that _power_ can do,--to accomplish all that lies within the province of power. So long as the Person sees fit not to exert his power, his ideal forms will be only ideals, and the power will be simply power. But whenever he shall see fit to send forth his power, and organize it according to the ideal forms, the Universe will become. In all this the Person, ”of his own will,” freely establishes whatever his unerring wisdom shows is most worthy of his dignity; and so the actualities and relations which he thus ordains are no proper limit or restraint, for they in no way lessen his fulness, but are only a manifestation of that fulness,--a declaration of his glory. In a word, Creation is that executive act of G.o.d by which he combines with his power that ideal system which he had chosen because best, or _it is the organization of ample power according to perfect law_. If one shall now ask, ”How could he send forth the power?” it is to be replied that the question is prompted by the curiosity of the ”flesh,” man's animal nature; and since no representation--picture--can be made, no answer can be furnished. It is not needed to know _how_ G.o.d is, or does anything, but only that he does it. All the essential requirements of the problem are met when it is ascertained in the light of the Reason, that all fulness is in G.o.d, that from this fulness he established all other beings and their natural relations, and that no relation is _imposed_ upon him by another. The view thus advanced avoids the evil of the understanding-conception, that creation is the bringing of something out of nothing. There is an actual self-existent ground, from which the Universe is produced. Neither is the view pantheistic, for it starts with the _a priori_ idea of an absolute and infinite Person who is ”before all things, and by whom all things consist,”--who organizes his own power in accordance with his own ideals, and thus produces the Universe, and all this by free will in self-consciousness.

On page eighty-four, in speaking ”of the atheistic alternative,” Mr.

Mansel makes use of the following language: ”A limit is itself a relation; and to conceive a limit as such, is virtually to acknowledge the existence of a correlative on the other side of it.” Upon reading this sentence, some sensuous form spontaneously appears in the Sense.

Some object is conceived, and something outside it, that bounds it. But let the idea be once formed of a Being who possesses all limitation within himself, and for whom there is no ”other side,” nor any ”correlative,” and the difficulty vanishes. We do not seek to account for sensuous objects. It is pure Spirit whom we consider. We do not need to form a concept of ”a first moment in time,” or ”a first unit of s.p.a.ce,” nor could we if we would. To do so would be for the faculty which forms concepts to transcend the very laws of its organization.

What we need is, to see the fact that a Spirit is, who, possessing personality as form, and absoluteness and infinity as qualities, thereby contains all limits and the ground of all being in himself, and ant.i.thetical to whom is only negation.

From the ground thus attained there is seen to result, not the dreary Sahara of interminable contradictions, but the fair land of harmonious consistency. A Spirit, sole, personal, self-conscious, the absolute and infinite Person, is the Being we seek and have found; and upon such a Being the soul of man may rest with the unquestioning trust of an infant in its mother's arms. One cannot pa.s.s by unnoticed the beautiful spirit of religious reverence which s.h.i.+nes through the closing paragraphs of this lecture. It is evident with what dissatisfaction the writer views the sterile puzzles of which he has been treating, and what a relief it is to turn from them to ”the G.o.d who is 'gracious and merciful, slow to anger, and of great kindness, and repenteth Him of the evil.'” The wonder is, that he did not receive that presentation which his devout spirit has made, as the truth--which it is--and say, ”I will accept this as final. My definitions and deductions shall accord with this highest revelation. This shall be my standard of interpretation.” Had he done so, far other, and, as it is believed, more satisfactory and truthful would have been the conclusions he would have given us.

In his third Lecture Mr. Mansel is occupied with an examination of the human nature, for the purpose, if possible, of finding ”some explanation of the singular phenomenon of human thought,” which he has just developed. At the threshold of the investigation the fact of consciousness appears, and he begins the statement of its conditions in the following language: ”Now, in the first place, the very conception of Consciousness, in whatever mode it may be manifested, necessarily implies _distinction between one object and another_. To be conscious we must be conscious of something; and that something can only be known as that which it is, by being distinguished from that which it is not.” In this statement Mr. Mansel unconsciously a.s.sumes as settled, the very question at issue; for, the position maintained by one cla.s.s of writers is, that in certain of our mental operations, viz., in intuitions, the mind sees a simple truth, idea, first principle, as it is, in itself, and that there is no distinction in the act of knowledge. It is unquestionably true that, in the examination of objects on the Sense, and the conclusion of judgments in the Understanding, no object can come into consciousness without implying a ”distinction between one object and another.” But it is also evident that a first truth, to be known as such, must be intuited--seen as it is in itself; and so directly known to have the qualities of necessity and universality which const.i.tute it a first truth. Of this fact Sir William Hamilton seems to have been aware, when he denied the actuality of the Reason,--perceiving, doubtless, that only on the ground of such a denial was his own theory tenable. But if it shall be admitted, as it would seem it must be, that men have necessary and universal convictions, then it must also be admitted that these convictions are not entertained by distinguis.h.i.+ng them from other mental operations, but that they are seen of themselves to be true; and thus it appears that there are some modes of consciousness which do not imply the ”distinction” claimed. The subsequent sentences seem capable of more than one interpretation. If the author means that ”the Infinite” cannot be infinite without he is also finite, so that all distinction ceases, then his meaning is both pantheistic and contradictory; for the word infinite has no meaning, if it is not the opposite of finite, and to identify them is undoubtedly Pantheism. Or if he means ”that the Infinite cannot be distinguished” as independent, from the Finite _as independent_, and thus, as possessing some quality with which it was not endowed by the infinite Person, then there can be no doubt of his correctness. But if, as would seem, his idea of infinity is that of amount, is such that it appears inconsistent, contradictory, for the infinite Person to retain his infinity, and still create beings who are really other than himself, and possessing, as quality, finiteness, which he cannot possess as quality, then is his idea of what infinity is wrong. Infinity is quality, and the capacity to thus create is essential to it. All that the Reason requires is, that the finite be created by and wholly dependent upon the infinite Person; then all the relations and conditions are only _improper_,--such as that Person has established, and which, therefore, in no way diminish his glory or detract from his fulness. When, then, Mr. Mansel says, ”A consciousness of the Infinite, as such, thus necessarily involves a self-contradiction, for it implies the recognition, by limitation and difference, of that which can only be given as unlimited and indifferent,” it is evident that he uses the term infinite to express the understanding-conception of unlimited amount, which is not relevant here, rather than the reason-idea of universality which is not contradictory to a real distinction between the Infinite and finite.

There is also involved the unexpressed a.s.sumption that we have no knowledge except of the limited and different, or, in other words, that the Understanding is the highest faculty of the mind. It has already been abundantly shown that this is erroneous,--that the Reason knows its objects in themselves, as out of all relation, plurality, difference, or likeness. Dropping now the abstract term ”the infinite,” and using the concrete and proper form, we may say: