Part 4 (1/2)
They are only general expressions of the actual conditions in an existing struggle of cla.s.ses, an agitation which is happening historically before our very eyes.”
The thoughts here expressed, as I have already indicated in several places in this review, have been later to some extent more precisely worded, have been to some decree enlarged and developed, have been in part modified; but the ground-lines of Marx's theory of the social movement are already revealed in them all. In what now lies their historic importance? How shall we explain their tremendous power of conquest? Whence comes their continuance already through a half-century?--and all this, in spite of the fact that, as I believe, this theory errs in essential points, and that it can scarcely indeed sustain itself as a whole!
Before I now attempt to give the answer I must make one thing clear.
What Marx and Engels have left to us as an intellectual inheritance, whether we consider their writings from 1842, or even only those after 1847, seems at first as if it were a confused ma.s.s of varied thought-material. Only he who looks closely and who takes the trouble to enter into the spirit of the men can bring the separated lines of thought into order. Such an one finds that some fundamental ideas run through the writings of Marx and Engels during the whole period of their literary activity; also that at different times quite different lines of thought run across and confuse the system which, as a whole, is built up upon these great ideas. Most exponents of the Marxian teaching, especially those representing the middle cla.s.s, have made the mistake of not separating the essential from the accidental, and have as a result not been able to do justice to the historic significance of these theories. Naturally it is easier to start with the contradictions and inconsistencies of an author, rather than to make tedious tracing of what is of lasting worth; it is easy, but not right, to content oneself with detached and apparent blunders and mistakes in the teaching of an important thinker, in order to reject this teaching _in toto_. Marxism, as no other teaching, offers itself for such treatment; partly because many of his theories awake the pa.s.sions of the critic and hence must in advance prevent calm judgment, partly because in fact, as already said, it presents a most clumsy confusion of contradictory teachings. This is shown in the fact that even now, after his thoughts have lived through a half-century, we must still exert ourselves to get at the real meaning and the deep importance of his teaching. This is due especially to the ”middle-cla.s.s” critics of Marx; but it is also because of the members of his own party. I recall the fact that the fundamental principle of Marx's economic system--the theory of value--has become an object of fruitful discussion as lately as two years ago. At that time I attempted to bring into use this method which I have just specified as the only true one for such a peculiar formation as the Marxian teaching; I asked how the parts of Marx's theory which stand in such opposition to each other could be reconciled, in order to bring out the sense which so earnest a thinker must surely have laid underneath.
At that time the aged Engels could bear witness that I had about ”hit the right mark,” but that he could not endorse all that I had ”introduced” into the Marxian teaching. Other critics thought at the time that nothing more would be heard of Marx's teaching concerning value. Perhaps they are right; but if Marx's _Theory of Value_ is a scientific work, it can be such only in my interpretation.
I have thus spoken in order to show you how I stand concerning Marx's theory of the social movement. I make most earnest effort to separate it from all extraneous matter, to comprehend it in its essential points, and so to present these essentials in such way that they shall be consistent with reality. At the same time I emphasise the spirit of Marx's theories, and only hope that it is truly the soul of Marx, and not of myself, ”in which the times reflect themselves.”
I shall attempt to speak later concerning what I look upon as confusing ”non-essentials” of the theory; I speak now of what I think to be the historically important essence--the ?t?a ?? ?e?--of Marx's theory of the social movement.
First and before all, it is a scientific accomplishment of the first order to give prominence to the historic conception of the social movement and the inner relations.h.i.+p of the ”economic,” ”social,” and ”political” manifestations and precedents. Marx applies the evolution idea to the social movement. Other conspicuous men have tried to consider socialism and the social movement as in the flow of historic life--I think, for example, of Lorenz von Stein, that writer who, perhaps, has most influenced Marx. But no one has so clearly, illuminatively, effectively shown these historical relations. That political revolutions and agitations are fundamentally great displacements of social cla.s.ses is a truth enunciated before the time of Marx; but no one has ever presented it in so impressive a way. He takes economic revolutions as his starting-point, in order to explain the creation and the conflict of social cla.s.ses; and in _Misere_ (175), before the ”Communistic Manifesto,” he had already said: ”il n'y a jamais de mouvement politique qui ne soit social en meme temps.”
But therewith--and it is this that is of importance to us--is the proletariat brought to full self-consciousness and taught to know itself in its historic relations. Out of this historic conception arises, for Marx and for the proletariat, with certainty the main points of the programme and the tactics of the social movement. They are only ”a general expression of actual relations in an existing struggle of cla.s.ses,” as the ”Communistic Manifesto” has expressed it somewhat vaguely. To state it more exactly, the theory of Marx affirms the identification of that which unconsciously and instinctively had arisen as a proletarian idea with that which is actually observable as the result of economic development. As to tactical management, however, the idea was decisive that revolutions could not be forced, but were the outgrowth of specific economic antecedents; while cla.s.s strife in both its forms--the political, of which the ”Communistic Manifesto” speaks chiefly, and the economic, for which in _Misere_ Marx breaks a lance--is recognised as the instrument which the proletariat must use in order to protect its interests during the process of economic transformation. Thus he formulates that which every intelligent proletarian movement must recognise as its fundamental principles. Socialism as a goal, struggle between cla.s.ses as the way towards it, cease to be merely personal opinions, and are understood as necessary.
This elementary conception, that these two main pillars of the modern social movement are not merely arbitrary creations, but are unavoidable products of the historic development, is even to-day so little accepted that it is worth our while to spend a little time upon it.
First, it must be noticed that in all the writing's of Marx and Engels, whose ”Anti-Duehring” always const.i.tutes a necessary complement to all the theories of Marx, there is no proof of the a.s.serted ”necessity” of the social movement which fully satisfies the demands of our day as to scientific method. It is known that Marx stands upon the Hegelian dialectic, out of date now. What we demand is a psychological founding of social happening, and for this Marx cares little.
Now it seems to me easy to fill this gap. I shall attempt it so far as the limitations of time allow.
Why must the ideal of every proletarian movement be necessarily a democratic collectivism--that is, the communisation of the means of production? It seems to me that the following considerations contain the answer to the question.
The modern social movement strives after that which is represented by the battle-cry, ”The emanc.i.p.ation of the proletariat.” But this has two phases, an ideal and a material. Ideally a social cla.s.s can consider itself as ”emanc.i.p.ated” only when it as a cla.s.s is economically and politically dominant or at least independent; the proletariat, that now finds itself in economic dependence upon capital, can only become ”emanc.i.p.ated” by throwing off this connection. Perhaps we can conceive of the proletariat as using employers as agents to carry on the work of production. But even then the management will be no longer in the hands of the employers as to-day, but of the proletariat as master of the situation. So long as this supremacy is not reached in any such form, there can be no thought of an ”emanc.i.p.ation” of a cla.s.s. Nor can we speak of this ”emanc.i.p.ation” in a material sense, so long as those conditions obtain which to-day, from a cla.s.s standpoint, are looked upon as marking a social inferiority and are derived from the capitalistic social system. If the proletariat sets an aim clearly before itself, this goal can only be, from the cla.s.s standpoint, the overthrow of this capitalistic order. Now this overthrow is possible in either of two ways. Either operations on a large scale, which have replaced the earlier and smaller methods of production, can be so reconst.i.tuted as that large interlocal and international production shall be again narrowed and localised--in which case the overthrow of the capitalistic order will be simply a retrogression to the ”middle-cla.s.s” system. Or this present order can be conquered in such a way that the existing forms of production on a large scale shall be retained--then the results will be socialism. There is no third possibility. If the proletariat does not vanquish capitalism by a return to the smaller forms of operation, it can accomplish this only by putting a socialistic organisation in place of the capitalistic.
And further: the proletariat can attach itself only to the latter method, because its whole existence is interwoven with the system of production on a large scale; it is indeed only the shadow of the system, it exists only where this system rules. Therefore we can say that socialism as the aim of the social movement arises fundamentally and necessarily out of the economic situation of the proletariat. The whole demonstration falls to the ground in a moment, wherever a tendency to the development of proletarian production on a large scale does not exist in economic life.
What I would here show, let me say again, is the necessity of the ideal; but this must not be confused with the certainty of its realisation. In order to prove this, it would be necessary to present other considerations, which lie far from our subject. Thus, whether any such realisation of the ideal is scientifically possible seems to be doubtful. For this would not be proved even if it should be demonstrated that what the proletariat desires and strives for has been provided in the course of social development. I shall have opportunity later to draw attention to this, that the conception of socialism as a need of nature, and thus ”necessarily” to be realised, does not rest upon clear thought.
What we must now hold fast as the result of our investigation is this, and it is a true Marxian thought, that social ideals are only utopianism so long as they are merely evolved in the head of the theorist. They obtain reality only when they are united to actual economic conditions, when they arise out of these conditions. The possibility of realising the good and beautiful is enclosed within the sheath of economic necessity. This covering, created out of capitalistic and proletarian conditions and historic economic circ.u.mstances, is of such a nature that the ideal of proletarian exertion can only lie in the direction of a socialistic order of society.
But why must the way towards the realisation of this aim lie through cla.s.s strife? To this we answer in brief: modern society presents itself to us as an artificial medley of numerous social cla.s.ses--that is, of certain groups of persons whose h.o.m.ogeneity arises out of their attachment to specific forms or spheres of economic life. We distinguish the ”junker,” as representative of feudal agrarianism, from the bourgeoisie, the representatives of capital; we distinguish the ”middle cla.s.s,” the representatives of local production and distribution, from the modern wage-worker or the proletariat, etc.
Each one of these groups of economic interests has its special adherents in the professional cla.s.ses of society among the officials, scholars, artists, who stand outside the economic life, but who unite themselves by birth or position to one or another of the social cla.s.ses.
This attachment to a social cla.s.s works decisively in two directions.
It implants in the mind of each individual member of a cla.s.s the conception of the world and life characteristic of that group of men whose thoughts and feelings tend to become identical through the uniformity of the external circ.u.mstances that control them; similarity of aspiration and ideal is created. Further, this attachment accomplishes a positive control over the individual in the maintenance of that which is represented by the cla.s.s--its social position as truly as its material interests; it creates what we may call cla.s.s interest.
Everywhere and spontaneously there is developed a distinction between cla.s.ses, and cla.s.s interest is involved in this. The upholding of this cla.s.s interest leads throughout to cla.s.s opposition. Not always does the upholding of a cla.s.s standard involve necessarily collision with the interests of other cla.s.ses; at times an ident.i.ty of interests arises; but this harmony never lasts. The interest of the ”junker”
must at a certain point come into conflict with that of the burgher, that of the capitalist with that of the proletariat, that of the hand-worker and tradesman with that of the large capitalist; for each cla.s.s strives naturally for itself, and by that very fact excludes other interests. Then comes to pa.s.s the saying:
”Where one goes ahead, others go back; Who would not be driven must drive; So strife ensues and the strongest wins.”
It is here that differences of opinion may emerge: but must this really come to ”strife” and ”warfare”? May we not hope that, through love of mankind, or sympathy, or interest in the welfare of the whole, or some such n.o.ble motive, each cla.s.s will freely divest itself of such of its privileges as stand in the way of others? I have already had occasion in another place to express my opinion on this point--that I look upon such well-intentioned judgment of average human nature as in contradiction with actual life. I have referred to the fact that conclusive proof for or against such a conception cannot be presented; that the final ground of decision rests in the depths of personal conviction on the part of the individual. But what offers some proof for the justification of the realistic opinion presented by me is the circ.u.mstance that history has as yet given no example of a free divestment of cla.s.s privilege; at least I will say that every instance claimed as such may easily be invalidated. On the other side we have innumerable instances in history where such reform has been begun by well-meaning friends of humanity, theorists, only to be shattered soon on the _rocher de bronze_ of the strong self-interest of the threatened dominant cla.s.s. They eagerly hold up before us unbelievers the night of the 4th of August, 1789, and they forget the hundred burning castles in France. They remind us of the Prussian agrarian reforms, and forget not only the French Revolution but also the Declaration of 1816. They remind us--but why add ill.u.s.trations?
Let such men prove authentically a single case in history in which a social cla.s.s has against its own interests and out of altruistic motives made an essential concession. Certainly there have been conspicuous individuals who have done this; why not? We see this daily. But a whole cla.s.s--never! If this is so, then the word of the great realist must be true, that ”only strength conquers.” So we find as the conclusion of our thought, first a difference of cla.s.ses, then cla.s.s interests, then cla.s.s opposition, finally cla.s.s strife. It is thus that Marx would have developed his theory of cla.s.s strife, and easily, if he had chosen to proceed upon a psychological foundation.
As we now turn to this theory itself and its significance for the social movement we are obliged, I think, to concede that the entrance of Karl Marx was a decisive turning-point in this agitation, because through him it was based upon a fundamentally changed conception of history and humanity. This change is occasioned by the fact that, in place of an idealistic, or rather partisan, way of looking at things, a realistic vision obtains, and thus for the social movement the idea of ”revolution” pa.s.ses into the thought of ”evolution.” The spirit of the nineteenth century supplants the spirit of the preceding centuries. You remember how I sought to make clear to you the essence of this spirit in connection with the teachings of the utopists; if I may be allowed to refer to it again, it is that idealistic conception of man and life,[1] cherished now only by the scholars, that faith in humanity as good by nature, that belief that men so long as they are not led astray by the mistake or malice of individual bad men will live in the most affectionate peace with their brethren; it is that belief in a ”natural order” of the past and future--that rock-fast confidence that only explanation and exhortation are needed in order to bring men out of this vale of tears to the happy islands of the blest. This is that faith in the power of eternal love which through its own force shall overcome the bad, and help the good to victory.
This it was that, though the leaders were not conscious of it, really lay at the bottom of all political and social agitation until the middle of our century; this it is that, in my opinion, as I have already said, still slumbers in the lap of anarchism, even to-day as an instinct. This fundamental tendency is now directly reversed; the belief in a humanity good by nature gives place to the conviction that man is of himself ruled by no n.o.ble motives, that he carries within himself the _bete humaine_ even in all culture and in spite of all ”advance.” Hence the conclusion: that a man, in order to accomplish anything in the world, must before all call upon ”interest”--a normal and material instinct. For it is the most important conclusion for the fate of the social movement, that now ”interest” rules in the world; that where anything is to be done, or a cla.s.s, like the proletariat, is to be emanc.i.p.ated, a man needs some weapon stronger than the theory of ”eternal love” against the interest of the capitalist cla.s.s, and must present force against force, might armed by ”interest.” At the end of all thought upon this matter lies this consideration, which leads not only to the theory, but as well to the practice, of cla.s.s strife. Combat is the solution of the difficulty for this hard and unlovely proletarian generation which has grown up since the middle of our century; not peace, not reconciliation, not a general brotherhood--but battle. That this strife is no longer open warfare, like street riot, does not alter the fact that it is really strife.