Volume Ii Part 24 (1/2)
”It is lucky for you that I'm at the end of my paper, or you were 'in'
for a 'sixteenthly.' But, oh where, and oh where, is my Yankee paper gone? I want the sheets of 'Sir B.' collectively from the part where the last missive ended. I am re-reading and pondering.
”I half suspect my old friend Whiteside must be in some tiff with the Cabinet. He has not resigned, and yet men are canva.s.sing for his seat for the University. It all looks very odd. It may be that he is bargaining for the Chancellors.h.i.+p, which he is certainly _not_ fit for.
I might as well ask to be Mistress of the Robes,--and old Lefroy will not resign unless his son be promoted to the Bench! And this is the man they accuse of senility and weak intellect!
”How like flunkies, after all, are these great gentlemen when it becomes a question of place. There is a dash of 'Jeames' through Cabinet appointments positively frightful.
”Wasn't it cunning to send Garibaldi where he could do nothing? It was the way they muzzle a troublesome man in the House by putting him on a committee. He (G.) grumbles sorely, says he ought to be in Istria, &c.; but there is always the _dessous des cartes_ in this war, and France has had to be consulted or conciliated everywhere.”
_To Dr Burbidge._
”Villa Morelli, _July_ 21, 1866.
”I take shame to myself for not having sooner replied to your kindest of notes and thanked you for all your trouble at Malta; but first of all I was obliged to go to Spezzia, and then came the wondrous turn-out of the Whigs, which has kept me in close correspondence with scores of people,--no other good result, however, having come of the advent of my friends to power.
”Malta, at all events, is out of the question; for though they have got no further than civil messages to me, common report (a common liar, says Figaro) says that I _ought_ to get something.
”The war absorbs fortunately thoughts that might under other circ.u.mstances have taken a more personal turn, and the war resolves itself pretty much into what that arch scoundrel, L. N., may do next.
For the moment he is all but stalemated--that is, he can scarcely move without a check. If he aid Prussia, it will be to strengthen the great Germany that he dreads, and aggrandise the Power that threatens to be more than his rival. If he a.s.sist Austria, it is to throw off Italy and undo the past. If he remain neutral, it is to let France subside into the position of seeing Europe able to do without her.
”The armed intervention which he desired with us and Russia we will have none of. He is, as Bright said of somebody the other day, 'a bad fellow to hunt a tiger with.'
”Now, Prussia was so manifestly in the wrong at first, and had contrived to be so unpopular with us besides, and Bismarck's views were so palpably false and tricky, he could have no sympathy with us at all,--and yet success (that dear idol of Englishmen) has done fully as much as the best principles and the purest ambition could, and we are rapidly becoming Prussian.
”I own that I am extremely Prussian. I see no hope of any barrier against France but a strong-big-ambitious-non-scrupulous Germany.
”Beer-drinking, stolidity, and the needle-gun will do for the peace of Europe more than Downing St. and the homilies of the whole Russell family.
”I have little trust in the F. O. policy of the Conservatives. The theory is, the Tories love a war; and to controvert this we shall be driven to bear more insult under a Tory Government than if we had Bright on the Treasury bench.
”What a fizzle our friends of the Italian fleet present! They said a few days back that they were in the Tyrol with Garibaldi. He too is not adding to his fame,--but who is in this war? Not La Marmora certainly.”
_To Mr John Blackwood._
”Croce di Malta, Spezzia, July 28, 1866.
”I am here in the midst of great excitement, the late sea-fight being to our naval population the most exciting of all topics. If the Admiral Persano were to venture to land at Genoa at this moment, they would tear him in pieces. The more generously minded only call him a coward, but the ma.s.ses believe him to be a traitor and to have sold the fleet.
This, of course, is the sort of falsehood that could only gain currency amongst Italians. It is alleged that in changing from the _Re d'Italia_ to the _Affondatore_ his flag was never struck on the former, and consequently the whole of the Austrian attack was directed to a vessel where the admiral was supposed to be. As to the _Affondatore_, she was kept out of the action, some say a mile off,--and the terrific losses of s.h.i.+ps and men were actually incurred by officers being driven to desperation by the misconduct of their chief.
”The prefect here has just shown me a despatch saying Persano is to be tried by court-martial, and it will require all the skill of Government to get him off, and they may seriously endanger the very monarchy (as he is the personal friend of the king) in the attempt.
”The Austrian artillery went through the iron plating as if it were two-inch plank, and the Yankee-built s.h.i.+p, the _Re_, was sunk by shot-holes. The _Affondatore_, too (Blackwall built), was riddled, while the Italian guns did positively nothing.
”The Italians certainly fought manfully, and, though beaten, were not dishonoured. As for the Austrians, horrible stories are told of their shooting,--the men struggling in the water and hacking with their sabres the poor fellows who clung to the boats. If these stories were not guaranteed by men of station and character, they would be unworthy of any credit, but I am driven to believe they are not falsehoods.
”I am here sailing and swimming and laying up a store of health and strength to carry me on, _Deo volente_, through the hot late summer of Florence.”