Part 17 (1/2)
Before Romanes, George H. Lewes, in his interesting monograph in the history of thought, ”Aristotle, a Chapter in the History of Science,” is quite as complimentary to the great Greek thinker. We may say that Lewes was by no means partial to Aristotle. Anything but inclined to accept authority as of value in philosophy, he had been rendered impatient by the fact that so much of the history of philosophy was dominated by Aristotle, and it was only that the panegyric was forced from him by careful study of all that the Stagirite wrote that he said: ”History gazed on him with wonder. His intellect was piercing and comprehensive; his attainments surpa.s.sed those of every philosopher; his influence has been excelled only by the founders of religion ... his vast and active intelligence for twenty centuries held the world in awe.”
Professor Osborn, whose scholarly study of the theory of evolution down the ages ”From the Greeks to Darwin” rather startled the world of science by showing not only how old was a theory of evolution, but how frequently it had been stated and how many of them antic.i.p.ated phases of our own thought in the matter, pays a high compliment to the great Greek scientist. He says: ”Aristotle clearly states and rejects a theory of the origin of adaptive structures in animals altogether similar to that of Darwin.” He then quotes certain pa.s.sages from Aristotle's ”Physics,”
and says: ”These pa.s.sages seem to contain absolute evidence that Aristotle had substantially the modern conception of the evolution of life, from a primordial, soft ma.s.s of living matter to the most perfect forms, and that even in these he believed that evolution was incomplete for they were progressing to higher forms.”
Modern French scientists are particularly laudatory in their estimation of Aristotle. The group of biologists, Buffon, Cuvier, St. Hilaire, and others who called world attention to French science and its attainments about a century ago, are all of them on record in highest praise of Aristotle. Cuvier said: ”I cannot read his work without being ravished with astonishment. It is impossible to conceive how a single man was able to collect and compare the mult.i.tude of facts implied in the rules and aphorisms contained in this book.”
It is possible, however, to get opinions ardently laudatory of Aristotle from the serious students of any nation, provided only they know their Aristotle. Sir William Hamilton, the Scotch philosopher, said:
”Aristotle's seal is upon all the sciences, his speculations have determined those of all subsequent thinkers.” Hegel, the German philosophic writer, is not less outspoken in his praise: ”Aristotle penetrated the whole universe of things and subjected them to intelligence.” Kant, who is often said to have influenced our modern thinking more than any other in recent generations, has his compliment for Aristotle. It relates particularly to that branch of philosophy with which Kant had most occupied himself. The Koenigsberg philosopher said: ”Logic since Aristotle, like Geometry since Euclid, is a finished science.”
I do not want to tire you or I could quote many other authorities who proclaim Aristotle the genius of the race. They would include poets like Dante and Goethe, scholars like Cicero and Anthon, literary men like Lessing and Reich and many others. The scholars of the Middle Ages, far from condemnation for their devotion to Aristotle, deserve the highest praise for it. If they had done nothing else but appreciate Aristotle as our greatest modern scholars have done, that of itself would proclaim their profound scholars.h.i.+p.
The medieval writers are often said to have been uncritical in their judgment, but in their lofty estimation of Aristotle they displayed the finest possible critical judgment. On the contrary, the generations who made much of the opportunity to minimize medieval scholars.h.i.+p because of its wors.h.i.+p at the shrine of Aristotle, must themselves fall under the suspicion at least of either not knowing Aristotle or of not thinking deeply about the subjects with regard to which he wrote. For in all the world's history the rule has been that whenever men have thought deeply about a subject and know what Aristotle has written with regard to that subject, they have the liveliest admiration for the great Greek thinker.
This is true for philosophy, logic, metaphysics, politics, ethics, dramatics, but it is also quite as true for physical science. He lacked our knowledge, though not nearly to the degree that is usually thought, and he had a marvellous acc.u.mulation of information, but he had a breadth of view and a thoroughness of appreciation with a power of penetration that make his opinions worth while knowing even on scientific subjects in our enlightened age.
As for the supposed swearing by Aristotle, in the sense of literally accepting his opinions without daring to examine them critically, which is so constantly a.s.serted to have been the habit of the medieval scholars and teachers, it is extremely difficult in the light of the expressions which we have from them, to understand how this false impression arose. Aristotle they thoroughly respected. They constantly referred to his works, but so has every thinking generation ever since.
Whenever he had made a declaration they would not accept the contradiction of it without a good reason, but whenever they had good reasons, Aristotle's opinion was at once rejected without compunction.
Albertus Magnus, for instance, said: ”Whoever believes that Aristotle was a G.o.d must also believe that he never erred, but if we believe that Aristotle was a man, then doubtless he was liable to err just as we are.” A number of direct contradictions of Aristotle we have from Albert. A well-known one is that with regard to Aristotle's a.s.sertion that lunar rainbows appeared only twice in fifty years. Albert declared that he himself had seen two in a single year.
Indeed, it seems very clear that the whole trend of thought among the great teachers of the time was away from the acceptance of scientific conclusions on authority unless there was good evidence for them available. They were quite as impatient as the scientists of our time with the constant putting forward of Aristotle as if that settled a scientific question. Roger Bacon wanted the Pope to forbid the study of Aristotle because his works were leading men astray from the study of science, his authority being looked upon as so great that men did not think for themselves but accepted his a.s.sertions. Smaller men are always p.r.o.ne to do this, and indeed it const.i.tutes one of the difficulties in the way of advance in scientific knowledge at all times, as Roger Bacon himself pointed out.
These are the sort of expressions that are to be expected from Friar Bacon from what we know of other parts of his work. His ”Opus Tertium”
was written at the request of Pope Clement IV, because the Pope had heard many interesting accounts of what the great thirteenth-century teacher and experimenter was doing at the University of Oxford, and wished to learn for himself the details of his work. Bacon starts out with the principle that there are four grounds of human ignorance. These are, ”first, trust in inadequate authority; second, that force of custom which leads men to accept without properly questioning what has been accepted before their time; third, the placing of confidence in the a.s.sertions of the inexperienced; and fourth, the hiding of one's own ignorance behind the parade of superficial knowledge, so that we are afraid to say I do not know.” Professor Henry Morley, a careful student of Bacon's writings, said with regard to these expressions of Bacon:
No part of that ground has yet been cut away from beneath the feet of students, although six centuries have pa.s.sed. We still make sheep-walks of second, third and fourth, and fiftieth hand references to authority; still we are the slaves of habit, still we are found following too frequently the untaught crowd, still we flinch from the righteous and wholesome phrase ”I do not know” and acquiesce actively in the opinion of others that we know what we appear to know.
In his ”Opus Majus” Bacon had previously given abundant evidence of his respect for the experimental method. There is a section of this work which bears the t.i.tle ”Scientia Experimentalis.” In this Bacon affirms that ”without experiment nothing can be adequately known. An argument may prove the correctness of a theory, but does not give the cert.i.tude necessary to remove all doubt, nor will the mind repose in the clear view of truth unless it finds its way by means of experiment.” To this he later added in his ”Opus Tertium”: ”The strongest argument proves nothing so long as the conclusions are not verified by experience.
Experimental science is the queen of sciences, and the goal of all speculation.”
It is no wonder that Dr. Whewell, in his ”History of the Inductive Sciences,” should have been unstinted in his praise of Roger Bacon's work and writings. In a well-known pa.s.sage he says of the ”Opus Majus”:
Roger Bacon's ”Opus Majus” is the encyclopedia and ”Novum Organon” of the thirteenth century, a work equally wonderful with regard to its wonderful scheme and to the special treatises by which the outlines of the plans are filled up.
The professed object of the work is to urge the necessity of a reform in the mode of philosophizing, to set forth the reasons why knowledge had not made greater progress, to draw back attention to the sources of knowledge which had been unwisely neglected, to discover other sources which were yet almost untouched, and to animate men in the undertaking of a prospect of the vast advantages which it offered. In the development of this plan all the leading portions of science are expanded in the most complete shape which they had at that time a.s.sumed; and improvements of a very wide and striking kind are proposed in some of the princ.i.p.al branches of study. Even if the work had no leading purposes it would have been highly valuable as a treasure of the most solid knowledge and soundest speculations of the time; even if it had contained no such details it would have been a work most remarkable for its general views and scope.
As a matter of fact the universities of the Middle Ages, far from neglecting science, were really scientific universities. Because the universities of the early nineteenth century occupied themselves almost exclusively with languages and especially formed students' minds by means of cla.s.sical studies, men in our time seem to be p.r.o.ne to think that such linguistic studies formed the main portion of the curriculum of the universities in all the old times and particularly in the Middle Ages. The study of the cla.s.sic languages, however, came into university life only after the Renaissance. Before that the undergraduates of the universities had occupied themselves almost entirely with science. It was quite as much trouble to introduce linguistic studies into the old universities in the Renaissance time to replace science, as it was to secure room for science by pus.h.i.+ng out the cla.s.sics in the modern time.
Indeed the two revolutions in education are strikingly similar when studied in detail. Men who had been brought up on science before the Renaissance were quite sure that that formed the best possible means of developing the mind. In the early nineteenth century men who had been formed on the cla.s.sics were quite as sure that science could not replace them with any success.
There is no pretence that this view of the medieval universities is a new idea in the history of education. Those who have known the old universities at first hand by the study of the actual books of their professors and by familiarity with their courses of study, have not been inclined to make the mistake of thinking that the medieval university neglected science. Professor Huxley in his ”Inaugural Address as Rector of Aberdeen University” some thirty years ago stated very definitely his recognition of medieval devotion to science. His words are well worth remembering by all those who are accustomed to think of our time as the first in which the study of science was taken up seriously in our universities. Professor Huxley said:
The scholars of the medieval universities seem to have studied grammar, logic, and rhetoric; arithmetic and geometry; astronomy, theology, and music. Thus their work, however imperfect and faulty, judged by modern lights, it may have been, brought them face to face with all the leading aspects of the many-sided mind of man. For these studies did really contain, at any rate in embryo, sometimes it may be in caricature, what we now call philosophy, mathematical and physical science, and art. _And I doubt if the curriculum of any modern university shows so clear and generous a comprehension of what is meant by culture, as this old Trivium and Quadrivium does._
It would be entirely a mistake, however, to think that these great writers and teachers who influenced the medieval universities so deeply and whose works were the text-books of the universities for centuries after, only had the principles of physical and experimental science and did not practically apply them. As a matter of fact their works are full of observation. Once more, the presumption that they wrote only nonsense with regard to science comes from those who do not know their writings at all, while great scientists who have taken the pains to study their works are enthusiastic in praise. Humboldt, for instance, says of Albertus Magnus, after reading some of his works with care:
Albertus Magnus is equally active and influential in promoting the study of natural science and of the Aristotelian philosophy. His works contain some exceedingly acute remarks on the organic structure and physiology of plants. One of his works bearing the t.i.tle of ”Liber Cosmographicus De Natura Locorum” is a species of physical geography. I have found in it considerations on the dependence of temperature concurrently on lat.i.tude and elevation and on the effect of different angles of the sun's rays in heating the ground which have excited my surprise.
It is with regard to physical geography of course that Humboldt is himself a distinguished authority.
Humboldt's expression that he found some exceedingly acute remarks on the organic structure and physiology of plants in Albert the Great's writings will prove a great surprise to many people. Meyer, the German historian of botany, however, has re-echoed Humboldt's praise with emphasis. The extraordinary erudition and originality of Albert's treatise on plants drew from Meyer the comment: