Part 28 (1/2)

Again, there are many possible reservations as to the precise stage at which a dispute may be laid before the Court. The most far-reaching of these would be to make the resort to the Court in connection with every dispute in respect of which its compulsory jurisdiction is recognised contingent upon the establishment of an agreement for submission of the case which, failing agreement between the parties, would be drawn up by the Court itself, the a.n.a.logy of the provisions of the Hague Convention of 1907 dealing with the Permanent Court of Arbitration being thus followed.

It might also be stated that the recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court does not prevent the parties to the dispute from agreeing to resort to a preliminary conciliation procedure before the Council of the League of Nations or any other {172} body selected by them, or to submit their disputes to arbitration in preference to going before the Court.

A State might also, while accepting compulsory jurisdiction by the Court, reserve the right of laying disputes before the Council of the League with a view to conciliation in accordance with paragraphs 1-3 of Article 15 of the Covenant, with the proviso that neither party might, during the proceedings before the Council, take proceedings against the other in the Court.

It will be seen, therefore, that there is a very wide range of reservations which may be made in connection with the undertaking referred to in Article 36, paragraph 2. It is possible that apprehensions may arise lest the right to make reservations should destroy the practical value of the undertaking. There seems, however, to be no justification for such misgivings. In the first place, it is to be hoped that every Government will confine its reservations to what is absolutely essential. Secondly, it must be recognised that, however restrictive the scope of the undertaking may be, it will always be better than no undertaking at all.

The fact that the signatory States undertake to accede, even though it be with reservations, to paragraph 2 of Article 36 may therefore be held to const.i.tute a great advance.

Such accession must take place at latest within the month following upon the coming into force or subsequent acceptance of the Protocol.

It goes without saying that such accession in no way restricts the liberty which States possess, under the ordinary law, of concluding special agreements for arbitration. It is entirely open to any two countries signatory of the Protocol which have acceded to paragraph 2 of Article 36 to extend still further, as between themselves, the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, or to stipulate that before having recourse to its jurisdiction they will submit their disputes to a special procedure of conciliation or even to stipulate, either before or after a dispute {173} has arisen, that it shall be brought before a special tribunal of arbitrators or before the Council of the League of Nations rather than to the Court.

It is also certain that up to the time of the coming into force or acceptance of the Protocol accession to paragraph 2 of Article 36 which will thenceforth become compulsory, will remain optional, and that if such accession has already taken place it will continue to be valid in accordance with the terms under which it was made.

The only point which may cause difficulty is the question what is the effect of accessions given to the Protocol if the latter becomes null and void. It may be asked whether such accessions are to be regarded as so intimately bound up with the Protocol that they must disappear with it. The reply must be in the negative. The sound rule of interpretation of international treaties is that, unless there is express provision to the contrary, effects already produced survive the act from which they sprang.

The natural corollary is that any State which wishes to make the duration of its accession to Article 36 dependent on the duration of the Protocol must make an express stipulation to this effect. As Article 36 permits acceptance of the engagement in question for a specified term only, a State may, when acceding, stipulate that it only undertakes to be bound during such time as the Protocol shall remain in force.

5.--STRENGTHENING OF PACIFIC METHODS OF PROCEDURE.

_Article 4._

We have, in the second place, succeeded in making possible the pacific settlement of all disputes by strengthening the procedure laid down in the Covenant.

_Article 4, paragraph 1._

_Action by the Council with a view to reconciliation_.--If a dispute does not come within the compulsory jurisdiction of the {174} Permanent Court of International Justice and if the Parties have been unable to come to an agreement to refer it to the Court or to submit it to arbitration, it should, under the terms of Article 15 of the Covenant, be submitted to the Council, which will endeavour to secure a settlement by reconciling the parties. If the Council's efforts are successful, it must, so far as it considers it advisable, make public a statement giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of settlement thereof as it may deem appropriate.

In this connection no change has been made in the procedure laid down by the Covenant. It appeared unnecessary to specify what particular procedure should be followed. The Council is given the utmost lat.i.tude in choosing the means most appropriate for the reconciliation of the parties. It may take advice in various quarters; it may hear expert opinions; it may proceed to investigations or expert enquiries, whether by itself or through the intermediary of experts chosen by it; it may even, upon application by one of the parties, const.i.tute a special conciliation committee. The essential point is to secure, if possible, a friendly settlement of the dispute; the actual methods to be employed are of small importance. It is imperative that nothing should in any way hamper the Council's work in the interests of peace. It is for the Council to examine the question whether it would be expedient to draw up for its own use and bring to the notice of the Governments of the signatory States general regulations of procedure applicable to cases brought before it and designed to test the good-will of the parties with a view to persuading them more easily to reach a settlement under its auspices.

Experience alone can show whether it will be necessary to develop the rules laid down in the first three paragraphs of Article 15 of the Covenant.

For the moment it would appear to be expedient to make no addition and to have full confidence in the wisdom of the Council, it being understood that, whether at the moment in question or at any other stage of the procedure, it will be open to the {175} parties to come to an agreement for some different method of settlement: by way of direct understanding, const.i.tution of a special committee of mediators or conciliators, appeal to arbitration or to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

The new procedure set up by the Protocol will be applicable only in the event of the Council's failing in its efforts at reconciliation and of the parties failing to come to an understanding in regard to the method of settlement to be adopted.

In such case, before going further, the Council must call upon the parties to submit their dispute to judicial settlement or to arbitration.

It is only in the case where this appeal--which the Council will make in the manner which appears to it most likely to secure a favourable hearing--is not listened to that the procedure will acquire the compulsory character which is necessary to make certain the final settlement of all disputes. There are three alternatives:

(_a_) Compulsory arbitration at the request of one of the parties;

(_b_) A unanimous decision by the Council;

(_c_) Compulsory arbitration enjoined by the Council.

Appropriate methods are laid down for all three cases.

_Article 4, paragraph 2._