Part 10 (1/2)

Part II of the Report contains the scheme which Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford propose for the solution of the problem which they had set themselves to solve in Part I. In giving their reasons for a new policy they observe:

”_No further development (on old lines) is possible unless we are going to give the people of India some responsibility for their own government._ But no one can imagine that no further development is necessary. _It is evident that the present machinery of government no longer meets the needs of the time; it works slowly and it produces irritation_; there is a widespread demand on the part of educated Indian opinion for its alteration; and the need for advance is recognised by official opinion also.”

[Italics are ours.]

The new policy sketched by them is, in their judgment, ”the logical outcome of the past. Indians must be enabled, in so far as they attain responsibility, to determine for themselves what they want done

”... such limitations on powers as we are now proposing are due only to the obvious fact that time is necessary in order to train both representatives and electorates for the work which we desire them to undertake; and that we offer Indians opportunities at short intervals to prove the progress they are making and to make good their claim, not by the method of agitation but by positive demonstration, to the further stages in self-government which we have just indicated.”

That is the only basis on which they maintain they can hope to see in India ”the growth of a conscious feeling of organic unity with the Empire as a whole.” With these and a few more prefatory remarks about the educational problem and the att.i.tude of the ryot and the enunciation of the general principles on which their proposals are based they proceed to formulate their scheme, starting first with the provinces.

I

The proposals relating to Provincial Government may be noticed under the following heads:

(_a_) _Financial devolution_: It is proposed that henceforth there should be a complete separation of the provincial finances from those of the Government of India; that, reserving certain sources of revenue for the Government of India, all others should be made over to the Provincial Governments with the proviso that the first charge on all Provincial revenues will be a contribution towards the maintenance of the Government of India, considered necessary and demanded by the latter. A certain amount of power to impose fresh taxes and to raise loans is also conceded to the provincial Governments subject to the veto of the Government of India.

(_b_) _Legislative devolution_: ”It is our intention,” say the authors of the report, ”to reserve to the Government of India a general overriding power of legislation for the discharge of all functions which it will have to perform. It should be enabled under this power to intervene in any province for the protection and enforcement of the interests for which it is responsible; to legislate on any provincial matter in respect of which uniformity of legislation is desirable, either for the whole of India or for any two or more provinces; and to pa.s.s legislation which may be adopted either _simpliciter_ or with modifications by any province which may wish to make use of it. We think that the Government of India must be the sole judge of the propriety of any legislation which it may undertake under any one of these categories, and that its competence so to legislate should not be open to challenge in the courts. Subject to these reservations we intend that within the field which may be marked off for provincial legislative control the sole legislative power shall rest with the provincial legislatures.” It is not proposed to put a statutory limitation on the power of the Government of India to legislate for the provinces, but it is hoped that ”const.i.tutional practice” will prevent the central Government interfering in provincial matters unless the interests for which the latter is responsible are directly affected.

(_c_) _Provincial Executive_: Article 220 gives the Governor the power to appoint ”one or two additional members of his Government as members without portfolio for purposes of consultation and advice.”

These, in substance, are the proposals of the Secretary of State and the Government of India for the future government of the provinces into which India is divided. Some of these latter and some other tracts are expressly excluded from the operation of these recommendations. It will be at once observed that this is neither autonomy nor home rule. It is a kind of hybrid system with final powers of veto and control vested in the Government of India. The provision as to Provincial Legislatures make it still more complicated.

”Let us now explain how we contemplate in future that the executive Governments of the provinces shall be const.i.tuted. As we have seen, three provinces are now governed by a Governor and an Executive Council of three members, of whom one is in practice an Indian and two are usually appointed from the Indian Civil Service, although the law says only that they must be qualified by twelve years' service under the Crown in India. One province, Bihar and Orissa, is administered by a Lieutenant-Governor with a council of three const.i.tuted in the same way. The remaining five provinces, that is to say, the three Lieutenant-Governors.h.i.+ps of the United Provinces, the Punjab and Burma and the Chief Commissioners.h.i.+ps of the Central Provinces and a.s.sam are under the administration of a single official Head. We find throughout India a very general desire for the extension of Council government....

Our first proposition, therefore, is that in all these provinces singleheaded administration must cease and be replaced by collective administration.

”In determining the structure of the Executive we have to bear in mind the duties with which it will be charged. We start with the two postulates; the complete responsibility for the government cannot be given immediately without inviting a breakdown, and that some responsibility must be given at once if our scheme is to have any value. We have defined responsibility as consisting primarily in amenability to const.i.tuents, and in the second place in amenability to an a.s.sembly. We do not believe that there is any way of satisfying these governing conditions other than by making a division of the functions of the Government, between those which may be made over to popular control and those which for the present must remain in official hands.... We may call these the 'reserved' and 'transferred' subjects respectively. It then follows that for the management of these two categories there must be some form of executive body, with a legislative organ in harmony with it....

”We propose therefore that in each province the executive Government should consist of two parts. One part would comprise the head of the province and an executive council of two members.

In all provinces the head of the Government would be known as Governor.... One of the two Executive Councillors would in practice be a European qualified by long official experience, and the other would be an Indian. It has been urged that the latter should be an elected member of the provincial legislative council.

It is unreasonable that choice should be so limited. It should be open to the Governor to recommend whom he wishes.... The Governor in council would have charge of the reserved subjects. The other part of the government would consist of one member or more than one member, according to the number and importance of the transferred subjects, chosen by the Governor from the elected members of the Legislative council. They would be known as ministers. They would be members of the executive Government but not members of the Executive Council; they would be appointed for the life-time of the legislative council, and if reelected to that body would be re-eligible for appointment as members of the Executive. As we have said, they would not hold office at the will of the legislature but at that of their const.i.tuents.

”The portfolios dealing with the transferred subjects would be committed to the ministers, and on these subjects the ministers together with the Governor would form the administration. On such subjects their decision would be final, subject only to the Governor's advice and control. We do not contemplate that from the outset the Governor should occupy the position of a purely const.i.tutional Governor who is bound to accept the decisions of his ministers.”

(_d_) _Provincial Legislatures_: ”We propose there shall be in each province an enlarged legislative council, differing in size and composition from province to province, with a substantial elected majority, elected by direct election on a broad franchise, with such communal and special representation as may be necessary.”

The questions of franchise and special and communal representation have been entrusted to a special committee the report of which is shortly expected. The same committee will also decide how many official members there will be on each Legislative Council. It is provided that the Governor shall be the President of the Council and will have the power to nominate a Vice-president from the official members. As to the effect of resolutions it is said that ”we do not propose that resolutions, whether on reserved or transferred subjects should be binding.”

The cla.s.sification of the reserved and transferred subjects was also left to a special committee which has since concluded its labours and whose report is awaited with interest.

_Legislation on reserved subjects_:

”For the purpose of enabling the provincial Government to get through its legislation on reserved subjects, we propose that the head of the Government should have power to certify that a Bill dealing with a reserved subject is a measure 'essential to the discharge of his responsibility for the peace or tranquillity of the province or of any part thereof, or for the discharge of his responsibility for the reserved subjects.'... The Bill will be read and its general principles discussed in the full legislative council. It will at this stage be open to the council by a majority vote to request the Governor to refer to the Government of India, whose decision on the point shall be final, on the question whether the certified Bill deals with a reserved subject.

If no such reference is made, or if the Government of India decide that the certificate has been properly given, the Bill will then be automatically referred to a Grand Committee of the council. Its composition should reproduce as nearly as possible the proportion of the various elements in the larger body ... the grand committee in every council should be const.i.tuted so as to comprise from 40 to 50 per cent. of its strength. It should be chosen for each Bill, partly by election by ballot, and partly by nomination. The Governor should have power to nominate a bare majority exclusive of himself. Of the members so nominated not more than two-thirds should be officials, and the elected element should be elected _ad hoc_ by the elected members of the council on the system of the transferable vote.”

”On reference to the grand committee, the Bill will be debated by that body in the ordinary course, if necessary referred to a select committee, to which body we think that the grand committee should have power to appoint any member of the legislative council whether a member of the grand committee or not. The select committee will, as at present, have power to take evidence. Then, after being debated in the grand committee and modified as may be determined, the Bill will be reported to the whole council. The council will have the right to discuss the Bill again generally, but will not be able to reject it, or to amend it except on the motion of a member of the executive council. The Governor will then appoint a time limit within which the Bill may be debated in the council, and on its expiry it will pa.s.s automatically. But during such discussion the council will have the right to pa.s.s a resolution recording any objection which refers to the principle or details of the measure (but not, of course, to the certificate of its character), and any such resolution will accompany the Act when, after being signed by the Governor, it is submitted to the Governor General and the Secretary of State.”