Part 7 (1/2)
(_f_) That, considering the economic conditions of India, the higher servants of the Government are paid on a scale unparalleled in the history of public administration in the world.
(_g_) That the interests of the services often supersede those of the country and the Government.
(_h_) And last, but not least, that by the gathering of all powers of initiative and execution in their hands they have emasculated India.
As regards (_a_) we have already quoted the opinion of the eminent authors of the report. The principle laid down in the announcement of August 20, and the scheme proposed are supposed to do away with the element of irresponsibility. It is obvious that with the introduction of the principle of popular control into the Government, the power of individual servants of the executive will not remain what it is now, or has been in the past. Much that is vested in and done by the service will be transferred to public bodies elected by popular vote. This will naturally affect (_b_) and (_c_) also. We will here stop to quote again from the Report:
”In the forefront of the announcement of August 20 the policy of the increasing a.s.sociation of Indians in every branch of the administration was definitely placed. It has not been necessary for us, nor indeed would it have been possible, to go into this large question in detail in the time available for our inquiry. We have already seen that Lord Hardinge's Government was anxious to increase the number of Indians in the public services, and that a Royal Commission was appointed in 1912 to examine and report on the existing limitations in the employment of Indians.... The report was signed only a few months after the outbreak of war, and its publication was deferred in the hope that the war would not be prolonged. When written, it might have satisfied moderate Indian opinion, but when published two years later it was criticised as wholly disappointing. Our inquiry has since given us ample opportunity of judging the importance which Indian opinion attaches to this question. While we take account of this att.i.tude, a factor which carries more weight with us is that since the report was signed an entirely new policy toward Indian government has been adopted, which must be very largely dependent for success on the extent to which it is found possible to introduce Indians into every branch of the administration.”
The authors of the Report then proceed to state the limitations of the process, subject to the general remark that at the present moment there are few Indians (we do not admit this) trained in public life, who can replace the Europeans, and thus to alter the personnel of a service must be a long and steady process. They admit that:
”If responsible government is to be established in India there will be a far greater need than is even dreamt of at present for persons to take part in public affairs in the legislative a.s.semblies and elsewhere; and for this reason the more Indians we can employ in the public services the better. Moreover, it would lessen the burden of Imperial responsibilities if a body of capable Indian administrators could be produced. We regard it as necessary, therefore, that recruitment of a largely increased proportion of Indians should be begun at once.”
In the next paragraph they state why, in their judgment, it is necessary that a substantial portion of the services must continue to be European.
Their reasons may be gathered from the following:
”The characteristics which we have learned to a.s.sociate with the Indian public services must as far as possible be maintained and the leaven of officers possessed of them should be strong enough to a.s.sure and develop them in the service as a whole. The qualities of courage, leaders.h.i.+p, decision, fixity of purpose, detached judgment and integrity in her public servants will be as necessary as ever to India. There must be no such sudden swamping of any service with any new element that its whole character suffers a rapid alteration.”
On these grounds they make the following recommendations:
”I. That all distinctions based on race be removed, and that appointments to all branches of the public service be made without racial discrimination” (Paragraph 315).
”II. That for all the public services, for which there is recruitment in England open to Europeans and Indians alike, there must be a system of appointment in India, ... and we propose to supplement it by fixing a definite percentage of recruitment to be made in India.”
”III. We have not been able to examine the question of the percentage of recruitment to be made in India for any service other than the Indian Civil Service. The Commission recommended that 25 per cent. of the superior posts of that service should be recruited for in India. We consider that changed conditions warrant some increase in that proportion, and we suggest that 33 per cent. of the superior posts should be recruited for in India, and that this percentage should be increased by 1-1/2 per cent.
annually until the periodic commission is appointed which will re-examine the whole subject.... We have dealt only with the Indian Civil Service, but our intention is that there should be in all other services now recruited from England a fixed percentage of recruitment in India, increasing annually.”
Now we must admit that this is certainly a distinct and marked advance on the existing situation. The Indian Const.i.tutional party, however, wants to have the percentage of recruitment in India fixed at 50 per cent., retaining at the same time the annual increase suggested. In our opinion, this difference is not material, provided the number of posts to which the rule of percentage is to be applied is substantially reduced. We may state our position briefly.
We are of the opinion that the system of administration in India is much more costly than it should be, considering the sources and the amounts of Indian revenues. Unless the industries of the country are developed we can see no new sources of increased taxation. Consequently, to us, it seems essential that some economy should be effected in the various departments of the administration. The only way to effect that economy is to substantially reduce the number of posts on which it is considered necessary to retain a certain percentage of Europeans. In speaking of the machinery of the Government of India, the authors of the Report say:
”_We think we have reason for saying that in some respects the machinery is no longer equal to the needs of the time._ The normal work of the departments is heavy. The collective responsibility of the Government is weighty, especially in time of war. There is little time or energy left for those activities of a political nature which the new situation in the country demands. A legislative session of the Government of India imposes a serious strain upon the departments, and especially on the members in charge of them. But apart from the inevitable complexities of the moment, the growing burden of business, which results from the changing political conditions of the country, is leading to an acc.u.mulation of questions which cannot be disposed of as quickly as they present themselves. We find the necessity for reforms admitted, principles agreed upon, and decisions taken, and then long delays in giving effect to them. Difficulties are realized, enquiries are started, commissions report, and then there is a pause. There is a belief abroad that a.s.surances given in public p.r.o.nouncement of policy are sometimes not fulfilled. On this occasion, therefore, we have taken steps to guard against such imputations, and to provide means for ensuring the ordered development of our plans.”
PRESENT CAUSES OF DELAY
”267. The main fault for the clogging of the machine does not, we think, lie altogether with its highly trained engineers. What is chiefly wanted is some change of system in the directions of simplicity and speed. _How does it happen that announcements are made that arouse expectations only to defeat them?_ We know that it is not from any intention of deluding the public. We suggest that it is because the wheels move too slowly for the times; the need for change is realized, but because an examination of details would take too long, promises are made in general terms, which on examination it becomes necessary so to qualify with reservations as to disappoint antic.i.p.ations, and even to lead to charges of breach of faith. We suspect that a root-cause of some political discontent lies in such delays. Now, so far as the provinces are concerned, we believe that our proposals _for freeing them to a great extent from the control of the Government of India and the Secretary of State will improve matters. But the Government of India are in the worst case_.” [The italics are ours.]
These observations raise an apprehension in our mind that it is proposed to add to the strength of the services under the Government of India.
We, for ourselves, do not see how it can be otherwise. With the steady admission of the popular element into the Government of India the activities of the latter are likely to increase rather than diminish; the secretarial work of the different departments will expand rather than contract. The question of questions is how to meet the increased cost.
The remedy is the same as was suggested many years ago by Sir William Hunter, the official historian of India. He said:
”If we are to give a really efficient administration to India, many services must be paid for at lower rates even at present. For those rates are regulated in the higher branches of the administration by the cost of officers brought from England. You cannot work with imported labor as cheaply as you can with native labor, and I regard the more extended employment of the natives, not only as an act of justice, but as a financial necessity. If we are to govern the Indian people efficiently and cheaply, we must govern them by means of themselves, and pay for the administration at the market rates for native labor.”
Now, whatever may be said about the necessity of maintaining a strong European element in the departments which require initiative, courage, resourcefulness and all the other qualities of ”leaders.h.i.+p” they are certainly not a _sine qua non_ for efficiency in secretarial work. We can see no reason why, then, the different secretariats of the Government of India cannot be manned mainly, if not exclusively, by Indians. Their salaries need not be the same as those now paid to the Europeans engaged in these departments. May we ask if there is any country on earth where such high salaries are paid to the secretarial heads of departments as in India? Secretaries to the Government of India in the Army and Public works and Legislative departments receive 42,000 Rs. each ($14,000, or 2800 a year); Secretaries to the Government of India in the Finance, Foreign, Home, Revenue, Agriculture, Commerce and Industry and Education departments get Rs. 48,000 a year each ($16,000 or 3,200); Educational Commissioners from 30 to 36,000 Rs. ($10,000 to $12,000).
These secretarial officers are not of Cabinet rank. Besides their salaries they get various allowances, and the purchasing value of the rupee in India is much higher than that of 33 cents in the United States or of 16d. in the United Kingdom, the exchange equivalents of an Indian rupee. The same remarks may be made about Provincial Secretariats. We do not ignore the fact that a European who cuts himself away from his country and people for the best part of his life cannot be expected to give his time, energy and talents for the compensation he might accept in his own country, nor that, if the best kind of European talent is desired for India, the compensation must be sufficiently attractive to tempt competent men to accept it. In Paragraphs 318 to 322, both inclusive, the Secretary of India and the Viceroy have put forward a forceful plea for improvement in the conditions of the European Services by (_a_) increment in their salaries, (_b_) expediting promotions, and (_c_) grant of additional allowances, and also by bettering the prospects of pensions and leave. We are afraid the only way to obtain the concurrence of Indian public opinion in this matter, if at all, is by restricting the number of posts which _must_ be held by Europeans.
The _cadre_ of services to which the rule of percentage is to apply must be reduced in strength, and if Europeans are required for posts outside these they should be employed for short periods and from an open market.
For example, it seems inconceivable to us why professional men like doctors, engineers and professors should be recruited for permanent service. Nor is there any reason why the recruitment should be confined to persons of British domicile. The Government of India must be run on business principles. With the exception, perhaps, of the higher posts in the I. C. S. and in the Army, all other offices should be filled by taking the supply on the best available terms for short periods and from open market. By reducing the number of higher posts to which the rule of percentage should apply, the Government would be reducing the number of Indian officers who could claim the same salary as is given to their European colleagues. In our humble opinion, the latter claim is purely sentimental, and the best interests of the country require that the administration should be as economical as is compatible with efficiency.