Part 6 (2/2)
The element of _a.s.sociative suggestion_ also enters into the manifestation of aesthetic emotional feeling. The mind accepts the suggestion of the beauty of certain styles of art, or the excellence of certain cla.s.ses of music. There are fas.h.i.+ons in art and music, as in clothes, and what is thought beautiful to-day may be deemed hideous to-morrow. This is not entirely due to the evolution of taste, for in many cases the old fas.h.i.+ons are revived and again deemed beautiful.
There is, moreover, the effect of the a.s.sociation of the object of emotion with certain events or persons. This a.s.sociation renders the thing popular, and therefore agreeable and beautiful for the time being.
The suggestion in a story will often cause the beauty of a certain scene, or the harmony of a certain piece of music, to dawn upon thousands of persons. Some noted person sets the seal of approval upon a certain picture or musical composition and lo! the mult.i.tude calls it beautiful. It must not be supposed, however, that the crowd always counterfeits this sense of beauty and excellence which has been suggested to it. On the contrary, genuine aesthetic feeling often results from the discovery so made.
There is style and fas.h.i.+on in the use of words, resulting from fas.h.i.+on, which gives rise to aesthetic feelings regarding them. These feelings do not arise from the consideration of the nature of the object expressed by the word; of two words designating the same thing, one causes disgust and the other at least pa.s.sive tolerance. For instance, in speaking of the sensible moisture which is emitted from the pores of the skin, we may use either of the respective terms ”sweat” or ”perspiration.” Both mean the same thing, and have an equally respectable origin. But to many persons the word ”sweat” causes unpleasant aesthetic emotion, while the word ”perspiration” is accepted without remonstrance. Some persons abhor the term ”victuals,” while ”viands” or ”food” are accepted without protest. There is often an unpleasant, low, vulgar a.s.sociation connected with some words which accounts for the disfavor with which they are received, and which a.s.sociation is absent from the more ”polite” terms employed to indicate the same thing. But in other cases there is nothing but the simple suggestion of fas.h.i.+on and style to account for the aesthetic acceptance or rejection.
It is possible that some psychologist of the future will establish the truth of the theory now tentatively advanced by a few investigators, namely, that taste and the sense of beauty depend almost entirely upon the element of suggestion, manifested as a.s.sociation, influence of authority, habit, fas.h.i.+on, imitation, etc. It is known that the emotional nature is peculiarly liable to suggestion, and that tastes may be created or destroyed by repeated suggestion under the most favorable circ.u.mstances. It is thought likely that if we could trace back to its roots every emotion of taste, we would find it arising from some a.s.sociative, suggestive influence connected with another and more elemental cla.s.s of emotions.
Regarding the fact that there is no universal standard of taste or beauty, Halleck says: ”It has been said that aesthetics cannot be treated in a scientific way because there is no standard of taste. '_De gustibus non est disputandum_' ('there is no disputing about tastes') is an old proverb. Of two equally intelligent persons, the one may like a certain book, the other dislike it. * * * While it is true that the standard of taste is a varying one within certain limits, it is no more so than that of morals. As men's nervous systems, education, and a.s.sociations differ, we may scientifically conclude that their tastes must differ. The greater the uniformity in the factors the less does the product vary. On the other hand, within certain limits, the standard of aesthetics is relatively uniform. _It is fixed by the majority of intelligent people of any age and country._ To estimate the standard by which to judge of the correctness of language or of the literary taste of any era, we examine the conversations of the best speakers, the works of the standard writers.”
The aesthetic emotions may be developed and cultivated by exercise and practice, and particularly by a.s.sociation and familiarity with beautiful things, and with those who have ”good taste.” Appreciation of beauty is more or less contagious, up to a certain point of development, at least, and if one wishes to recognize, understand, and appreciate beauty, he should go where beauty is, and where its votaries are gathered. The study of standard works of art, or objects of nature, or the best productions of the composers of music, will do much to develop and unfold one's higher aesthetic feelings and understanding.
It is claimed by some of the best authorities that to develop the finer and higher aesthetic feelings and understanding we must learn to find beauty and excellence in things removed from ourselves or our selfish interests. The narrow, selfish emotions kill the aesthetic feelings--the two cannot exist together. The person whose thoughts are centered on himself or herself very rarely finds beauty or excellence in works of art or music. Grant Allen well sums up the subject in the following words: ”_Good taste is the progressive product of progressing fineness and discrimination in the nerves, educated attention, high and n.o.ble emotional const.i.tution, and increasing intellectual faculties._”
CHAPTER XVII.
The Intellectual Emotions.
By ”the intellectual emotions” is meant that cla.s.s of emotional feeling resulting from the presence of objects of intellectual interest. This cla.s.s of emotions depends for its satisfaction upon the exercise of the intellectual faculties, from the most simple to the most complex, and including perception, memory, imagination, reason, judgment, and all the logical faculties. Those who are accustomed to employing the mind through voluntary attention, particularly in the direction of creative ideation or constructive imagination, experience these emotions to a greater or less degree.
The exercise of perception, if we are skilled therein, gives us a pleasurable feeling, and if we succeed in making an interesting or important discovery by reason thereof, we experience a strong degree of emotional satisfaction. Likewise, we experience agreeable feelings when we are able to remember distinctly something which might well have been forgotten, or when we succeed in recalling something which had escaped our memory for the moment. In the same way the exercise of the imagination is a source of great pleasure in many cases in the direction of writing, planning, inventing, or other creative processes, or even in the building of air castles. The exercise of the logical faculties gives great pleasure to those in whom these faculties are well developed.
Halleck well says: ”There was probably not a happier moment in Newton's life than when he had succeeded in demonstrating that the same power which caused the apple to fall held the moon and the planets in their orbits. When Watts discovered that steam might be harnessed like a horse, when an inventor succeeds in perfecting a labor-lightening device, whenever an obscurity is cleared away, the reason for a thing understood, and a baffling instance brought under a general law, intellectual emotion results.”
The pleasurable feelings we experience upon the reading of a good book, or the discovery of real poetry, are forms of intellectual emotion. The same cla.s.s of emotional feeling is aroused when we witness a good play.
Among other instances of this cla.s.s we mention the perception of clever work of any kind, intricate machinery, ingenious devices, helpful improvements, or other works of man which indicate the existence of thought and inventive ability in the designer or builder. To appreciate mental work of this kind we must bring a mind developed along the same or similar lines. It has well been said that before one can take away anything from a book he must bring something to it. It takes mentality to recognize and appreciate mentality or the work of mentality.
The study of scientific subjects is a source of great pleasure to those who are inclined to such pursuits. To the scientific mind the study of the latest work on the favorite branch gives a joy which nothing else is capable of arousing. To the philosopher the works of other philosophers of the same school give intense satisfaction.
It is claimed that the sense of humor and wit is an intellectual emotion, for it depends upon the detection of the ludicrous features of a happening. Certain psychologists have held that the distinctive element of humor is the feeling attendant upon the perception of incongruity; while that of wit is the feeling of superiority on the part of the witty person, and the corresponding chagrin of the object of his wit. It would seem, however, that the appreciation of wit must depend upon the intellectual perception of cleverness of expression and the pleasure resulting from the discovery thereof, and that the feeling of humor is aroused princ.i.p.ally by reason of the incongruous element; the feeling of self-satisfaction as contrasted with the discomfiture of the other person belongs to the more selfish emotions. An authority says: ”Humor is a mental faculty which tends to discover incongruous resemblances between things which essentially differ, or essential differences between things put forth as the same, the result being internal mirth or an outburst of laughter. Wit does so likewise, but the two are different. Humor has deep human sympathy, and loves men while raising a laugh against their weaknesses. Wit is deficient in sympathy, and there is often a sting in its ridicule. Somewhat contemptuous of mankind, it has not the patience to study them thoroughly, but must content itself with noting superficial resemblances or differences.
Humor is patient and keenly observant, and penetrates beneath the surface; while, therefore, the sallies of wit are often one-sided and unfair, those of humor are, as a rule, just and wise.”
The development and cultivation of the intellectual emotions depend, of course, upon education, training, exercise, and practice. The cultivation of the intellect (which has been referred to, in part, in the previous parts of this book, and which will be again considered in the chapters devoted to the intellect) results in the development and cultivation of the emotions accompanying intellectual effort. In a general way, however, it may be said that the reading of the best works of fiction, science, and philosophy will bring out in time the best form of intellectual enjoyment and feeling. The highest gives the best--that is the rule. The present chapter should be read and studied in connection with those devoted to the intellect.
BLENDED EMOTIONS.
As we have said at the beginning of our consideration of the subject of the emotions, the majority of emotions are composed of several feelings, and tend to blend and combine emotional elements. For instance, the emotion of s.e.xual love certainly has its origin in the instinctive feelings of the race, and its motive element is that of pa.s.sion. But pa.s.sion is far from being all there is in human s.e.xual love. Above the plane of pa.s.sion is found the social emotion of companions.h.i.+p, protection, and care; the desire for the welfare of the loved one; the mingling of the love of the parent with that of the mate. Human love manifests many of the altruistic emotions during its course. The welfare of the loved one becomes the chief concern of life, often stronger even than self-preservation. The joy of the loved one becomes the greatest joy, far surpa.s.sing the more selfish forms of happiness. Then come the aesthetic feelings, which find satisfaction in the two ”liking the same things,” sympathy and community of feeling being the connecting link.
The several ideals of the two combining, there is produced an idealistic union, which is often called ”spiritual harmony.” Finally, there is found the blending of the intellectual emotions, in which harmony there exists one of the highest forms of pleasure satisfaction between two persons of opposite s.e.xes. It is said that the more things that a man and woman ”like” in common, the closer will be their ”liking” for each other. ”I love you because you love the things I love,” is no rare thought and expression.
So it is seen that though born in elemental instinct and pa.s.sion, human s.e.xual love is something far different in its flowering. And yet without its root it would not be, and cannot be. This is an excellent example of the complex nature of the most common emotions. It may be used as a typical ill.u.s.tration. What is true of it is also true, in a way and in a degree, of every other form of emotion. Therefore in studying a particular emotion, be not too quick to cry, ”It is this; it is that!”
but rather seek to say, ”It is composed of this and that, of this and that!” Few, if any, emotions are simple; the majority are very complex.
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