Part 30 (1/2)
[272] Governor of Upper Germany.
[273] As a subordinate division of Lower Germany the Batavian district would be administered by 'prefects' subordinate to the imperial legate.
[274] Vitellius had reduced the strength of the legions (cp. ii. 94).
[275] Because it would weaken the position of Vitellius.
[276] They lived north of the Batavi, between the Zuider Zee and the North Sea.
[277] ii. 29.
[278] Mogontiac.u.m.
[279] Caligula's only trophy had been helmetfuls of stones and sh.e.l.ls from the sea-sh.o.r.e of Germany.
[280] Living in Friesland, north-east of the Zuider Zee.
[281] Reading _applicata_ (Andresen) instead of _occupata_, which gives no sense. The camp was probably somewhere near Katwyk.
[282] The Nervii were a Gallic tribe living on the Sambre, with settlements at Cambray, Tournay, Bavay. Ritter's alteration of _Germanorum_ to _Cugernorum_ is very probably right. They lived about a dozen miles west of Vetera, and are thus a likely recruiting-ground. They were of German origin, so if _Germanorum_ is right, the reference will still be to them and the Tungri and other German Settlements on the east of the Rhine.
[283] See ii. 42, note 301. Here, however, it is not improbable that the word _cuneus_ means a V-shaped formation.
Tacitus' phrase in _Germ._ 6 is generally taken to mean that the Germans fought in wedge-formation. The separation of the three tribes in three columns was also typical of German tactics. The presence of kinsmen stimulated courage.
[284] Presumably at the eastern end of the island, near either Nymwegen or Arnheim.
[285] The Aedui lived in Bourgogne and Nivernois, between the Loire and the Saone; the Arverni in Auvergne, north-west of the Cevennes. Both had joined Vindex.
[286] 'Many' must be an exaggeration, since Augustus' census of Gaul took place 27 B.C., ninety-five years ago.
[287] Sixty years ago, to be exact.
THE MUTINY OF THE BATAVIAN COHORTS
Hordeonius Flaccus at first furthered Civilis' schemes by shutting his eyes to them. But when messengers kept arriving in panic with news that a camp had been stormed, cohorts wiped out, and not a Roman left in the Batavian Island, he instructed Munius Lupercus, who commanded the two legions[288] in winter-quarters,[289] to march against the enemy. Lupercus lost no time in crossing the river,[290] taking the legions whom he had with him, some Ubii[291] who were close at hand, and the Treviran cavalry who were stationed not far away. To this force he added a regiment of Batavian cavalry, who, though their loyalty had long ago succ.u.mbed, still concealed the fact, because they hoped their desertion would fetch a higher price, if they actually betrayed the Romans on the field. Civilis set the standards of the defeated cohorts[292] round him in a ring to keep their fresh honours before the eyes of his men, and to terrify the enemy by reminding them of their disaster. He also gave orders that his own mother and sisters and all the wives and small children of his soldiers should be stationed in the rear to spur them to victory or shame them if they were beaten.[293] When his line raised their battle-cry, the men singing and the women shrieking, the legions and their auxiliaries replied with a comparatively feeble cheer, for their left wing had been exposed by the desertion of the Batavian cavalry, who promptly turned against us. However, despite the confusion, the legionaries gripped their swords and kept their places. Then the Ubian and Treviran auxiliaries broke in shameful flight and went wandering all over the country. The Germans pressed hard on their heels and meanwhile the legions could make good their escape into the camp, which was called 'Castra Vetera'.[294] Claudius Labeo, who commanded the Batavian cavalry, had opposed Civilis as a rival in some petty munic.i.p.al dispute. Civilis was afraid that, if he killed him, he might offend his countrymen, while if he spared him his presence would give rise to dissension; so he sent him off by sea to the Frisii.
It was at this time that the cohorts of Batavians and 19 Canninefates, on their way to Rome under orders from Vitellius, received the message which Civilis had sent to them.[295] They promptly fell into a ferment of unruly insolence and demanded a special grant as payment for their journey, double pay, and an increase in the number of their cavalry.[296] Although all these things had been promised by Vitellius they had no hope of obtaining them, but wanted an excuse for rebellion. Flaccus made many concessions, but the only result was that they redoubled their vigour and demanded what they felt sure he would refuse. Paying no further heed to him they made for Lower Germany, to join Civilis. Flaccus summoned the tribunes and centurions and debated with them whether he should use force to punish this defiance of authority. After a while he gave way to his natural cowardice and the fears of his subordinates, who were distressed by the thought that the loyalty of the auxiliaries was doubtful and that the legions had been recruited by a hurried levy. It was decided, therefore, to keep the soldiers in camp.[297] However, he soon changed his mind when he found himself criticized by the very men whose advice he had taken. He now seemed bent on pursuit, and wrote to Herennius Gallus in command of the First legion, who was holding Bonn, telling him to bar the path of the Batavians, and promising that he and his army would follow hard upon their heels. The rebels might certainly have been crushed had Flaccus and Gallus each advanced their forces from opposite directions and thus surrounded them. But Flaccus soon gave up the idea, and wrote another letter to Gallus, warning him to let the rebels pa.s.s undisturbed. This gave rise to a suspicion that the generals were purposely promoting the war; and all the disasters which had already occurred or were feared in the future, were attributed not to the soldiers' inefficiency or the strength of the enemy, but to the treachery of the generals.
On nearing the camp at Bonn, the Batavians sent forward a 20 messenger to explain their intentions to Herennius Gallus. Against the Romans, for whom they had fought so often, they had no wish to make war: but they were worn out after a long and unprofitable term of service and wanted to go home and rest. If no one opposed them they would march peaceably by; but if hostility was offered they would find a pa.s.sage at the point of the sword. Gallus hesitated, but his men induced him to risk an engagement. Three thousand legionaries, some hastily recruited Belgic auxiliaries, and a mob of peasants and camp-followers, who were as cowardly in action as they were boastful before it, came pouring out simultaneously from all the gates, hoping with their superior numbers to surround the Batavians. But these were experienced veterans. They formed up into columns[298] in deep formation that defied a.s.sault on front, flank, or rear. They thus pierced our thinner line. The Belgae giving way, the legion was driven back and ran in terror to reach the trench and the gates of the camp.
It was there that we suffered the heaviest losses. The trenches were filled with dead, who were not all killed by the blows of the enemy, for many were stifled in the press or perished on each other's swords.
The victorious cohorts avoided Cologne and marched on without attempting any further hostilities. For the battle at Bonn they continued to excuse themselves. They had asked for peace, they said, and when peace was persistently refused, had merely acted in self-defence.
FOOTNOTES:
[288] V Alaudae and XV Primigenia, both depleted.
[289] At Vetera.
[290] Waal.
[291] They lived round their chief town, known since A.D. 50 as Colonia Agrippinensis, now Cologne (cp. i. 56, note 106).