Part 11 (1/2)

[244] Antibes.

[245] Albenga.

[246] Sardinia and Corsica were an imperial province A.D.

6-67. Then Nero gave it back to the senate to compensate for his declaration of the independence of Achaia. Vespasian once more transferred it to imperial government. If _procurator_ is correct here, Pacarius must have been a subordinate imperial functionary in a senatorial province. As the province changed hands so often and was so soon after this placed under imperial control, it is possible that Tacitus made a mistake and that Pacarius was an ex-praetor. Those who feel that Tacitus is unlikely to have made this error, and that Pacarius can hardly have been anything but governor, adopt the suggestion that Corsica did not share the fate of Sardinia in A.D. 67, but remained under the control of an imperial procurator. There is no clear evidence of this, but under Diocletian Corsica was certainly separate.

[247] These cruisers were of a peculiarly light build, called after the Liburni, an Illyrian tribe, who fought for Octavian in the battle of Actium. He introduced similar craft into the Roman navy. They were very fast, and worked with a triangular, instead of the usual square sail.

[248] i.e. his Corsican and Roman clients.

[249] i. 70.

[250] Piacenza and Pavia.

[251] i.e. one of the two detachments sent forward by the armies of Dalmatia and Pannonia (cp. chap. 11).

[252] Otho's Praetorian Guards were the weakest point in his army.

[253] Cp. i. 36 note 61.

[254] i.e. that Spurinna was in league with Caecina, and meant to hand them over to him.

[255] He was making 'a reconnaissance in force westwards along the river bank to discover, if he could, the strength and intentions of the enemy' (B.W. Henderson, _Civil War_, &c.).

But Mr. E.G. Hardy points out that, as he had only 4,000 men and Caecina's 30,000 were in the immediate neighbourhood, this would have been foolish. It seems better to believe Tacitus'

suggestion that his insubordinate troops forced Spurinna to march out.

[256] Considered Gallic and effeminate.

[257] Mr. Henderson (_Civil War_, &c.) argues that it was imperative for Caecina to take the fortress at Placentia, since it threatened his sole line of communication with Valens' column. Tacitus, as usual, gives a practical rather than a strategic motive. His interests are purely human.

[258] Familiar devices for sheltering troops against missiles from a town wall. They were generally made of hurdles covered with raw hides. The _vinea_ was a shelter on poles, so named from its resemblance to a pergola of vines.

[259] In i. 61 only legion XXI is mentioned. But Caecina may have formed the detachments into another legion.

[260] Civilis' nephew and bitter enemy. See iv. 70, v. 21.

[261] Spurinna's colleague in the command of the advanced guard from Rome. He was now probably at Mantua.

[262] At the meeting of two high roads leading to Cremona, the one from Hostilia and the other from Mantua. It was near here that Vitellius defeated Otho, and here that his power fell before Vespasian (cp. iii. 15 f.).

[263] See note 231.

[264] This was stated in i. 87. The reminder is inserted because they were not mentioned with Gallus in ii. 11--unless, indeed, Mr. Onions is right in suggesting that _quoque_ is an error for _duces_.

[265] He had left him in charge of Rome. See i. 90.

[266] We learn in chap. 33 that Gallus was disabled and took no part in this engagement: hence the omission of his name.

[267] About 10 English miles.

[268] Locus Castorum.

[269] See chap. 11.