Part 54 (1/2)

* The reality was different from the media storyline. In the fog of war, Lynch's unit had become lost after taking a wrong turn, and in a firefight she had been wounded and captured. Lynch's captors took her to a local hospital, where a courageous Iraqi reported her whereabouts to U.S. forces. After her rescue, Lynch reportedly remembered little about the ordeal, but like most American troops who had volunteered to serve their country, she was brave and dedicated. The reality was different from the media storyline. In the fog of war, Lynch's unit had become lost after taking a wrong turn, and in a firefight she had been wounded and captured. Lynch's captors took her to a local hospital, where a courageous Iraqi reported her whereabouts to U.S. forces. After her rescue, Lynch reportedly remembered little about the ordeal, but like most American troops who had volunteered to serve their country, she was brave and dedicated.

* One mile east of the airport, Army Sergeant First Cla.s.s Paul Ray Smith and the soldiers of the 3rd Infantry Division were clearing a position to hold enemy prisoners of war. Without warning, Republican Guard troops began firing from a nearby watchtower, and nearly one hundred Iraqi troops threatened to overrun his position and an aid station where dozens of wounded American soldiers were receiving medical attention. Smith manned a machine gun and led a counterattack from an exposed position. Though he would not survive the battle, Smith prevented Saddam's men from attacking the aid station, saving the lives of over a hundred American soldiers. For his courage, Paul Ray Smith became the first to receive the Congressional Medal of Honor in the wars that began after September 11, 2001. One mile east of the airport, Army Sergeant First Cla.s.s Paul Ray Smith and the soldiers of the 3rd Infantry Division were clearing a position to hold enemy prisoners of war. Without warning, Republican Guard troops began firing from a nearby watchtower, and nearly one hundred Iraqi troops threatened to overrun his position and an aid station where dozens of wounded American soldiers were receiving medical attention. Smith manned a machine gun and led a counterattack from an exposed position. Though he would not survive the battle, Smith prevented Saddam's men from attacking the aid station, saving the lives of over a hundred American soldiers. For his courage, Paul Ray Smith became the first to receive the Congressional Medal of Honor in the wars that began after September 11, 2001.

* The list also included hospitals, mosques, and schools. The list also included hospitals, mosques, and schools.

* At one point, I commented to General John Abizaid and General Myers: ”The history books suggest that the way they stopped looting in earlier era[s] in Iraq was to get the tribes to provide security for things like electric power lines and oil wells.” I asked, ”Have we considered talking to some of the tribes about providing that security and paying them for it, like we would police, and having them be responsible?” It would be precisely these tribes that would prove critical to achieving a level of security in the country three years later. At one point, I commented to General John Abizaid and General Myers: ”The history books suggest that the way they stopped looting in earlier era[s] in Iraq was to get the tribes to provide security for things like electric power lines and oil wells.” I asked, ”Have we considered talking to some of the tribes about providing that security and paying them for it, like we would police, and having them be responsible?” It would be precisely these tribes that would prove critical to achieving a level of security in the country three years later.10

* The intelligence community a.s.sessed that the Iraqi ”police and justice personnel appear to have extensive professional training,” as one brief provided to the NSC princ.i.p.als a.s.serted. This proved to be off the mark. To a great many Iraqis, the police force was equated with the abuses of Saddam's regimes. The police lacked legitimacy and thus authority, posing a major problem for the coalition as an insurgency took root. The intelligence community a.s.sessed that the Iraqi ”police and justice personnel appear to have extensive professional training,” as one brief provided to the NSC princ.i.p.als a.s.serted. This proved to be off the mark. To a great many Iraqis, the police force was equated with the abuses of Saddam's regimes. The police lacked legitimacy and thus authority, posing a major problem for the coalition as an insurgency took root.12

* Today the Baghdad Museum is open and thousands of ancient Near Eastern artifacts have been moved back into their displays. Today the Baghdad Museum is open and thousands of ancient Near Eastern artifacts have been moved back into their displays.

The situation brought to mind a quote I had read: ”The power of the media is willful and dangerous because it dramatically affects Western policy while bearing no responsibility for the outcome. Indeed, the media's moral perfectionism is possible only because it is politically unaccountable.” The situation brought to mind a quote I had read: ”The power of the media is willful and dangerous because it dramatically affects Western policy while bearing no responsibility for the outcome. Indeed, the media's moral perfectionism is possible only because it is politically unaccountable.”19

* In the 2000 campaign, candidate George W. Bush had indicated that he was similarly ill disposed to sending American troops to take on ”nation-building” missions. ”I don't think our troops ought to be used for what's called nation-building,” Bush said. In the 2000 campaign, candidate George W. Bush had indicated that he was similarly ill disposed to sending American troops to take on ”nation-building” missions. ”I don't think our troops ought to be used for what's called nation-building,” Bush said.8

* Rodman had come of age as a protege of Henry Kissinger during the Nixon and Ford administrations. Like Kissinger, he was a strategist who thought long term, the kind of adviser I favored. Rodman was a quiet presence in Department meetings. When he spoke, it was with unusual precision and insight. Rodman had come of age as a protege of Henry Kissinger during the Nixon and Ford administrations. Like Kissinger, he was a strategist who thought long term, the kind of adviser I favored. Rodman was a quiet presence in Department meetings. When he spoke, it was with unusual precision and insight.

The deputies committee was the most senior interagency forum below the cabinet level. Departments were represented by the deputy secretaries or under secretaries in the meetings. The deputies committee was the most senior interagency forum below the cabinet level. Departments were represented by the deputy secretaries or under secretaries in the meetings.

* In late 2003, when this deficiency became apparent, Doug Feith and I joined White House officials in urging the State Department to undertake the responsibility of creating an office of stabilization and reconstruction and a civilian reserve corps that could deploy as our military reserves did. Powell agreed eventually on the condition that it would be ”small scale.” He was understandably concerned about State being a.s.signed additional missions without increasing its budget, personnel, and resources. Such an office came into being only in 2004, but with less authority and a smaller mandate than it merits. In late 2003, when this deficiency became apparent, Doug Feith and I joined White House officials in urging the State Department to undertake the responsibility of creating an office of stabilization and reconstruction and a civilian reserve corps that could deploy as our military reserves did. Powell agreed eventually on the condition that it would be ”small scale.” He was understandably concerned about State being a.s.signed additional missions without increasing its budget, personnel, and resources. Such an office came into being only in 2004, but with less authority and a smaller mandate than it merits.

* The State Department and CIA had also not favored having the Northern Alliance advance on Kabul for fear the Afghans might not be able to settle disputes among Afghanistan's ethnic divisions. Their view seemed to be that the United States needed to orchestrate the takeover of the Afghan capital and set up a balance of power for them. The State Department and CIA had also not favored having the Northern Alliance advance on Kabul for fear the Afghans might not be able to settle disputes among Afghanistan's ethnic divisions. Their view seemed to be that the United States needed to orchestrate the takeover of the Afghan capital and set up a balance of power for them.

* More than a year before the war began, in January 2002, Pentagon officials were pus.h.i.+ng for a U.S. government-sponsored conference for all the external groups to show a united front against the Saddam regime. Deputy Secretary of State Armitage generated a series of bureaucratic impediments to stop or delay the meeting. Eventually, in December 2002, the administration organized a conference in London. By then, nearly a year had pa.s.sed, to the detriment of our country's planning efforts. Even then, State and CIA remained skeptical of the Iraqi externals, and voiced doubts about the Iraqis' ability to come together to build a new country. More than a year before the war began, in January 2002, Pentagon officials were pus.h.i.+ng for a U.S. government-sponsored conference for all the external groups to show a united front against the Saddam regime. Deputy Secretary of State Armitage generated a series of bureaucratic impediments to stop or delay the meeting. Eventually, in December 2002, the administration organized a conference in London. By then, nearly a year had pa.s.sed, to the detriment of our country's planning efforts. Even then, State and CIA remained skeptical of the Iraqi externals, and voiced doubts about the Iraqis' ability to come together to build a new country.

* I recommended to President Bush that Garner be appointed amba.s.sador to Afghanistan soon after he returned to the United States, but without success. I believed he could inject a sense of urgency into the State Department mission in Kabul. I recommended to President Bush that Garner be appointed amba.s.sador to Afghanistan soon after he returned to the United States, but without success. I believed he could inject a sense of urgency into the State Department mission in Kabul.18

* The failure to take responsibility for leaks that threatened to damage the administration ultimately belonged to the White House. In April 2003, a few weeks after my phone conversation with Powell, I a.s.sembled a package of news articles quoting officials from the State Department, including Armitage, that revealed damaging a.s.sertions against the administration, and sent the memo to Card. The articles, I noted, ”reflect a hemorrhaging in the administration. It is clearly not disciplined.” Though it was seldom noted, Armitage also leaked CIA operative Valerie Plame's name to the press, causing further damage. The failure to take responsibility for leaks that threatened to damage the administration ultimately belonged to the White House. In April 2003, a few weeks after my phone conversation with Powell, I a.s.sembled a package of news articles quoting officials from the State Department, including Armitage, that revealed damaging a.s.sertions against the administration, and sent the memo to Card. The articles, I noted, ”reflect a hemorrhaging in the administration. It is clearly not disciplined.” Though it was seldom noted, Armitage also leaked CIA operative Valerie Plame's name to the press, causing further damage.22

* After a brief talk with Bremer, I told Card that ”I think he is the man” to head the CPA. Tenet said he had heard good things about Bremer, and Powell said he thought well of Bremer but wanted to ”run a couple of traps” before he could say he was comfortable. I later learned a slightly different version of the story of the Bremer selection. Apparently when I mentioned Bremer, Powell was delighted, because Bremer had close links to the State Department. After a brief talk with Bremer, I told Card that ”I think he is the man” to head the CPA. Tenet said he had heard good things about Bremer, and Powell said he thought well of Bremer but wanted to ”run a couple of traps” before he could say he was comfortable. I later learned a slightly different version of the story of the Bremer selection. Apparently when I mentioned Bremer, Powell was delighted, because Bremer had close links to the State Department.27

* Bremer quotes himself as saying, ”I'd settle for MacArthur's problems.” Bremer quotes himself as saying, ”I'd settle for MacArthur's problems.”1

* When I met with the two of them on my visits to Iraq, their body language signaled a lack of rapport. By the end of their tours in mid-2004, I received reports that they were barely speaking. When I met with the two of them on my visits to Iraq, their body language signaled a lack of rapport. By the end of their tours in mid-2004, I received reports that they were barely speaking.

* A subtle but important semantic misstep was that the administration allowed the United Nations to label the United States ”an occupying power” in Security Council Resolution 1483. The unanimous May 2003 resolution signaled broad international approval for the coalition's efforts in a liberated Iraq, but it gave credence to the propaganda of our enemies that we were ”occupying” Iraq. A subtle but important semantic misstep was that the administration allowed the United Nations to label the United States ”an occupying power” in Security Council Resolution 1483. The unanimous May 2003 resolution signaled broad international approval for the coalition's efforts in a liberated Iraq, but it gave credence to the propaganda of our enemies that we were ”occupying” Iraq.

* It's difficult to penetrate the fog of war even after the fact, but in the years that followed, some senior military officers who were on the ground now believe there were at least some Iraqi units that might have been called back to duty. Some believe that as many as three Iraqi divisions might have been available for use. ”The idea,” Lieutenant General McKiernan later said, ”was to bring in the Iraqi soldiers and their officers, put them on a roster, and sort out the bad guys as we went.” If McKiernan had been acting as the senior commander in Iraq on the ground, as I believed he was supposed to be, his view might have prevailed. It's difficult to penetrate the fog of war even after the fact, but in the years that followed, some senior military officers who were on the ground now believe there were at least some Iraqi units that might have been called back to duty. Some believe that as many as three Iraqi divisions might have been available for use. ”The idea,” Lieutenant General McKiernan later said, ”was to bring in the Iraqi soldiers and their officers, put them on a roster, and sort out the bad guys as we went.” If McKiernan had been acting as the senior commander in Iraq on the ground, as I believed he was supposed to be, his view might have prevailed.31

* The CPA called the proposed new army the New Iraqi Corps. Though it had been done unwittingly, the acronym NIC was a particularly foul word in Arabic. The CPA called the proposed new army the New Iraqi Corps. Though it had been done unwittingly, the acronym NIC was a particularly foul word in Arabic.

* In 2004, after the fact, the Senate Intelligence Committee's report could highlight only one small section at the end of a thirty-eight-page National Intelligence Council doc.u.ment suggesting that the CIA cautioned of an insurgency: ”[R]ogue ex-regime elements could forge an alliance with existing terrorist organizations or act independently to wage guerrilla warfare against the new government or Coalition forces.” This point was not included in the executive summary at the front of the doc.u.ment. Though press reports and opportunistic politicians seized on this line years later, CIA Director Tenet, to his considerable credit, came forward and put it into proper perspective in his memoirs: ”It's tempting to cite this information and say, 'See, we predicted many of the difficulties that later ensued'-but doing so would be disingenuous.... Had we felt strongly that these were likely outcomes, we should have shouted our conclusions.” In 2004, after the fact, the Senate Intelligence Committee's report could highlight only one small section at the end of a thirty-eight-page National Intelligence Council doc.u.ment suggesting that the CIA cautioned of an insurgency: ”[R]ogue ex-regime elements could forge an alliance with existing terrorist organizations or act independently to wage guerrilla warfare against the new government or Coalition forces.” This point was not included in the executive summary at the front of the doc.u.ment. Though press reports and opportunistic politicians seized on this line years later, CIA Director Tenet, to his considerable credit, came forward and put it into proper perspective in his memoirs: ”It's tempting to cite this information and say, 'See, we predicted many of the difficulties that later ensued'-but doing so would be disingenuous.... Had we felt strongly that these were likely outcomes, we should have shouted our conclusions.”49

* According to the official Defense Department dictionary, guerrilla warfare was defined as ”military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.” An insurgency was defined as ”an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a const.i.tuted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.” According to the official Defense Department dictionary, guerrilla warfare was defined as ”military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.” An insurgency was defined as ”an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a const.i.tuted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.”53

* We learned that several Al-Jazeera correspondents were embedded with the terrorists. They knew when and where attacks against Iraqi and coalition forces would take place, and they videotaped the attacks showing our troops being killed. We learned that several Al-Jazeera correspondents were embedded with the terrorists. They knew when and where attacks against Iraqi and coalition forces would take place, and they videotaped the attacks showing our troops being killed.

* The often cited statistics about electricity generation did not give a full picture. After insurgent attacks on the power grid began taking a toll on production, Iraqis began to figure out the best solution for themselves. They bought generators for their homes and businesses that were far less susceptible to attacks than the large, vulnerable, and expensive power plants, lines, and transformers that made up the national grid. The often cited statistics about electricity generation did not give a full picture. After insurgent attacks on the power grid began taking a toll on production, Iraqis began to figure out the best solution for themselves. They bought generators for their homes and businesses that were far less susceptible to attacks than the large, vulnerable, and expensive power plants, lines, and transformers that made up the national grid.

* Two of the most promising leads were from two Sunni former army generals, Abdul Razaq Sultan al-Jibouri and Talalal-Gaood, who had reached out to the U.S. military in late 2003 and offered to help negotiate peace with Sunni tribes in Anbar province. Two of the most promising leads were from two Sunni former army generals, Abdul Razaq Sultan al-Jibouri and Talalal-Gaood, who had reached out to the U.S. military in late 2003 and offered to help negotiate peace with Sunni tribes in Anbar province.