Volume Vi Part 19 (2/2)

Chief Justice Melville W. Fuller.

The plaintiffs, who were manufacturers of hats, complained that the defendants--members of the United Hatters of North America, an organization which was a part of the American Federation of Labor--were ”engaged in a combined scheme and effort to force all manufacturers of fur hats in the United States, including the plaintiffs, against their will and their previous policy of carrying on their business, to organize their workmen ... into an organization of the said combination known as The United Hatters of North America, or, as the defendants and their confederates term it, to unionize their shops, with the intent thereby to control the employment of labor in, and the operation of, said factories ... and to carry out such scheme, effort and purpose by restraining and destroying the interstate trade and commerce of such manufacturers by means of intimidation of, and threats made to such manufacturers and their customers in the several States, of boycotting them, their product and their customers ... until ... the said manufacturers should yield to the demand to unionize their factories.”

These methods had been successfully employed before, as is evidenced by the fact that seventy of the eighty-two manufacturers of fur hats had been compelled to accept the conditions set forth by the American Federation of Labor. The boycott against the Danbury, manufacturers began in July, 1902, and was widened to include the wholesalers who handled the goods of the Danbury concern, the dealers who bought from the wholesalers, and customers who bought from these dealers. Notices to this effect were printed in the official organs of the American Federation of Labor and the United Hatters of North America. To make the feeling against the manufacturers more intense, statements were published to the effect that they were practising an unfair, un-American policy in discriminating against competent union men in favor of the cheap unskilled foreign labor.

The counsel for the defence argued that no case could be set up under the Sherman act, since the defendants were not engaged in interstate commerce, implying that a combination of laborers was not a violation of the act. The court held that an action could be maintained in this case and that the combination as it existed was ”in restraint of trade” in the sense designated by the act of 1890. The significance of the decision lies in the fact that the Supreme Court made no distinctions between cla.s.ses. Records of Congress show that efforts were made to exempt, by legislation, organizations of farmers and laborers from the operation of the act and that their efforts failed. Therefore the court held that every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade was illegal and cited a former decision (The United States vs.

Workingmen's Amalgamated Council) to show that the law interdicted combinations of workingmen as well as capital.

The Sherman act was pa.s.sed by Congress in 1890. It was ent.i.tled ”An Act to Protect Trade and Commerce against Unlawful Restraints and Monopolies.” Since its pa.s.sage various cases falling under it have been decided, but until the decisions in the Standard Oil Company and the American Tobacco Company cases the extent and intent of this act have not been understood.

In the Standard Oil case the question involved was this: Was the Sherman act violated by the existence and conduct of this corporation, which owned or controlled some eighty corporations originally in compet.i.tion?

The control had been acquired for the purpose of monopolizing the sale and distribution of petroleum products in the United States, and had been acquired by various means of combination with the intent either by fair or unfair methods ”to drive others from the field and to exclude them from their right to trade.” The proof was that, to destroy compet.i.tors, prices had been temporarily reduced in various localities, spies had been used on compet.i.tors' business, bogus independent companies operated, and rebates given and taken.

In the case of the American Tobacco Company, there were more than one hundred formerly competing companies united under the control of a single organization and the market in nearly all tobacco products was monopolized. This domination was secured ”by methods devised in order to monopolize the trade by driving compet.i.tors out of business.”

In each case the court found the defendants guilty on the grounds that the agreements and the conduct of the defendants indicated a purpose to destroy compet.i.tors and monopolize trade in certain articles. The desired result was accomplished by wrongful means which injured the public as well as the compet.i.tors.

The facts in neither case required the consideration of the question as to whether the Sherman act prohibited every unification of formerly competing properties and every restraint of trade, reasonable or unreasonable but, owing to the uncertainty of the public concerning the meaning of the law, the court stated definitely the meaning and scope of the act. From appearances the Supreme Court has practically amended the Sherman act by limiting its application to ”unreasonable” restraints of trade. The significance of the decisions lies here rather than in the fact that both companies were compelled to dissolve. The best legal authorities believe that the new interpretation of ”reasonableness” and ”unreasonableness” of restraint of trade has increased rather than decreased the effectiveness of the law, inasmuch as the meaning has always been obscure. The new policy is a notification to combinations of capital that to exist without prosecution they must not resort to any unfair, oppressive, or illegal methods to control compet.i.tion or crush compet.i.tors.

CHAPTER XIII

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S SECOND TERM--CONTINUED

[1907]

While President Roosevelt advocated peace, he believed that the best means to preserve peace was suitable preparation for war. In his message to Congress, 1904, he said; ”There is no more patriotic duty before us as a people than to keep the navy adequate to the needs of this country's position. Our voice is now potent for peace, and is so potent because we are not afraid of war. But our protestations would neither receive nor deserve the slightest attention if we were impotent to make them good.” At all times he urged a larger and more efficient navy. For years, before he became a.s.sistant Secretary of the Navy, he had been a student of naval affairs. He found that there was no programme for building s.h.i.+ps as in the European countries, and that there was general unpreparedness for war.

Before the war with Spain, the American navy was so inferior that it was excluded from any table of the princ.i.p.al navies of the world. Had the United States possessed a few more battles.h.i.+ps at that time, it is probable that war would not have occurred. Spanish authorities had been told by naval experts that their navy was superior to ours.

Profiting by that experience, plans for a larger navy were projected. By the close of the year 1907 there were about 300 vessels in the navy manned by 35,377 men. In comparative strength it ranked second only to that of Great Britain. Not only was there an increase in the number of vessels but there was great improvement in marksmans.h.i.+p and in the handling of s.h.i.+ps. In the battle of Santiago it has been estimated that about five per cent of the sh.e.l.ls struck the enemy. During the year 1902 Rear-Admiral Robley D. Evans introduced regular and frequent target practice. So effective was this work that in 1908, at ranges twice as great as at Santiago, gunners throughout the fleet averaged sixty per cent and one vessel scored eighty per cent. Rapidity of fire also was increased nearly fourfold.

It was the custom to send the fleet each winter to the Caribbean Sea for manoeuvres, which lasted about four months. In December, 1907, the Atlantic fleet, comprising sixteen battle-s.h.i.+ps and a flotilla of torpedo-boats, began a cruise around the world. President Roosevelt steadily adhered to the plan in the face of the most extravagant denunciation on the part of those who declared that it could be considered only as a menace toward j.a.pan. Naval experts claimed, however, that the experience to be gained by this cruise, such as practice in handling s.h.i.+ps in all kinds of weather, the renewal of stores and coal, and the meeting of other problems incident to actual warfare, justified the experiment.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Portrait.]

Copyright. 1908. by Harris & Ewing.

Rear-Admiral Robley D. Evans.

Under command of Rear-Admiral Evans the fleet reached Rio Janeiro on January 12. Unusual honors were tendered the men by the Brazilian government and people. The day of their arrival was made a national festival. In reply to the friendly greeting from the Brazilian government President Roosevelt wrote: ”The war-s.h.i.+ps on this cruise exist for no other purpose than to protect peace against possible aggression. As between the United States and Brazil these s.h.i.+ps are not men-of-war, but messengers of friends.h.i.+p and good-will.” There were similar manifestations on the part of Argentina, Chile, and Peru. The visit of the fleet to these countries was regarded as a compliment. They were permitted to see something of the strength of the republic at the north and learned that the Monroe Doctrine might be enforced, if need be, by a navy of the first rank. Notable ceremonies attended the arrival of the fleet at Honolulu, Auckland, Sydney, Melbourne, and Manila. A despatch to a London paper said: ”It is beyond question that the United States is no longer a Western but a cosmic power. America is now a force in the world, speaking with authoritative accent, and wielding a dominant influence such as ought to belong to her vast wealth, prosperity, and importance.”

[Ill.u.s.tration]

Copyright, 1907. by Underwood & Underwood.

The Atlantic fleet starting on its journey round the world, December, 1907.

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