Volume V Part 22 (2/2)

They set to work with great zeal and discretion to win to the cause of peace not only the Filipinos but the government of the Philippine Republic itself. In this latter they succeeded. Their proclamation that United States sway in the archipelago would be made ”as free, liberal, and democratic as the most intelligent Filipino desired,” ”a firmer and surer self-government than their own Philippine Republic could ever guarantee,” operated as a powerful agent of pacification.

May 1, 1899, the Philippine Congress almost unanimously voted for peace with the United States. Aguinaldo consented. Mabini's cabinet, opposing this, was overturned, and a new one formed, pledged to peace. A commission of cabinet members was ready to set out for Manila to effectuate the new order.

A revolution prevented this. General Luna, inspired by Mabini, arrested the peace delegates and charged them with treason, sentencing some to prison, some to death. This occurred in May, 1899. After that time not so much as the skeleton of any Philippine public authority--president, cabinet, or other official--existed. Later opposition to the American arms seemed to proceed in the main not from real Filipino patriotism, but from selfishness, l.u.s.t of power, and the spirit of robbery.

Everywhere and always Americans had to guard against treachery. In Samar false guides led an expedition of our Marine Corps into a wilderness and abandoned the men to die, cruelty which was deemed to justify retaliation in kind. Eleven prisoners subsequently captured were shot without trial as implicated in the barbarity. For this Major Waller was court-martialed, being acquitted in that he acted under superior orders and military necessity. A sensational feature of his trial was the production of General Smith's command to Major Waller ”to kill and burn”; ”make Samar a howling wilderness”; ”kill everything over ten”

(every native over ten years old). General Smith was in turn court-martialed and reprimanded. President Roosevelt thought this not severe enough and summarily retired him from active service.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Soldier on a train.]

Bringing ammunition to the front for Gen. Otis's Brigade, north of Manila.

Despite vigilant censors.h.i.+p by the War Department, rumors of other cruelties on the part of our troops gained credence. It appeared that in not a few instances American soldiers had tortured prisoners by the ”water cure,” the victim being held open-mouthed under a stream of water, the process sometimes supplemented by pounding on the abdomen with rifle-b.u.t.ts.

These disgraces were sporadic, not general, and occurred, when they did occur, under terrible provocation. Devotion to duty, however trying the circ.u.mstances, was the characteristic behavior of our officers and men.

Deeds of daring occurred daily. On November 14, 1900, Major John A.

Logan, son of the distinguished Civil War general, lost his life in battle near San Jacinto. December 19th the brave General Lawton was killed in attacking San Mateo. Systematic opposition to our arms was at last ended by an enterprise involving both nerve and cleverness in high degree.

Our forces captured a message from Aguinaldo asking reenforcements. This suggested to General Frederick Funston, who had served with Cuban insurgents, a plan for seizing Aguinaldo. Picking some trustworthy native troops and scouts, Funston, Captain Hazzard, Captain Newton, and Lieutenant Mitch.e.l.l, pa.s.sed themselves off as prisoners and their forces as the reenforcements expected. When the party approached Aguinaldo's headquarters word was forwarded that reenforcements were coming, with some captured Americans. Aguinaldo sent provisions, and directed that the prisoners be treated with humanity. March 23, 1901, he received the officers at his house. After brief conversation they excused themselves.

Next instant a volley was poured into Aguinaldo's body-guard, and the American officers rushed upon Aguinaldo, seized him, his chief of staff, and his treasurer. April 2, 1901, Aguinaldo swore allegiance to the United States, and, in a proclamation, advised his followers to do the same. Great and daily increasing numbers of them obeyed.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Stone fort with many large sh.e.l.l holes.]

Fort Malate, Cavite.

To the Philippines, though Spain's de facto sovereignty there was hardly more than nominal, our t.i.tle, whether or not good as based on conquest, was unimpeachable considered as a cession by way of war indemnity or sale. Nor, according to the weight of authority, could the right of the federal power to acquire these islands be denied. But did ”the Const.i.tution follow the flag” wherever American jurisdiction went? If not, what were the relations of those outlands and their peoples to the United States proper? Could inhabitants of the new possessions emigrate to the United States proper? Did our domestic tariff laws apply there as well as here? Must free trade exist between the nation and its dependencies? Were rights such as that of peaceable a.s.semblage and that to jury trial guaranteed to Filipinos, or could only Americans to the manner born plead them?

On the fundamental question whether the dependencies formed part of the United States the Supreme Court pa.s.sed in certain so-called ”insular cases” which were early brought before it. Four of the justices held that at all times after the Paris Treaty the islands were part and parcel of United States soil. Four held that they at no time became such, but were rather ”territories appurtenant” to the country.

[Ill.u.s.tration: River crowded with small boats.]

The Pasig River, Manila.

Mr. Justice Brown gave the ”casting” opinion. Though reasoning in a fas.h.i.+on wholly his own, he sided, on the main issue, with the latter four of his colleagues, making it the decision of the court that Porto Rico and the Philippines did not belong to the United States proper, yet, on the other hand, were not foreign. The revenue clauses of the Const.i.tution did not, therefore, forbid tariffing goods from or going to the islands. In the absence of express legislation, the general tariff did not obtain as against imports from the dependencies. This reasoning, it was observed, was equally applicable to mainland territories and to Alaska. The court intimated that, so far as applicable, the Const.i.tution's provisions in favor of personal rights and human liberty accompanied the Stars and Stripes beyond sea as well as between our old sh.o.r.es.

Unsatisfactory to nearly all as was this utterance of a badly divided court, it sanctioned the Administration policy and opened the way for necessary legislation. It did nothing, however, to hush the anti-imperialist's appeal, based more upon the Declaration of Independence and the spirit of our national ideals.

It was said that having delivered the Filipinos from Spain ”we were bound in all honor to protect their newly acquired liberty against the ambition and greed of any other nation on earth, and we were equally bound to protect them against our own. We were bound to stand by them, a defender and protector, until their new government was established in freedom and in honor; until they had made treaties with the powers of the earth and were as secure in their national independence as Switzerland, Denmark, Belgium, Santo Domingo, or Venezuela.” But we ought to bind ourselves and promise the world that so soon as these ends could be realized or a.s.sured we would leave the Filipinos to themselves, Such was the view of eminent and respected Americans like George F.

h.o.a.r, George S. Boutwell, Carl Schurz, and William J. Bryan.

These and others urged that the Filipinos had inalienable right to life and to liberty; that our policy in the Philippines was in derogation of those rights; that j.a.pan, left to herself, had stridden farther in a generation than England's crown colony of India in a century; that the Filipinos could be trusted to do likewise; that our increments of territory hitherto had been adapted to complete incorporation in the American empire while the new were not; and that growth of any other character would mean weakness, not strength. The mistakes, expense, and difficulties incident to expansion, and the misbehavior and crimes of some of our soldiers were exhibited in their worst light.

Rejoinder usually proceeded by denying the capacity of the Filipinos for self-government without long training. Even waiving this consideration, men found in international law no such mid-status between sovereignty and non-sovereignty as anti-imperialists wished to have the United States a.s.sume while the Filipinos were getting upon their feet. Many made great point of minimizing the abuses of our military government and of dilating upon native atrocities. The material wealth of the archipelago was described in glowing terms. Only American capital and enterprise were needed to develop it into a mine of national riches. The military and commercial advantages of our position at the doorway of the East, our duty to protect lives and property imperilled by the insurgents, and our manifest destiny to lift up the Filipino races, were dwelt upon. The argument having chief weight with most was that there seemed no clear avenue by which we could escape the policy of American occupation save the dishonorable and humiliating one of leaving the islands to their fate--anarchy and intestine feuds at once, conquest by j.a.pan, Germany, or Spain herself a little later.

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