Volume Iv Part 10 (1/2)
General Winfield S. Hanc.o.c.k.
On the Confederate right no action took place till late in the day.
Burnside then attacked and gained some slight advantage. But re-enforcements from Harper's Ferry came up and were put in against him, forcing him back to the creek. During the next day McClellan feared to risk a battle. Being re-enforced, he intended to attack on the following morning; but Lee, who should have been crushed, having but 40,000 men to McClellan's 87,000, slipped away in the night and got safely across the Potomac. The Union loss was 12,400; that of the Confederates probably about the same.
The general dissatisfaction with McClellan's slowness caused his removal early in November, Burnside succeeding him. The new commander, who, as the head of the army, was an amiable failure, proposed to move directly against Richmond, but Lee flung himself in his path at Fredericksburg.
Fredericksburg lies on the south bank of the Rappahannock. Behind the city is a gradually ascending plain, bounded by heights which bend toward the river. Lee's army, 80,000 strong, lay in a semicircle along these heights, its wings touching the river above and below the town.
Two rows of batteries, planted on the heights, swept the plain in front and flank. A sunken road, sheltered by a stone wall, ran along the base of the declivity. Burnside's army of 125,000 men occupied a range of hills on the north side of the river.
[Ill.u.s.tration: Portrait.]
General Ambrose E. Burnside.
Lee's position was very strong; but the country was impatient for action, and Burnside too readily and without any definite plan gave the order to attack. December 11th and 12th were spent in crossing the river on pontoon bridges. The ominous 13th came. The first charge was made by 5,000 of Franklin's men against the Confederate right. The attacking column broke through the lines and reached the heights; but it was not supported, and Confederate reserves drove it back.
About noon an attack was made by Hanc.o.c.k's and French's corps against the Confederate left. They advanced over the plain in two lines, one behind the other. Suddenly the batteries in front, to left, to right, poured upon them a murderous fire. Great gaps were mowed in their ranks.
Union batteries, replying from across the river, added horror to the din, but helped little. Still the lines swept on. They grew thinner and thinner, halted, broke, and fled.
Again they advanced, this time almost up to the stone wall. Behind it, hidden from sight, lay gray ranks four deep. Suddenly that silent wall burst into flame, and the advancing lines crumbled away more rapidly than before. Three times more the gallant fellows came on, bayonets fixed, to useless slaughter. That deadly wall could not be pa.s.sed.
[Ill.u.s.tration: Ditch full of dead soldiers, behind a four foot stone wall.]
The Stone Wall at Fredericksburg.
[1863]
The two wings having failed, the Union centre, under Fighting Joe Hooker, was ordered to try. He kept his batteries playing till sunset, hoping to make a breach. Four thousand men were then ordered into the jaws of death. Stripping off knapsacks and overcoats, and relying on the bayonet alone, they charged on the double-quick and with a cheer. They got within twenty yards of the stone wall. Again that sheet of flame! In fifteen minutes it was all over, and they returned as rapidly as they advanced, leaving nearly half their number dead and dying behind. During the day Burnside had had 113,000 men either across the river or ready to cross. Lee's force was 78,000.
Night put an end to the luckless carnage. Burnside's generals dissuaded him from renewing the attack next day, and the army re-crossed the river. They had lost 12,300 men; the Confederates 5,000. A writer to the London Times from Lee's headquarters called this December 13th a day ”memorable to the historian of the Decline and Fall of the American Republic.”
Burnside resigned in January, and Hooker took the command, but he did not a.s.sume the offensive till the last of April. Then, leaving three corps under Sedgwick to deceive Lee by a demonstration in front, he marched up-stream with the other four of his corps, crossed the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, partially turned Lee's left, and took up a position near Chancellorsville. It was a perfect plan, and thus far triumphantly executed. But here Hooker waited, and the pause was fatal.
On the night of April 30th Lee perceived that Sedgwick's movement was only a feint, and gathered all his forces, 62,000 strong, to fight at Chancellorsville. He fortified himself so firmly that Hooker with 64,000, or, including Sedgwick's two corps and the cavalry, 113,000, made not a single step of further advance.
[Ill.u.s.tration: Portrait.]
General Oliver O. Howard.
[Ill.u.s.tration: Portrait.]
General John Sedgwick.
[Ill.u.s.tration: Map.]
R.D. Servoss, N.Y.
Jackson's Attack on Howard, May 1st, 1863.
Nor was this the worst. Hooker's right wing, under Howard, was weakly posted. On the 2d of May Stonewall Jackson, who cherished the theory that one man in an enemy's rear is worth ten in his front, making a detour of fifteen miles, got upon Howard's right un.o.bserved, and rolled it up. The surprise was as complete as it was inexcusable. Arms were stacked and the men getting supper. Suddenly some startled deer came bounding into camp, gray-coats swarming from the woods hard behind.
Almost at the first charge the whole corps broke and flee! But the victory cost the Confederates dear; Jackson was fatally wounded, probably by his own men.