Volume Ii Part 13 (2/2)
Gladly would one form fuller acquaintance with other Revolutionary leaders: Stirling, Sullivan, Sumter, Mad Anthony Wayne, of Monmouth and Stony Point fame, Glover with his brave following of Marblehead fishermen, who, able to row as well as shoot, manned the oars that critical night when General Was.h.i.+ngton crossed to Trenton. But s.p.a.ce is too brief. Colonel Was.h.i.+ngton, the das.h.i.+ng cavalryman, was the Custer of the Revolution. All the patriot ladies idolized him. In a hot sword-fight with the Colonel, Tarleton had had three fingers nearly severed. Subsequently in conversation with a South Carolina lady Tarleton said: ”Why do you ladies so lionize Colonel Was.h.i.+ngton? He is an ignorant fellow. He can hardly write his name.” ”But you are a witness that he can make his mark,” was the reply.
[Ill.u.s.tration: An officer on horseback looking down at a wounded man lying on the ground.]
DeKalb Wounded at Camden.
DeKalb was an American, too--by adoption. It is related that he expostulated with Gates for fighting so unprepared at Camden, and that Gates intimated cowardice. ”Tomorrow will tell, sir, who is the coward,”
the old fellow rejoined. And tomorrow did tell. As the battle reddened, exit Gates from Camden and from fame. We have recounted elsewhere how like a bull De Kalb held the field. A monster British grenadier rushed on him, bayonet fixed. DeKalb parried, at the same time burying his sword in the grenadier's breast so deep that he was unable to extract it. Then seizing the dead man's weapon he fought on, thrusting right and left, till at last, overpowered by numbers, he slipped and fell, mortally hurt.
Among the civilian heroes of the Revolution, Robert Morris, the financier, deserves exceeding praise. Now turning over the lead ballast of his s.h.i.+ps for bullets, now raising $50,000 on his private credit and sending it to Was.h.i.+ngton in the nick of time, now leading the country back to specie payment in season to save the national credit, the Philadelphia banker aided the cause as much as the best general in the field.
Faithful and successful envoys as Jay and John Adams were, the Revolution brought to light one, and only one, true master in the difficult art of diplomacy--Franklin. Wise with a lifetime's shrewd observation, venerable with years, preceded by his fame as scientist and Revolutionary statesman, grand in his plain dignity, the Philadelphia printer stood unabashed before the throne of France, and carried king and diplomats with an art that surprised Europe's best-trained courtiers. Never missing an opportunity, he yet knew, by delicate intuition, when to speak and when to hold his tongue. Through concession, intrigue, and delay, his resolute will kept steady to its purpose. To please by yielding is easy. To carry one's point and be pleasing still, requires genius. This Franklin did--how successfully, our treaty of alliance with France and our treaty of peace with England splendidly attested.
Towering above Revolutionary soldier, general, and statesman stands a figure summing up in himself all these characters and much more. That figure is George Was.h.i.+ngton, the most perfect human personality the world has known. Was.h.i.+ngton's military ability has been much underrated.
He was hardly more First in Peace than First in War. That he had physical courage and could give orders calmly while bullets whizzed all about, one need not repeat. He was strategist and tactician too. Trenton and Yorktown do not cover his whole military record. With troops inferior in every single respect except natural valor, he out-generalled Howe in 1776, and he almost never erred when acting upon his own good judgment instead of yielding to Congress or to his subordinates. His movements on the Delaware even such a captain as Frederick the Great declared ”the most brilliant achievements in the annals of military action.” Was.h.i.+ngton advised against the attempt to hold Fort Was.h.i.+ngton, which failed; against the Canada campaign, which failed; against Gates for commander in the South, who failed; and in favor of Greene for that post, who succeeded. His army was indeed driven back in several battles, but never broken up. At Monmouth his plan was perfect, and it seems that he must have captured Clinton but for the treason of Charles Lee, set, by Congress's wish, to command the van.
Indeed, of Was.h.i.+ngton's military career, ”take it all in all, its long duration, its slender means, its vast theatre, its glorious aims and results, there is no parallel in history.” [Footnote: Winthrop, Was.h.i.+ngton Monument Oration. February 23, 1885.]
Yet we are right in never thinking of the Great Man first as a soldier, he was so much besides. Was.h.i.+ngton's consummate intellectual trait was sound judgment, only matched by the magnificent balance which subsisted between his mental and his moral powers. ”George had always been a good son,” his mother said. Nature had endowed him with intense pa.s.sions and ambitions, but neither could blind him or swerve him one hair from the line of rect.i.tude as he saw it. And he made painful and unremitting effort to see it and see it correctly. He was approachable, but repelled familiarity, and whoever attempted this was met with a perfectly withering look. He rarely laughed, and he was without humor, though he wrote and conversed well. He had the integrity of Aristides. His account with Congress while general shows scrupulousness to the uttermost farthing. To subordinate, to foe, even to malicious plotters against him, he was almost guiltily magnanimous. He loved popularity, yet, if conscious that he was right, would face public murmuring with heart of flint. Became the most famous man alive, idolized at home, named by every tongue in Europe, praised by kings and great ministers, who compared him with Caesar, Charlemagne, and Alfred the Great, his head swam not, but with steadfast heart and mind he moved on in the simple pursuit of his country's weal. ”In Was.h.i.+ngton's career,” said Fisher Ames, ”mankind perceived some change in their ideas of greatness; the splendor of power, and even the name of conqueror had grown dim in their eyes.” Lord Erskine wrote him: ”You are the only being for whom I have an awful reverence.” ”Until time shall be no more,” said Lord Brougham, ”will a test of the progress which our race has made in Wisdom and Virtue be derived from the veneration paid to the immortal name of Was.h.i.+ngton.” And Mr. Gladstone: ”If among all the pedestals supplied by history for public characters of extraordinary n.o.bility and purity I saw one higher than all the rest, and if I were required at a moment's notice to name the fittest occupant for it, my choice would light upon WAs.h.i.+NGTON.” [Footnote: See Winthrop's Oration for these and other encomia.]
CHAPTER IX.
THE OLD CONFEDERATION
[1781]
The Revolutionary Congress was less a government than an exigency committee. It had no authority save in tacit general consent. Need of an express and permanent league was felt at an early date. Articles of Confederation, framed by d.i.c.kinson, of Pennsylvania, were adopted by Congress in November, 1777. They were then submitted to the State Legislatures for ratification. By the spring of 1779 all the States but Maryland had given their approval. Upon the accession of the latter, on March 1, 1781, the articles went into effect at once.
The Confederation bound the States together into a ”firm league of friends.h.i.+p” for common defence and welfare, and this ”union” was to be ”perpetual.” Each State retained its ”sovereignty” and ”independence,”
as well as every power not ”expressly delegated” to the central Government. Inhabitants of each State were ent.i.tled to all the privileges of citizens in the several States. Criminals fleeing from one State to another were to be returned.
Congress was composed of delegates chosen annually, each State being represented by not less than two or more than seven. Each State had but one vote, whatever the number of its delegates.
Taxation and the regulation of commerce were reserved to the State Governments. On the other hand, Congress alone could declare peace or war, make treaties, coin money, establish a post-office, deal with Indians outside of the States, direct the army, and appoint generals and naval officers. Many other things affecting all the States alike, Congress alone could do. It was to erect courts for trial of felonies and piracies on the high seas, and appoint judges for the settlement of disputes between the States. It was to make estimates for national expenses, and request of each State its quota of revenue.
To amend the Articles, the votes of the entire thirteen States were demanded. Important lesser measures--such as those regarding war or peace, treaties, coinage, loans, appropriations--required the consent of nine States. Upon other questions a majority was sufficient. A committee, composed of one delegate from each State, was to sit during the recess of Congress, having the general superintendence of national affairs.
The faults of the Confederation were numerous and great. Three outshadowed the rest: Congress could not enforce its will, could not collect a revenue, could not regulate commerce.
Congress could not touch individuals; it must act through the State Governments, and these it had no power to coerce. Five States, for instance, pa.s.sed laws which violated the treaty provision about payment of British creditors; yet Congress could do nothing but remonstrate.
Hence its power to make treaties was almost a nullity. European nations did not wish to treat with a Government that could not enforce its promises.
Congress could make requisition upon the States for revenue, but had no authority to collect a single penny. The States complied or not as they chose. In October, 1781, Congress asked for $8,000,000; in January, 1783, it had received less than half a million. Lack of revenue made the Government continually helpless and often contemptible.
Yet in spite of their looseness and other faults, the adoption of the Articles of Confederation was a forward step in American public law.
Their greatest value was this: they helped to keep before the States the thought of union, while at the same time, by their very inefficiency, they proved the need of a stronger government to make union something more than a thought. The years immediately after the war were an extremely critical period. The colonies had indeed pa.s.sed through the Red Sea, but the wilderness still lay before them. The great danger which had driven them into union being past, State pride and jealousy broke out afresh. ”My State,” not ”my country,” was the foremost thought in most minds. There was serious danger that each State would go its own way, and firm union come, if at all, only after years of weakness and disaster, if not of war. The unfriendly nations of Europe were eagerly antic.i.p.ating such result. At this juncture the Articles of Confederation, framed during the war when union was felt to be imperative, did invaluable service. They solemnly committed the States to perpetual union. Their provisions for extradition of criminals and for inter-State citizens.h.i.+p helped to break down the barriers between State and State. Congress, by discharging its various duties on behalf of all the States, kept steadily before the public mind the idea of a national government, armed with at least a semblance of authority.
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