Volume I Part 3 (1/2)
If we look at Greek religious tradition, we observe the coexistence of the RATIONAL and the apparently IRRATIONAL elements. The RATIONAL myths are those which represent the G.o.ds as beautiful and wise beings. The Artemis of the Odyssey ”taking her pastime in the chase of boars and swift deer, while with her the wild wood-nymphs disport them, and high over them all she rears her brow, and is easily to be known where all are fair,”(1) is a perfectly RATIONAL mythic representation of a divine being. We feel, even now, that the conception of a ”queen and G.o.ddess, chaste and fair,” the abbess, as Paul de Saint-Victor calls her, of the woodlands, is a beautiful and natural fancy, which requires no explanation. On the other hand, the Artemis of Arcadia, who is confused with the nymph Callisto, who, again, is said to have become a she-bear, and later a star; and the Brauronian Artemis, whose maiden ministers danced a bear-dance,(2) are G.o.ddesses whose legend seems unnatural, and needs to be made intelligible. Or, again, there is nothing not explicable and natural in the conception of the Olympian Zeus as represented by the great chryselephantine statue of Zeus at Olympia, or in the Homeric conception of Zeus as a G.o.d who ”turns everywhere his s.h.i.+ning eyes, and beholds all things, and protects the righteous, and deals good or evil fortune to men.” But the Zeus whose grave was shown in Crete, or the Zeus who played Demeter an obscene trick by the aid of a ram, or the Zeus who, in the shape of a swan, became the father of Castor and Pollux, or the Zeus who deceived Hera by means of a feigned marriage with an inanimate object, or the Zeus who was afraid of Attes, or the Zeus who made love to women in the shape of an ant or a cuckoo, is a being whose myth is felt to be unnatural and bewildering.(3) It is this IRRATIONAL and unnatural element, as Mr. Max Muller says, ”the silly, senseless, and savage element,” that makes mythology the puzzle which men have so long found it. For, observe, Greek myth does not represent merely a humorous play of fancy, dealing with things religiously sacred as if by way of relief from the strained reverential contemplation of the majesty of Zeus. Many stories of Greek mythology are such as could not cross, for the first time, the mind of a civilised Xenophanes or Theagenes, even in a dream. THIS was the real puzzle.
(1) Odyssey, vi. 102.
(2) (Greek word omitted); compare Harpokration on this word.
(3) These are the features in myth which provoke, for example, the wonder of Emeric-David. ”The lizard, the wolf, the dog, the a.s.s, the frog, and all the other brutes so common on religious monuments everywhere, do they not all imply a THOUGHT which we must divine?” He concludes that these animals, plants, and monsters of myths are so many ”enigmas” and ”symbols” veiling some deep, sacred idea, allegories of some esoteric religious creed. Jupiter, Paris, 1832, p. lxxvii.
We have offered examples--Savage, Indian, and Greek--of that element in mythology which, as all civilised races have felt, demands explanation.
To be still more explicit, we may draw up a brief list of the chief problems in the legendary stories attached to the old religions of the world--the problems which it is our special purpose to notice. First we have, in the myths of all races, the most grotesque conceptions of the character of G.o.ds when mythically envisaged. Beings who, in religion, leave little to be desired, and are spoken of as holy, immortal, omniscient, and kindly, are, in myth, represented as fas.h.i.+oned in the likeness not only of man, but of the beasts; as subject to death, as ignorant and impious.
Most pre-Christian religions had their ”zoomorphic” or partially zoomorphic idols, G.o.ds in the shape of the lower animals, or with the heads and necks of the lower animals. In the same way all mythologies represent the G.o.ds as fond of appearing in animal forms. Under these disguises they conduct many amours, even with the daughters of men, and Greek houses were proud of their descent from Zeus in the shape of an eagle or ant, a serpent or a swan; while Cronus and the Vedic Tvashtri and Poseidon made love as horses, and Apollo as a dog. Not less wild are the legends about the births of G.o.ds from the thigh, or the head, or feet, or armpits of some parent; while tales describing and pictures representing unspeakable divine obscenities were frequent in the mythology and in the temples of Greece. Once more, the G.o.ds were said to possess and exercise the power of turning men and women into birds, beasts, fishes, trees, and stones, so that there was scarcely a familiar natural object in the Greek world which had not once (according to legend) been a man or a woman. The myths of the origin of the world and man, again, were in the last degree childish and disgusting. The Bushmen and Australians have, perhaps, no story of the origin of species quite so barbarous in style as the anecdotes about Phanes and Praj.a.pati which are preserved in the Orphic hymns and in the Brahmanas. The conduct of the earlier dynasties of cla.s.sical G.o.ds towards each other was as notoriously cruel and loathsome as their behaviour towards mortals was tricksy and capricious. The cla.s.sical G.o.ds, with all their immortal might, are, by a mythical contradiction of the religious conception, regarded as capable of fear and pain, and are led into sc.r.a.pes as ludicrous as those of Brer Wolf or Brer Terrapin in the tales of the Negroes of the Southern States of America. The stars, again, in mythology, are mixed up with beasts, planets and men in the same embroglio of fantastic opinion. The dead and the living, men, beasts and G.o.ds, trees and stars, and rivers, and sun, and moon, dance through the region of myths in a burlesque ballet of Priapus, where everything may be anything, where nature has no laws and imagination no limits.
Such are the irrational characteristics of myths, cla.s.sic or Indian, European or American, African or Asiatic, Australian or Maori. Such is one element we find all the world over among civilised and savage people, quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus. It is no wonder that pious and reflective men have, in so many ages and in so many ways, tried to account to themselves for their possession of beliefs closely connected with religion which yet seemed ruinous to religion and morality.
The explanations which men have given of their own sacred stories, the apologies for their own G.o.ds which they have been constrained to offer to themselves, were the earliest babblings of a science of mythology.
That science was, in its dim beginnings, intended to satisfy a moral need. Man found that his G.o.ds, when mythically envisaged, were not made in his own moral image at its best, but in the image sometimes of the beasts, sometimes of his own moral nature at its very worst: in the likeness of robbers, wizards, sorcerers, and adulterers. Now, it is impossible here to examine minutely all systems of mythological interpretation. Every key has been tried in this difficult lock; every cause of confusion has been taken up and tested, deemed adequate, and finally rejected or a.s.signed a subordinate place. Probably the first attempts to shake off the burden of religious horror at mythical impiety were made by way of silent omission. Thus most of the foulest myths of early India are absent, and presumably were left out, in the Rig-Veda.
”The religious sentiment of the hymns, already so elevated, has discarded most of the tales which offended it, but has not succeeded in discarding them all.”(1) Just as the poets of the Rig-Veda prefer to avoid the more offensive traditions about Indra and Tvashtri, so Homer succeeds in avoiding the more grotesque and puerile tales about his own G.o.ds.(2) The period of actual apology comes later. Pindar declines, as we have seen, to accuse a G.o.d of cannibalism. The Satapatha Brahmana invents a new story about the slaying of Visvarupa. Not Indra, but Trita, says the Brahmana apologetically, slew the three-headed son of Tvashtri. ”Indra a.s.suredly was free from that sin, for he is a G.o.d,”
says the Indian apologist.(3) Yet sins which to us appear far more monstrous than the peccadillo of killing a three-headed Brahman are attributed freely to Indra.
(1) Les Religions de l'Inde, Barth, p. 14. See also postea, ”Indian Myths”.
(2) The reasons for Homer's reticence are probably different in different pa.s.sages. Perhaps in some cases he had heard a purer version of myth than what reached Hesiod; perhaps he sometimes purposely (like Pindar) purified a myth; usually he must have selected, in conformity with the n.o.ble humanity and purity of his taste, the tales that best conformed to his ideal. He makes his deities reluctant to drag out in dispute old scandals of their early unheroic adventures, some of which, however, he gives, as the kicking of Hephaestus out of heaven, and the imprisonment of Ares in a vessel of bronze. Compare Professor Jebb's Homer, p. 83: ”whatever the instinct of the great artist has tolerated, at least it has purged these things away.” that is, divine amours in b.e.s.t.i.a.l form.
(3) Satapatha Brahmana, Oxford, 1882, vol. i. p. 47.
While poets could but omit a blasphemous tale or sketch an apology in pa.s.sing, it became the business of philosophers and of antiquarian writers deliberately to ”whitewash” the G.o.ds of popular religion.
Systematic explanations of the sacred stories, whether as preserved in poetry or as told by priests, had to be provided. India had her etymological and her legendary school of mythology.(1) Thus, while the hymn SEEMED to tell how the Maruts were G.o.ds, ”born together with the spotted deer,” the etymological interpreters explained that the word for deer only meant the many-coloured lines of clouds.(2) In the armoury of apologetics etymology has been the most serviceable weapon. It is easy to see that by aid of etymology the most repulsive legend may be compelled to yield a pure or harmless sense, and may be explained as an innocent blunder, caused by mere verbal misunderstanding. Brahmans, Greeks, and Germans have equally found comfort in this hypothesis. In the Cratylus of Plato, Socrates speaks of the notion of explaining myths by etymological guesses at the meaning of divine names as ”a philosophy which came to him all in an instant”. Thus we find Socrates shocked by the irreverence which styled Zeus the son of Cronus, ”who is a proverb for stupidity”. But on examining philologically the name Kronos, Socrates decides that it must really mean Koros, ”not in the sense of a youth, but signifying the pure and garnished mind”. Therefore, when people first called Zeus the son of Cronus, they meant nothing irreverent, but only that Zeus is the child of the pure mind or pure reason. Not only is this etymological system most pious and consolatory, but it is, as Socrates adds, of universal application. ”For now I bethink me of a very new and ingenious notion,... that we may put in and pull out letters at pleasure, and alter the accents.”(3)
(1) Rig-Veda Sanhita. Max Muller, p. 59.
(2) Postea, ”Indian Divine Myths”.
(3) Jowett's Plato, vol. i. pp. 632, 670.
Socrates, of course, speaks more than half in irony, but there is a certain truth in his account of etymological a.n.a.lysis and its dependence on individual tastes and preconceived theory.
The ancient cla.s.sical schools of mythological interpretation, though unscientific and unsuccessful, are not without interest. We find philosophers and grammarians looking, just as we ourselves are looking, for some condition of the human intellect out of which the absurd element in myths might conceivably have sprung. Very naturally the philosophers supposed that the human beings in whose brain and speech myths had their origin must have been philosophers like themselves--intelligent, educated persons. But such persons, they argued, could never have meant to tell stories about the G.o.ds so full of nonsense and blasphemy.
Therefore the nonsense and blasphemy must originally have had some harmless, or even praiseworthy, sense. What could that sense have been?
This question each ancient mythologist answered in accordance with his own taste and prejudices, and above all, and like all other and later speculators, in harmony with the general tendency of his own studies.