Part 1 (1/2)
The Theory of the Leisure Cla.s.s.
by Thorstein Veblen.
Chapter One -- Introductory
The inst.i.tution of a leisure cla.s.s is found in its best development at the higher stages of the barbarian culture; as, for instance, in feudal Europe or feudal j.a.pan. In such communities the distinction between cla.s.ses is very rigorously observed; and the feature of most striking economic significance in these cla.s.s differences is the distinction maintained between the employments proper to the several cla.s.ses.
The upper cla.s.ses are by custom exempt or excluded from industrial occupations, and are reserved for certain employments to which a degree of honour attaches. Chief among the honourable employments in any feudal community is warfare; and priestly service is commonly second to warfare. If the barbarian community is not notably warlike, the priestly office may take the precedence, with that of the warrior second. But the rule holds with but slight exceptions that, whether warriors or priests, the upper cla.s.ses are exempt from industrial employments, and this exemption is the economic expression of their superior rank. Brahmin India affords a fair ill.u.s.tration of the industrial exemption of both these cla.s.ses. In the communities belonging to the higher barbarian culture there is a considerable differentiation of sub-cla.s.ses within what may be comprehensively called the leisure cla.s.s; and there is a corresponding differentiation of employments between these sub-cla.s.ses.
The leisure cla.s.s as a whole comprises the n.o.ble and the priestly cla.s.ses, together with much of their retinue. The occupations of the cla.s.s are correspondingly diversified; but they have the common economic characteristic of being non-industrial. These non-industrial upper-cla.s.s occupations may be roughly comprised under government, warfare, religious observances, and sports.
At an earlier, but not the earliest, stage of barbarism, the leisure cla.s.s is found in a less differentiated form. Neither the cla.s.s distinctions nor the distinctions between leisure-cla.s.s occupations are so minute and intricate. The Polynesian islanders generally show this stage of the development in good form, with the exception that, owing to the absence of large game, hunting does not hold the usual place of honour in their scheme of life. The Icelandic community in the time of the Sagas also affords a fair instance. In such a community there is a rigorous distinction between cla.s.ses and between the occupations peculiar to each cla.s.s. Manual labour, industry, whatever has to do directly with the everyday work of getting a livelihood, is the exclusive occupation of the inferior cla.s.s. This inferior cla.s.s includes slaves and other dependents, and ordinarily also all the women. If there are several grades of aristocracy, the women of high rank are commonly exempt from industrial employment, or at least from the more vulgar kinds of manual labour. The men of the upper cla.s.ses are not only exempt, but by prescriptive custom they are debarred, from all industrial occupations. The range of employments open to them is rigidly defined. As on the higher plane already spoken of, these employments are government, warfare, religious observances, and sports. These four lines of activity govern the scheme of life of the upper cla.s.ses, and for the highest rank--the kings or chieftains--these are the only kinds of activity that custom or the common sense of the community will allow.
Indeed, where the scheme is well developed even sports are accounted doubtfully legitimate for the members of the highest rank. To the lower grades of the leisure cla.s.s certain other employments are open, but they are employments that are subsidiary to one or another of these typical leisure-cla.s.s occupations. Such are, for instance, the manufacture and care of arms and accoutrements and of war canoes, the dressing and handling of horses, dogs, and hawks, the preparation of sacred apparatus, etc. The lower cla.s.ses are excluded from these secondary honourable employments, except from such as are plainly of an industrial character and are only remotely related to the typical leisure-cla.s.s occupations.
If we go a step back of this exemplary barbarian culture, into the lower stages of barbarism, we no longer find the leisure cla.s.s in fully developed form. But this lower barbarism shows the usages, motives, and circ.u.mstances out of which the inst.i.tution of a leisure cla.s.s has arisen, and indicates the steps of its early growth. Nomadic hunting tribes in various parts of the world ill.u.s.trate these more primitive phases of the differentiation. Any one of the North American hunting tribes may be taken as a convenient ill.u.s.tration. These tribes can scarcely be said to have a defined leisure cla.s.s. There is a differentiation of function, and there is a distinction between cla.s.ses on the basis of this difference of function, but the exemption of the superior cla.s.s from work has not gone far enough to make the designation ”leisure cla.s.s” altogether applicable. The tribes belonging on this economic level have carried the economic differentiation to the point at which a marked distinction is made between the occupations of men and women, and this distinction is of an invidious character. In nearly all these tribes the women are, by prescriptive custom, held to those employments out of which the industrial occupations proper develop at the next advance. The men are exempt from these vulgar employments and are reserved for war, hunting, sports, and devout observances. A very nice discrimination is ordinarily shown in this matter.
This division of labour coincides with the distinction between the working and the leisure cla.s.s as it appears in the higher barbarian culture. As the diversification and specialisation of employments proceed, the line of demarcation so drawn comes to divide the industrial from the non-industrial employments. The man's occupation as it stands at the earlier barbarian stage is not the original out of which any appreciable portion of later industry has developed. In the later development it survives only in employments that are not cla.s.sed as industrial,--war, politics, sports, learning, and the priestly office.
The only notable exceptions are a portion of the fishery industry and certain slight employments that are doubtfully to be cla.s.sed as industry; such as the manufacture of arms, toys, and sporting goods.
Virtually the whole range of industrial employments is an outgrowth of what is cla.s.sed as woman's work in the primitive barbarian community.
The work of the men in the lower barbarian culture is no less indispensable to the life of the group than the work done by the women.
It may even be that the men's work contributes as much to the food supply and the other necessary consumption of the group. Indeed, so obvious is this ”productive” character of the men's work that in the conventional economic writings the hunter's work is taken as the type of primitive industry. But such is not the barbarian's sense of the matter.
In his own eyes he is not a labourer, and he is not to be cla.s.sed with the women in this respect; nor is his effort to be cla.s.sed with the women's drudgery, as labour or industry, in such a sense as to admit of its being confounded with the latter. There is in all barbarian communities a profound sense of the disparity between man's and woman's work. His work may conduce to the maintenance of the group, but it is felt that it does so through an excellence and an efficacy of a kind that cannot without derogation be compared with the uneventful diligence of the women.
At a farther step backward in the cultural scale--among savage groups--the differentiation of employments is still less elaborate and the invidious distinction between cla.s.ses and employments is less consistent and less rigorous. Unequivocal instances of a primitive savage culture are hard to find. Few of these groups or communities that are cla.s.sed as ”savage” show no traces of regression from a more advanced cultural stage. But there are groups--some of them apparently not the result of retrogression--which show the traits of primitive savagery with some fidelity. Their culture differs from that of the barbarian communities in the absence of a leisure cla.s.s and the absence, in great measure, of the animus or spiritual att.i.tude on which the inst.i.tution of a leisure cla.s.s rests. These communities of primitive savages in which there is no hierarchy of economic cla.s.ses make up but a small and inconspicuous fraction of the human race. As good an instance of this phase of culture as may be had is afforded by the tribes of the Andamans, or by the Todas of the Nilgiri Hills. The scheme of life of these groups at the time of their earliest contact with Europeans seems to have been nearly typical, so far as regards the absence of a leisure cla.s.s. As a further instance might be cited the Ainu of Yezo, and, more doubtfully, also some Bushman and Eskimo groups. Some Pueblo communities are less confidently to be included in the same cla.s.s. Most, if not all, of the communities here cited may well be cases of degeneration from a higher barbarism, rather than bearers of a culture that has never risen above its present level. If so, they are for the present purpose to be taken with the allowance, but they may serve none the less as evidence to the same effect as if they were really ”primitive” populations.
These communities that are without a defined leisure cla.s.s resemble one another also in certain other features of their social structure and manner of life. They are small groups and of a simple (archaic) structure; they are commonly peaceable and sedentary; they are poor; and individual owners.h.i.+p is not a dominant feature of their economic system.
At the same time it does not follow that these are the smallest of existing communities, or that their social structure is in all respects the least differentiated; nor does the cla.s.s necessarily include all primitive communities which have no defined system of individual owners.h.i.+p. But it is to be noted that the cla.s.s seems to include the most peaceable--perhaps all the characteristically peaceable--primitive groups of men. Indeed, the most notable trait common to members of such communities is a certain amiable inefficiency when confronted with force or fraud.
The evidence afforded by the usages and cultural traits of communities at a low stage of development indicates that the inst.i.tution of a leisure cla.s.s has emerged gradually during the transition from primitive savagery to barbarism; or more precisely, during the transition from a peaceable to a consistently warlike habit of life. The conditions apparently necessary to its emergence in a consistent form are: (1) the community must be of a predatory habit of life (war or the hunting of large game or both); that is to say, the men, who const.i.tute the inchoate leisure cla.s.s in these cases, must be habituated to the infliction of injury by force and stratagem; (2) subsistence must be obtainable on sufficiently easy terms to admit of the exemption of a considerable portion of the community from steady application to a routine of labour. The inst.i.tution of leisure cla.s.s is the outgrowth of an early discrimination between employments, according to which some employments are worthy and others unworthy. Under this ancient distinction the worthy employments are those which may be cla.s.sed as exploit; unworthy are those necessary everyday employments into which no appreciable element of exploit enters.
This distinction has but little obvious significance in a modern industrial community, and it has, therefore, received but slight attention at the hands of economic writers. When viewed in the light of that modern common sense which has guided economic discussion, it seems formal and insubstantial. But it persists with great tenacity as a commonplace preconception even in modern life, as is shown, for instance, by our habitual aversion to menial employments. It is a distinction of a personal kind--of superiority and inferiority. In the earlier stages of culture, when the personal force of the individual counted more immediately and obviously in shaping the course of events, the element of exploit counted for more in the everyday scheme of life.
Interest centred about this fact to a greater degree. Consequently a distinction proceeding on this ground seemed more imperative and more definitive then than is the case to-day. As a fact in the sequence of development, therefore, the distinction is a substantial one and rests on sufficiently valid and cogent grounds.
The ground on which a discrimination between facts is habitually made changes as the interest from which the facts are habitually viewed changes. Those features of the facts at hand are salient and substantial upon which the dominant interest of the time throws its light. Any given ground of distinction will seem insubstantial to any one who habitually apprehends the facts in question from a different point of view and values them for a different purpose. The habit of distinguis.h.i.+ng and cla.s.sifying the various purposes and directions of activity prevails of necessity always and everywhere; for it is indispensable in reaching a working theory or scheme of life. The particular point of view, or the particular characteristic that is pitched upon as definitive in the cla.s.sification of the facts of life depends upon the interest from which a discrimination of the facts is sought. The grounds of discrimination, and the norm of procedure in cla.s.sifying the facts, therefore, progressively change as the growth of culture proceeds; for the end for which the facts of life are apprehended changes, and the point of view consequently changes also. So that what are recognised as the salient and decisive features of a cla.s.s of activities or of a social cla.s.s at one stage of culture will not retain the same relative importance for the purposes of cla.s.sification at any subsequent stage.
But the change of standards and points of view is gradual only, and it seldom results in the subversion or entire suppression of a standpoint once accepted. A distinction is still habitually made between industrial and non-industrial occupations; and this modern distinction is a trans.m.u.ted form of the barbarian distinction between exploit and drudgery. Such employments as warfare, politics, public wors.h.i.+p, and public merrymaking, are felt, in the popular apprehension, to differ intrinsically from the labour that has to do with elaborating the material means of life. The precise line of demarcation is not the same as it was in the early barbarian scheme, but the broad distinction has not fallen into disuse.
The tacit, common-sense distinction to-day is, in effect, that any effort is to be accounted industrial only so far as its ultimate purpose is the utilisation of non-human things. The coercive utilisation of man by man is not felt to be an industrial function; but all effort directed to enhance human life by taking advantage of the non-human environment is cla.s.sed together as industrial activity. By the economists who have best retained and adapted the cla.s.sical tradition, man's ”power over nature” is currently postulated as the characteristic fact of industrial productivity. This industrial power over nature is taken to include man's power over the life of the beasts and over all the elemental forces. A line is in this way drawn between mankind and brute creation.
In other times and among men imbued with a different body of preconceptions this line is not drawn precisely as we draw it to-day.
In the savage or the barbarian scheme of life it is drawn in a different place and in another way. In all communities under the barbarian culture there is an alert and pervading sense of ant.i.thesis between two comprehensive groups of phenomena, in one of which barbarian man includes himself, and in the other, his victual. There is a felt ant.i.thesis between economic and non-economic phenomena, but it is not conceived in the modern fas.h.i.+on; it lies not between man and brute creation, but between animate and inert things.
It may be an excess of caution at this day to explain that the barbarian notion which it is here intended to convey by the term ”animate” is not the same as would be conveyed by the word ”living”. The term does not cover all living things, and it does cover a great many others. Such a striking natural phenomenon as a storm, a disease, a waterfall, are recognised as ”animate”; while fruits and herbs, and even inconspicuous animals, such as house-flies, maggots, lemmings, sheep, are not ordinarily apprehended as ”animate” except when taken collectively.
As here used the term does not necessarily imply an indwelling soul or spirit. The concept includes such things as in the apprehension of the animistic savage or barbarian are formidable by virtue of a real or imputed habit of initiating action. This category comprises a large number and range of natural objects and phenomena. Such a distinction between the inert and the active is still present in the habits of thought of unreflecting persons, and it still profoundly affects the prevalent theory of human life and of natural processes; but it does not pervade our daily life to the extent or with the far-reaching practical consequences that are apparent at earlier stages of culture and belief.
To the mind of the barbarian, the elaboration and utilisation of what is afforded by inert nature is activity on quite a different plane from his dealings with ”animate” things and forces. The line of demarcation may be vague and s.h.i.+fting, but the broad distinction is sufficiently real and cogent to influence the barbarian scheme of life. To the cla.s.s of things apprehended as animate, the barbarian fancy imputes an unfolding of activity directed to some end. It is this teleological unfolding of activity that const.i.tutes any object or phenomenon an ”animate” fact.
Wherever the unsophisticated savage or barbarian meets with activity that is at all obtrusive, he construes it in the only terms that are ready to hand--the terms immediately given in his consciousness of his own actions. Activity is, therefore, a.s.similated to human action, and active objects are in so far a.s.similated to the human agent. Phenomena of this character--especially those whose behaviour is notably formidable or baffling--have to be met in a different spirit and with proficiency of a different kind from what is required in dealing with inert things. To deal successfully with such phenomena is a work of exploit rather than of industry. It is an a.s.sertion of prowess, not of diligence.