Part 1 (1/2)

Carrier_ A Guided Tour of an Aircraft Carrier.

by Tom Clancy.

Acknowledgements

As we finish up the sixth book in this series, it is once again time to give credit where it is due. I'll start with my longtime friend, partner, and researcher, John D. Gresham. Once again, John met the people, took the pictures, spent nights aboard s.h.i.+p, and did all the things that make sure readers feel like they are there. We also have again benefited from the wisdom, experience, and efforts of series editor Professor Martin H. Green-berg, Larry Segriff, and all the staff at Tekno Books. Laura DeNinno is here again with her wonderful drawings, which have added so much to this book. As well, Tony Koltz and many others all need to be recognized for their outstanding editorial support that was so critical and timely.

Carrier required the support of many senior sea service personnel in a number of sensitive positions. In this regard, we have again been blessed with all the support that we needed and more. At the top were Admiral Jay Johnson and our old friend General Chuck Krulak. Both of these officers gave us their valuable time and support, and we cannot repay their trust and friends.h.i.+p. Their boss, Secretary of the Navy John Dalton, gave us critical support as well. Elsewhere around the Was.h.i.+ngton Beltway, we had the help of other influential leaders. Folks like Rear Admirals Dennis McGuinn and Carlos Johnson, and Captain Chuck Nash made it possible to get the information that we needed. This year, our home-away-from-home was the s.h.i.+ps of the required the support of many senior sea service personnel in a number of sensitive positions. In this regard, we have again been blessed with all the support that we needed and more. At the top were Admiral Jay Johnson and our old friend General Chuck Krulak. Both of these officers gave us their valuable time and support, and we cannot repay their trust and friends.h.i.+p. Their boss, Secretary of the Navy John Dalton, gave us critical support as well. Elsewhere around the Was.h.i.+ngton Beltway, we had the help of other influential leaders. Folks like Rear Admirals Dennis McGuinn and Carlos Johnson, and Captain Chuck Nash made it possible to get the information that we needed. This year, our home-away-from-home was the s.h.i.+ps of the George Was.h.i.+ngton George Was.h.i.+ngton battle group, and they took us to some really exciting places. Led by Rear Admiral Mike Mullen, this unit is key to helping keep us safe in a dangerous world. Running the battle group, and they took us to some really exciting places. Led by Rear Admiral Mike Mullen, this unit is key to helping keep us safe in a dangerous world. Running the GW GW was an extraordinary crew led by Captains ”Yank” Rutheford and Mark Groothausen, as well as Commander Chuck Smith. These men took us under their wings, and kept us warm and fed. Thanks also to Captains Jim Deppe of USS was an extraordinary crew led by Captains ”Yank” Rutheford and Mark Groothausen, as well as Commander Chuck Smith. These men took us under their wings, and kept us warm and fed. Thanks also to Captains Jim Deppe of USS Normandy Normandy and Jim Phillips of USS and Jim Phillips of USS Vella Gulf Vella Gulf for sharing insights and time and letting us break bread with them. For the thousands of other unnamed men and women of the for sharing insights and time and letting us break bread with them. For the thousands of other unnamed men and women of the GW GW group who took the time to show us the vital things that they do, we say a hearty ”Thanks!” group who took the time to show us the vital things that they do, we say a hearty ”Thanks!”

Another group that is always vital to our efforts consists of the members of the various military public and media offices (PAOs) that handled our numerous requests for visits, interviews, and information. Tops on our list were Rear Admirals Kendall Pease and Tom Jurkowsky in CHINFO at the Pentagon. Also at CHINFO were our project officers, Lieutenants Merritt Allen and Wendy Snyder, who did so much to keep things going. Over in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations was Captain Jim Kudla, who coordinated our interview requests. Down with the Atlantic Fleet in Norfolk, Virginia, Commander Joe Gradisher, Lieutenant Commander Roxy Merritt, and Mike Maus ably a.s.sisted us. Then there were the folks of the GW GW's PAO shop, led by the outstanding Lieutenant Joe Navritril. Along with Joe, an excellent young crew of media-relations specialists took us on some memorable adventures. Finally, we want to thank the special folks at the Navy Still Photo Branch, who have serviced our needs for so many years. They include Lieutenant Chris Madden and an incomparable staff of photographic experts. We thank them for their efforts as friends and professionals.

Again, thanks are due to our various industrial partners, without whom all the information on the various s.h.i.+ps, aircraft, weapons, and systems would never have come to light. Down at Newport News s.h.i.+pbuilding, we were allowed a look that few outsiders have ever had. Thanks are owed to Jerri Fuller d.i.c.kseski, Bill Hatfield, Mike Peters, Mike Shawcross, the folks from the U.S. Navy SUs.h.i.+PS office, and literally thousands of others. At the aircraft manufacturers, there were Barbara Anderson and Lon Nordeen of Boeing, Joe Stout, Karen Hagar, and Jeff Rhodes of Lockheed Martin, and finally, our old friend Bill Tuttle of Boeing Sikorsky. We also made and renewed many friends.h.i.+ps at the various missile, armament, and system manufacturers, including: Tony Geisha.n.u.ser and Vicki Fendalson at Raytheon Strike Systems, Larry Ernst at General Atomics, Craig Van Bieber at Lockheed, and the eternal Ed Rodemsky of Trimble Navigation. We also received an incredible amount of help from Dave ”Hey Joe” Parsons and the fine folks at Whitney, Bradley, & Brown, Inc.

We owe thanks for all of our friends in New York, especially Robert Gottlieb, Debra Goldstein, and Matt Bialer at William Morris, as well as Robert Youdelman and Tom Mallon, who took care of the legal details. Over at Berkley Books, our highest thanks go to our series editor, Tom Colgan, as well as David Shanks, Kim Waltemyer, and the staff of Berkley Books. To old friends like Matt Caffrey, Jim Stevenson, A. D. Baker, Norman Polmar, and Bob Dorr, thanks again for your contributions and wisdom. Thanks also to the late Jeff Eth.e.l.l and Russ Eggnor, who gave so much of themselves to us and the world. And to all the folks who took us for rides, tours, shoots, and exercises, thanks again for teaching the ignorant how things really really work. As for our friends, families, and loved ones, we again thank you. work. As for our friends, families, and loved ones, we again thank you.

Foreword.

”Where are the carriers?” This has been the likely first question asked by every President of the United States since World War II when faced with a developing international crisis that involves U.S. interests. It was probably also asked by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto (the Commander in Chief of the j.a.panese Combined Fleet) after the j.a.panese attack on Pearl Harbor initiating World War II. This same question was always a top concern of the Soviet leaders.h.i.+p throughout the Cold War. It drove an inordinate amount of their military expenditures, as well as many of their operational planning decisions.

More recently, in March of 1996, two U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBGs) were dispatched to the Taiwan Straits after the People's Republic of China launched a program of ballistic missile exercises close to Taiwan. The presence of the two aircraft carrier groups so close to the mainland of China defused the crisis, and prevented a Chinese escalation or miscalculation of our resolve.

The following year saw the latest in a series of crises with Iraq over Saddam Hussein's refusal to meet United Nations inspection criteria over his weapons of ma.s.s destruction. This was responded to by sending two more CVBGs to the Persian Gulf, this time to prepare for possible strikes on Iraqi targets had that been necessary.

Clearly, the flexibility, mobility, and independence of these versatile and forward-deployed a.s.sets will keep them center stage as our nation leads the world in the transition to a free-market system of democracies.

The rapid development and growth of airpower as the primary enabling capability for military operations represents one of the true military revolutions of the 20th century. At the close of this century, with manned s.p.a.ce exploration and earth-orbiting satellites commonplace, it is hard to conceive that just ninety-five years ago, the Wright brothers made their first flight at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina. That historic first effort traveled less distance than the wingspan of a modern jumbo jet. However, things began to rapidly progress with the coming of the First World War. With the start of the Great War visionaries around the world realized the potential significance of aviation capabilities on military operations. By 1914, then-Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels had announced ”that the point has been reached where aircraft must form a large part of our naval forces for offensive and defensive operations.” It was an insightful thought.

The ensuing twenty-five years before our entry into World War II saw the United States developing the a.s.sets and vision to take airpower to sea in a way unmatched by any other nation. As a maritime nation dependent on the sea lines of communications for its economic and national security interests, the United States would need the edge provided by Naval aviation to win the greatest over-water military campaigns ever conducted. The history of the Second World War in the Pacific doc.u.ments the great debt of grat.i.tude our nation owes to the early pioneers of naval aviation. These were legendary men like Glenn Curtis, Eugene Ely, Theodore Ellyson, John Towers, John Rogers, Was.h.i.+ngton Chambers, Henry Mustin, and many more too numerous to mention.

However, it was at Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941, with the war cry of ”Tora ... Tora ... Tora!” ”Tora ... Tora ... Tora!” and our own lax state of readiness, that j.a.pan brought home to the world the impact of carrier aviation. and our own lax state of readiness, that j.a.pan brought home to the world the impact of carrier aviation.1 The fact that none of our three Pacific-based aircraft carriers were in port that fateful morning may have been the single most significant factor in our eventual victory during the Great Pacific War. At the time of our entry into World War II, the U.S. Navy had just seven big-deck aircraft carriers in commission: The fact that none of our three Pacific-based aircraft carriers were in port that fateful morning may have been the single most significant factor in our eventual victory during the Great Pacific War. At the time of our entry into World War II, the U.S. Navy had just seven big-deck aircraft carriers in commission: Saratoga, Lexington, Ranger, Yorktown, Enterprise, Wasp, and Hornet. Saratoga, Lexington, Ranger, Yorktown, Enterprise, Wasp, and Hornet. These ”seven sisters” would take the war to our enemies from Casablanca and Malta to Midway and Guadalca.n.a.l. These ”seven sisters” would take the war to our enemies from Casablanca and Malta to Midway and Guadalca.n.a.l.

Clearly, Admiral Yamamoto knew that j.a.pan had awakened a ”sleeping giant,” and he believed a prolonged war would go in favor of the United States. He knew the potential productivity of American industry and its people, something that he had witnessed personally while on naval attache duty in Was.h.i.+ngton. Thus it was that j.a.pan, needing a quick decisive victory over the U.S. Navy in the Pacific, set in motion the great sea battle off Midway Island in mid-1942.2 Yamamoto mustered an overwhelming naval armada, designed to take Midway and hand the U.S. Navy and their carrier groups a crus.h.i.+ng defeat. However, when the Battle of Midway was over, the tide had turned in the Pacific, though not in the favor of j.a.pan. Thanks to the raw courage and aggressive tactics of the U.S. carrier pilots as well as superb intelligence, four j.a.panese carriers and a cruiser were sunk. In the process, j.a.pan's ability to project naval air power throughout the vast Pacific was crippled forever. Yamamoto mustered an overwhelming naval armada, designed to take Midway and hand the U.S. Navy and their carrier groups a crus.h.i.+ng defeat. However, when the Battle of Midway was over, the tide had turned in the Pacific, though not in the favor of j.a.pan. Thanks to the raw courage and aggressive tactics of the U.S. carrier pilots as well as superb intelligence, four j.a.panese carriers and a cruiser were sunk. In the process, j.a.pan's ability to project naval air power throughout the vast Pacific was crippled forever.

The U.S. carrier groups and their courageous aviators had, on paper, no right to win. But win they did. The cost was not insignificant; fifteen of fifteen aircraft and twenty-nine of thirty aircrew in Torpedo Squadron 8 alone were lost. Along with scores of American aircraft and their crews, the USN lost the Yorktown Yorktown and a destroyer. and a destroyer.3 However, finding a way to win in the face of adversity is a naval aviation tradition. However, finding a way to win in the face of adversity is a naval aviation tradition.

Today, U.S. carrier aviation is inextricably tied to the concept of United States forward presence and power projection; the ”From the Sea” doctrine. Since the end of the East/West conflict, the United States military has withdrawn from the majority of its overseas bases. Consequently, America's ability to exercise a forward military presence and provide military forces depends on a combination of naval power and power projection from the continental United States. This means that in the complex post-Cold War world, where the majority of the world's major population centers are within two hundred miles of the open ocean, naval forces are increasingly relevant, and able to influence all manner of events that shape regional stability. The fact that this can be done with little or no land-based support and with no host nation support is a tremendous advantage for our national interests.

The independence, sustainability, and staying power of naval units often makes them the forces of choice for our National Command Authorities. This includes protecting the sea-lanes for a global free-market economy, reinforcing and supporting American emba.s.sies, and executing non-combatant evacuations of American citizens overseas. These and many other missions are ideally suited to our forward-deployed naval forces. This has been continuously demonstrated in places like the Taiwan Straits, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Albania, the Central African Republic, Liberia, Zaire, and Sierra Leone. America is an island nation, dependent upon the seas for our economic prosperity and security. There was good reason why our founding fathers determined the need for the nation to maintain naval forces and raise an army. We should occasionally remind ourselves of this reality, since it is the geopolitics, not the geography of the world, that has changed over time.

Unfortunately, aircraft carriers and naval forces in general have often been seen as both provocative and vulnerable. Many critics who do not understand the science of modern naval operations have claimed that advances in s.p.a.ce systems and missile technology make the carrier/naval forces excessively vulnerable to air and missile attacks. Certainly technology has increased the threat from these systems, but far less so than that faced by fixed land bases and ground forces from terrorism and ballistic missile attacks.

For starters, there is the challenge to any would-be enemy who would try to find a CVBG in the open ocean. Naval units are highly mobile and the world's oceans are a big, dynamic place. Trying to coordinate sophisti-catedlong-range targeting solutions onto a target that can move thirty nautical miles in any direction in just one hour, or up to seven hundred nautical miles in a day, is a tough business. Clearly, a CVBG is not an easy target. The inherent mobility, together with sophisticated CVBG electronic-warfare-deception packages (radar ”blip” enhancers, target decoys, etc.), combined with the air defenses provided by our Aegis-equipped escorts (Ticonderoga- (Ticonderoga-cla.s.s [CG-47] cruisers and Arleigh Burke-cla.s.s Arleigh Burke-cla.s.s destroyers [DDG-51]) as well as the CVN's own organic aircraft, make the vulnerability quite manageable. destroyers [DDG-51]) as well as the CVN's own organic aircraft, make the vulnerability quite manageable.

The threat of theater ballistic and cruise missiles is also a matter of concern for the CVBG, and work is rapidly progressing to increase our defenses against these cla.s.ses of weapons. The Aegis combat system is being improved and extended to be able to provide theater-wide defense from the sea, for both land and sea forces. Survivability from these threats will always be greater from a mobile bastion at sea than a fixed base on land. Arriving along with this new capability are new aircraft, s.h.i.+ps, and even new carrier designs, which will help keep the CVBG credible long after the last manned-aircraft designs are retired. However, one does not have such naval forces for purely defensive purposes.

The real strength of CVBGs is offensive, making them a threat to the very despots and enemies that might themselves wish ill to the carrier group. Able to generate hundreds of air and missile attack sorties day and night, the modern CVBG is a powerful tool that requires no permission of ally or foe to do its job. Today, when the challenge is to get the most return for our limited defense dollars, it is significant to note that since the end of World War II, we have not lost any any carriers to enemy action or geopolitical changes. carriers to enemy action or geopolitical changes.

This is hardly true in the case of our overseas land bases. In such countries as Iran, Libya, Vietnam, and the Philippines to name just a few, we not only lost the airfields that the U.S. paid for, but also the costly infrastructure devoted to support, maintenance, and quality-of-life issues. There also is the fact that we pay a high monetary and often unacceptable political price for even restricted access to foreign military land and air bases. As recently as 1997, the U.S. was not allowed to place the desired number of USAF aircraft in Saudi Arabia, where the U.S. presence was already established. From this viewpoint, the aircraft carrier, which has a forty-five-year life cycle and remains free from such entanglements, is a relative bargain for our scarce defense dollars.

As a new crop of world economic and potential military superpowers emerge in the coming years, the value of aircraft carriers to U.S. foreign policy goals will dramatically increase. One of the unchallenged realities of modern warfare is that you cannot be victorious in any conflict on the ground or at sea without air/s.p.a.ce superiority. In an era of sophisticated precision weapons, including cruise and ballistic missiles, this is the medium that enables our land and sea forces to operate with acceptable risk. Air superiority is even more essential for forward-deployed forces that are shaping the battles.p.a.ce, trying to create stability and prevent conflict from occurring through their own forward presence. In more and more cases, this flexible combat power will have to be provided by forward-deployed carrier and amphibious groups. This is a reality since the world's surface is 70% covered by water, and our free-market economy depends on open access to the sea lines of communication.

Naval forces are more than just s.h.i.+ps, planes, and weapons. What I hope this book conveys is the quality and dedication of the people it takes to provide the nation the kind of flexibility and fighting punch packaged in our modem CVBGs. The carriers, Aegis cruisers, and destroyers, together with their aircraft and fast-attack submarines, would be nothing without the people who make them work. Operating a high-usage airport in day and night operations, while moving at thirty knots on the open seas, is one thing. However, to provide all the organic support to do this for extended periods of time at a great distance from a home base is another thing all together.

A modern Nimitz- Nimitz-cla.s.s (CVN-68) carrier is the equivalent of a small American city packaged into just four-and-a-half acres. This city not only operates an airport on its roof, but also can move over seven hundred nautical miles in any given day. It also provides full medical support, machine shops, jet engine test cells, food service operations, computer support, electrical generation, and almost everything else that you can imagine.

Now picture the carrier as a business, a company that has a net worth of six to seven billion dollars and employs over six thousand people. The average age of the six thousand employees is less than twenty-one years. On top of this, the Chairman of the Board (Admiral and Staff), the President and Chief Operating Officer (Captain and Air Wing Commander), all the Vice Presidents (Department Heads), and every other employee rotates out of the company every two to three years. Common sense would dictate that you could never make a profit with any any business under those conditions. Yet the U.S. Navy operates successfully under these very conditions, and the profit is freedom, and protection of our national interests. business under those conditions. Yet the U.S. Navy operates successfully under these very conditions, and the profit is freedom, and protection of our national interests.

This dedication of young Americans, the symphony of their teamwork, and the indomitable spirit of the American sailor make this all possible. We owe them our respect and grat.i.tude, and must never take the service or sacrifices they and their families make for granted. It was my privilege to be a s.h.i.+pmate with these great Americans for over thirty-seven years. For this I salute the American Sailors, Marines, Soldiers, Airmen, and Coast Guards-men of every generation who have protected our freedom at home and around the world.

-Leon A. ”Bud” Edney Admiral, USN (Retired) Former Commander, U.S. Atlantic Command & NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic

Introduction.

Presence, influence, and options. In these three words are the basic rationale for why politicians want carrier battle groups, and have been willing to spend over a trillion U.S. taxpayer dollars building a dozen for American use. That was hardly the original reason, though. Back in the years after the Great War, naval powers were trying to find loopholes in the first series of arms-control treaties (which had to do with naval forces). With the numbers and size of battles.h.i.+ps and other vessels limited by the agreements, various nations began to consider what s.h.i.+ps carrying aircraft might be able to contribute to navies. At first, the duties of these first carrier-borne aircraft were limited to spotting the fall of naval sh.e.l.ls and providing a primitive fighter cover for the fleet. Within a few years, though, aircraft technologies began to undergo a revolutionary series of improvements. Metal aircraft structures, improved power plants and fuels, as well as the first of what we would call avionics began to find their way onto airplanes. By the outbreak of World War II, some naval a.n.a.lysts and leaders even suspected that carriers and their embarked aircraft might be capable of sinking the same battles.h.i.+ps and other surface s.h.i.+ps that they had originally been designed to cover.

The Second World War will be remembered by naval historians as a conflict dominated by two new cla.s.ses of s.h.i.+ps: fast carriers and submarines. The diesel-electric submarines were a highly efficient force able to deny navies and nations the use of the sea-lanes for commerce and warfare. Unfortunately, as the German Kriegsmarine and Grand Admiral Karl Donitz found, you do not win wars through simple denial of a battles.p.a.ce like the Atlantic Ocean. Victory through seapower requires the ability to take the offensive on terms and at times of your choosing. This means being able to dominate vast volumes of air, ocean, and even near-earth s.p.a.ce. Without a balanced force to project its power over the entire range of possibilities and situations, one-dimensional forces like the U-boat-dominated Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine wound up being crushed in the crucible of war. wound up being crushed in the crucible of war.

By contrast, the carriers and their escorts of World War II were able to project offensive power over the entire globe. From the North Cape to the islands of the Central Pacific, carrier-based aircraft dominated the greatest naval war in history. Along the way, they helped nullify the threat from Germany's U-boats and other enemy submarines, as well as sweeping the seas of enemy s.h.i.+ps and aircraft. While the eventual j.a.panese surrender may have been signed aboard the battles.h.i.+p Missouri Missouri in Tokyo Bay, it occurred in the shadow of a sky blackened by hundreds of carrier aircraft flying overhead in review. Called ”Halsey's Folly,” the flyover was the final proof of the real force that had ended the second global war of this century. Despite the claims of Air Force leaders who p.r.o.nounced navies worthless in an era of nuclear-armed bombers, when the next shooting conflict erupted in Korea, it was carrier aircraft that covered the withdrawal to the Pusan Perimeter and the amphibious landings at Inchon. They then dropped into a role that would become common in the next half-century, acting as mobile air bases to project combat power ash.o.r.e. in Tokyo Bay, it occurred in the shadow of a sky blackened by hundreds of carrier aircraft flying overhead in review. Called ”Halsey's Folly,” the flyover was the final proof of the real force that had ended the second global war of this century. Despite the claims of Air Force leaders who p.r.o.nounced navies worthless in an era of nuclear-armed bombers, when the next shooting conflict erupted in Korea, it was carrier aircraft that covered the withdrawal to the Pusan Perimeter and the amphibious landings at Inchon. They then dropped into a role that would become common in the next half-century, acting as mobile air bases to project combat power ash.o.r.e.

Despite the best efforts of the former Soviet Union to develop a credible ”blue-water” fleet during the Cold War, the U.S. Navy never lost control of any ocean that it cared about. One of the big reasons for this was the regular presence of carrier battle groups, which took any sort of ”home-court advantage” away from a potential enemy. Armed with aircraft that were the match of anything flying from a land base, and flown by the best-trained aviators in the world, the American carriers and their escorts were the ”eight-hundred-pound guerrillas” of the Cold War naval world. This is a position that they still hold to this day. However, their contributions have taken on a deadly new relevance in the post-Cold War world.

One of the tragic truths about America's winning of the Cold War was that we did it with anyone who would help us. This meant that the U.S. frequently backed any local dictator with a well-placed air or naval base and a willingness to say that Communism was bad. The need to contain the ambitions of the Soviet Union and their allies took a front seat to common sense and human rights. The result was a series of alliances with despots ranging from Ferdinand Marcos to Manuel Noriega. However, there was a war to win and we did win it. The price, however, is what we are paying today. Around the world, Americans are being asked to please pack up their aircraft, s.h.i.+ps, and bases and please take them home. We should not be offended; we did it to ourselves. The continuing legacy of squalor in places like Olongapo City in the Philippines and other ”outside the gate” towns was more than the emerging democracies of the post-Cold War era could stand. When you add in our continued interference in the internal politics of the countries that hosted our bases, it is a wonder that we have any friends left in the world as the 20th century ends.

Our poor foreign policy record aside, the United States and our allies still have a number of responsibilities in the post-Cold War world. This means simply that to wield military force in a crisis, we now have just a few options. One is to ask nicely if a friendly host nation might allow us to base personnel, aircraft, and equipment on their soil so that we can threaten their neighbors with military force. As might be imagined, this can be a tough thing to do in these muddled times. George Bush managed to do it in the Persian Gulf in 1991, but Bill Clinton failed in the same task in 1997 and 1998. Even with a dictator like Saddam Hussein, most regional neighbors would rather tolerate the bully than risk the death and destruction that occurred in Kuwait in 1990 and 1991. This leaves just two other credible options; to base military power at homeland bases or aboard sovereign flagged s.h.i.+ps at sea. The first of these options means that fleets of transport s.h.i.+ps and aircraft must be maintained just to move them to the place where a crisis is breaking out. It also takes time to move combat aircraft and ground units to the places where trouble may be brewing. This is why having units forward-based aboard s.h.i.+ps is so incredibly important to us these days.

Time in a crisis is more precious than gold. As much as any other factor, the time delay in responding to a developing conflict determines whether it results in war, peace, or a distasteful standoff. While we may never know for sure, there is a good chance that Saddam Hussein stopped at the Saudi border in 1990 because of the rapid flood of U.S. and coalition forces into the Kingdom. However, it would be a tough act to duplicate today. One of the benefits of our military buildup in the late years of the Cold War was the ability to do both of these things well. Along with lots of continental-based forces with excellent transport capabilities, we usually had a number of carrier and amphibious groups forward-based to respond to crises. However, these rich circ.u.mstances are now just happy memories.

Today the U.S. Navy considers itself lucky to have retained an even dozen carrier battle groups, along with their matched amphibious ready groups. By being able to keep just two or three of these forward-deployed at any time, the United States has managed to maintain a toehold in places where it has few allies and no bases. The recent confrontation with Iraq over United Nations weapons inspectors, had it led to war, would have been prosecuted almost entirely from a pair of carrier groups based in the Persian Gulf. With the 1990/91 allied coalition splintered over each country's regional interests, almost n.o.body would allow U.S. warplanes and ground forces onto their soil. This is a 180 change from 1990/91, when the majority of Allied airpower was land-based.