Part 7 (1/2)

[6] In 1913 the trade of the United Kingdom with British possessions was still greater, though it formed in that year a smaller percentage of the entire trade of the country. Statesman's Year Book, 1915, p.

77. The trade of the United Kingdom with foreign countries was considerably less (in 1913) than was that of Germany.

[7] ”Colonial Administration,” pp. 210-11.

[8] _Op. cit._ ”It has further been shown that in the foreign trade of Great Britain the export of manufactured goods is declining while that of raw material and machinery is increasing.”

[9] ”Germany's Colonial Policy,” in ”Modern Germany in Relation to the Great War.” New York, Mitch.e.l.l Kennerley, 1916, p. 152. See also ”British White Book,” a report on Colonial Preferences given in various countries. Oct. 21, 1909, No. 296. For an able a.n.a.lysis of the results of the open and the closed door in colonies see Johlinger (Otto), ”Die Koloniale Handelspolitik der Weltmachte,”

(_Volkswirtschaftliche Zeitfragen_) Vol. x.x.xV, Berlin, 1914.

[10] Statesman's Year Book, 1915, pp. 893-94.

[11] Statesman's Year Book, 1915, p. 882.

[12] But the whole trade was small, amounting to less than 1 per cent.

of the entire foreign trade (in 1909) of Germany.

[13] In his defence of German Colonial policy, Dr. Solf makes much of the fact that of the total sum of 500,000,000 marks invested in German colonies, no less than 89,000,000 marks belongs to foreigners. But this means that Germany which has little capital to export has invested over 82 per cent. and all the other countries of the world less than 18 per cent. Moreover the character of the investment, not the absolute amount, is significant. Compet.i.tive investment, as in a brewery or cotton factory, does not bring the same profit as does a concession for a railroad, tramway or bank.

[14] Paul Arndt. ”Grundzuge der auswartigen Politik Deutschlands,”

quoted by Ludwig Quessel, _Sozialistische Monatshefte_, Vol. 19, II, June 12, 1913.

[15] Fr. Naumann. Die Hilfe, Nov. 16, 1911. Quoted by Ludwig Quessel.

”Auf dem Weg zum Weltreich.” _Sozialistische Monatshefte_, Vol. 19, 1913.

[16] Ruedorffer, J. J., ”Grundzuge der Weltpolitik in der Gegenwart,”

Stuttgart und Berlin, 1914, quoted by Paul Rohrbach, ”Germany's Isolation” (”Der Krieg und die deutsche Politik”). Chicago, 1915.

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CHAPTER IX

INDUSTRIAL INVASION

The direct compet.i.tion between great industrial nations for the products and profits of the backward countries would suffice to create an international antagonism even if no other economic forces contributed to this result. Closely though not obviously bound to this struggle for colonies, however, is an equally intense struggle among the industrial nations to force their way economically into each other's home territory. Germany, it is alleged, forces her way industrially into France, Switzerland, Italy, Belgium and Holland. She penetrates these countries economically, crushes their industries, forces upon them her own industrial products, extracts from them the profits which should go to their own manufacturers. Industrially, commercially, financially she seeks to rule Italy and Belgium as Great Britain rules the Argentine or Canada. She holds these countries, so it is claimed, in industrial non-age. It is all a quiet economic infiltration, a matter of buying and selling and of lawful contracts, but it is none the less war. ”War is war,” admits Prof. Maurice Milloud, a student of this phenomenon of German industrial expansion, ”but make no mistake that it is war.”[1]

Within the last few years there have appeared numerous books by French, Swiss, Belgian and Italian[2] {117} publicists attacking the policy by which Germany prior to the war secured a partial control of her neighbouring markets. With the merits of this controversy and with the morality or immorality of the procedure, we need not concern ourselves.

To us the only point of interest is the nature of the economic forces leading to such a conflict and the effect of this conflict in creating national animosity and in inciting to war.

All the industrial nations export to one another as well as to the agricultural countries. Why, then, is Germany's course so bitterly resented?

At first glance one might suppose that the chief objection to this German enterprise lay in its ruthlessness and economic terrorism. A French manufacturer of formic acid is crushed outright by a sudden price reduction; a Swiss or Italian manufacturer is ruined by being spied upon by his own employes in the pay of a German compet.i.tor. But the main objection to the German compet.i.tion seems to be its formidableness. Germany exports not only wares but men, and in all the neighbouring countries are to be found German chemists, engineers, business men and clerks. It is claimed that these pioneers hold together, advance together, maintain the cult of _Deutschtum_ in an alien country, and act as agents for the home industry. It is also claimed that Germany ”dumps” her goods on foreign markets, thus causing losses or even total destruction to rival industries. Yet all these things have been done before, and even the nations which object are not always innocent of like practices. What is deeply resented, however, is that the German compet.i.tion is a disciplined state-aided compet.i.tion, that it is collective rather than individual. The Belgian, Italian or Dutch {118} manufacturer feels that behind his German compet.i.tor stand the gigantic power and resources of the whole German nation. It is not individual Germans who compete, but Germany; a patient, resourceful, long-sighted Germany, willing to make temporary sacrifices for permanent gains, a Germany forced to expand industrially and bending its immense wealth and power to this one purpose. Against such an organised body what can a single manufacturer avail?

The means at Germany's disposal in this invasion of near-lying markets are varied and great. Industry is organised; the German has a genius for organisation. In all the near-lying countries, concerns with German connections open up a wide channel for the incoming wares. In Antwerp, in Rotterdam, in Zurich, a large part of the big business is in German hands. German banks are established and these aid directly or indirectly in the importation of German commodities. Moreover, the Germans are better informed than any of their rivals concerning all the minute knowledge necessary to the conquest of a local market. Their business plans are not only far flung but meticulous; they have a card-index method of study and their training is admirably adapted to just these methods of commercial penetration.

No such penetration would be possible, however, but for the intelligence with which German industry is conducted at home. In Germany the scientifically trained man is more highly regarded than in any other country. The chemist, the engineer, the specialist of every sort is called into consultation and the laboratory is united to the factory. The vast expense of maintaining a corps of inventors forever working at new problems is more than compensated for by the frequent technical improvements which result from their studies. The scientific men employed by {119} the German chemical factories have revolutionised methods and given Germany almost a monopoly in this rapidly growing industry. In Germany also, as in America, there is a willingness to discard old methods and machinery, whatever the initial expense. In a few years the losses due to the change are retrieved and the German business is creating values more efficiently than ever.