Part 1 (2/2)

1. Group for Hiros.h.i.+ma.

2. Group for Nagasaki.

3. Group to secure information concerning general j.a.panese activities in the field of atomic bombs.

The first two groups were organized to accompany the first American troops into Hiros.h.i.+ma and Nagasaki.

The primary purposes of the mission were as follows, in order of importance:

1. To make certain that no unusual hazards were present in the bombed cities.

2. To secure all possible information concerning the effects of the bombs, both usual and unusual, and particularly with regard to radioactive effects, if any, on the targets or elsewhere.

General Groves further stated that all available specialist personnel and instruments would be sent from the United States, and that the Supreme Allied Commander in the Pacific would be informed about the organization of the mission.

On the same day, 11 August, the special personnel who formed the part of the investigating group to be sent from the United States were selected and ordered to California with instructions to proceed overseas at once to accomplish the purposes set forth in the message to General Farrell. The main party departed from Hamilton Field, California on the morning of 13 August and arrived in the Marianas on 15 August.

On 12 August the Chief of Staff sent the Theater Commander the following message:

”FOR MACARTHUR, SIGNED MARSHALL:

”GROVES HAS ORDERED FARRELL AT TINIAN TO ORGANIZE A SCIENTIFIC GROUP OF THREE SECTIONS FOR POTENTIAL USE IN j.a.pAN IF SUCH USE SHOULD BE DESIRED. THE FIRST GROUP IS FOR HIROs.h.i.+MA, THE SECOND FOR NAGASAKI, AND THE THIRD FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING INFORMATION CONCERNING GENERAL j.a.pANESE ACTIVITIES IN THE FIELD OF ATOMIC WEAPONS. THE GROUPS FOR HIROs.h.i.+MA AND NAGASAKI SHOULD ENTER THOSE CITIES WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN TROOPS IN ORDER THAT THESE TROOPS SHALL NOT BE SUBJECTED TO ANY POSSIBLE TOXIC EFFECTS ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT ANY SUCH EFFECTS ACTUALLY EXIST. FARRELL AND HIS ORGANIZATION HAVE ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON THIS SUBJECT.”

General Farrell arrived in Yokohama on 30 August, with the Commanding General of the 8th Army; Colonel Warren, who was Chief of the Radiological Division of the District, arrived on 7 September. The main body of the investigating group followed later. Preliminary inspections of Hiros.h.i.+ma and Nagasaki were made on 8-9 and 13-14 September, respectively. Members of the press had been enabled to precede General Farrell to Hiros.h.i.+ma.

The special groups spent 16 days in Nagasaki and 4 days in Hiros.h.i.+ma, during which time they collected as much information as was possible under their directives which called for a prompt report. After General Farrell returned to the U.S. to make his preliminary report, the groups were headed by Brigadier General J. B. Newman, Jr. More extensive surveys have been made since that time by other agencies who had more time and personnel available for the purpose, and much of their additional data has thrown further light on the effects of the bombings. This data has been duly considered in the making of this report.

PROPAGANDA

On the day after the Hiros.h.i.+ma strike, General Farrell received instructions from the War Department to engage in a propaganda campaign against the j.a.panese Empire in connection with the new weapon and its use against Hiros.h.i.+ma. The campaign was to include leaflets and any other propaganda considered appropriate. With the fullest cooperation from CINCPAC of the Navy and the United States Strategic Air Forces, he initiated promptly a campaign which included the preparation and distribution of leaflets, broadcasting via short wave every 15 minutes over radio Saipan and the printing at Saipan and distribution over the Empire of a j.a.panese language newspaper which included the description and photographs of the Hiros.h.i.+ma strike.

The campaign proposed:

1. Dropping 16,000,000 leaflets in a period of 9 days on 47 j.a.panese cities with population of over 100,000. These cities represented more than 40% of the total population.

2. Broadcast of propaganda at regular intervals over radio Saipan.

3. Distribution of 500,000 j.a.panese language newspapers containing stories and pictures of the atomic bomb attacks.

The campaign continued until the j.a.panese began their surrender negotiations. At that time some 6,000,000 leaflets and a large number of newspapers had been dropped. The radio broadcasts in j.a.panese had been carried out at regular 15 minute intervals.

SUMMARY OF DAMAGES AND INJURIES

Both the Hiros.h.i.+ma and the Nagasaki atomic bombs exhibited similar effects.

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