Part 10 (2/2)

Then follows the criticism of the Critic.

What has the lecturer, indeed, left to the followers of the Christ?

(1) Intellect? Is the possession of pure intellect to be accounted cause for wors.h.i.+p? Even so, others have taught morality as Christ taught it, with the difference (and this surely an advantage from the critic's standpoint) that these teachers have failed to a.s.sert of themselves that to which Christ laid claim on his own behalf: that,

He, the sage and humble, Was also one with the Creator. (ll. 922-923.)

(2) Wors.h.i.+p of the intellect being thus disallowed, what then of the moral worth of the Man Christ as admitted by the Lecturer? Is mere virtue, however great in degree, sufficient to claim as of right for its possessor the submission of his fellow men? Perfection of moral character being allowed, is this adequate reason that the Christ should be held supreme ruler of the race? To answer the question satisfactorily one of two theories must be accepted: either ”goodness” is of human ”invention” or it is a divine gift freely bestowed. If the first, the Professor's listener holds that ”wors.h.i.+p were that man's fit requital” who should have proved himself capable of exhibiting in his own life, _for the first time in the world's history_, that which ”goodness” really is. Recognizing, however, the incontrovertible fact that moral worth was present in the world prior to the foundation of Christianity, the so-called ”invention” of goodness resolves itself into a mere matter of definition, and the adjustment of names to qualities already existent. In this case he who has achieved this work is no more deserving of wors.h.i.+p as the originator or creator of goodness than is Harvey to be adjudged inventor of the circulation of the blood. One is inclined here to question whether the speaker is not carrying his argument beyond the point necessary to the exposure of the weakness of the Lecturer's position as professed follower of a merely human Christ. Whether or not this be so, he has succeeded in proving logically untenable the first of the two hypotheses suggested in this connection. What then of the second? If goodness is admittedly the direct gift of G.o.d, if the founder of Christianity taught how best to preserve such gift ”free from fleshly taint”; then he merits indeed the t.i.tle of Saint, but no more transcendent honour, his powers differing in degree, not in kind, from those of his fellow men: he was inspired, but as Shakespeare was inspired. No immensity of virtue may effect the conversion of human nature into the divine; and the man of supreme moral dignity, as of marvellous intellectual capacity, remains man only; vastly, but yet measurably, beyond his fellows; the position attained being one to which it is possible that humanity may again attain, nay, which it may even surpa.s.s in the future ”by growth of soul.” And this divine gift of goodness may, moreover, necessarily be bestowed in accordance with the divine will; hence, he who made this man Pilate may well make ”this other”

Christ. Thus then, if the Prophet of Nazareth is to be regarded as mere man, the Professor's argument breaks down following the adoption of either hypothesis--that involving a divine or a human origin of goodness.

Is there any point at which the faith of the Christian may come into contact with that of him who, whilst calling himself a follower of Christ, by a denial of His divinity refuses credence to a direct a.s.sertion on the part of his leader? To the Christian the main proof of divine inspiration is the spark of divine light kindled within the human breast, that which supplies motive for action, which instigates to practical application of the good already recognized as good by the intelligence: not identical with conscience (as is clear from line 1033), but the power which awakens the activities of conscience. Here again a suggestion of Browning's usual estimate of the relative worth of the intellect and the heart. The man whose moral standard of life is most depraved is yet possessed of the capacity for discriminating between good and evil; since such capacity does not necessarily imply the co-existence of a life-giving faith, and through faith alone may knowledge become of practical utility.

Whom do you count the worst man upon earth?

Be sure, he knows, in his conscience, more Of what right is, than arrives at birth In the best man's acts that we bow before. (ll. 1032-1035.)

To _know_ is not to _do_: a distinction akin to that drawn in the Epistle of James[64] between intellectual credence and living faith--between belief, the result of the acceptance of certain facts making inevitable appeal to the intellect, and faith inspiring life, the ultimate results of which are manifest in action. This distinction we find again strikingly presented in parabolic form in _Shah Abbas_ of _Ferishtah's Fancies_.

The most marked lines of divergence between listener and lecturer would appear then to be that mere abstract good, even morality personified, is insufficient for the satisfaction of the demands of human nature: that the life lived in Palestine did not denote a mere renewal of things old, a more extended development of the good already existent in the world. It introduced a new and more active principle of life, that to which all past history had been leading up, that from which the future history of the human race must take its starting point. _The revelation of G.o.d in man had been made to men._ To sum up--

Morality to the uttermost, Supreme in Christ as we all confess, Why need we prove would avail no jot To make him G.o.d, if G.o.d he were not?

What is the point where himself lays stress?

Does the precept run, ”Believe in good, In justice, truth, now understood For the first time?”--or, ”Believe in me, Who lived and died, yet essentially Am Lord of Life?” Whoever can take The same to his heart and for mere love's sake Conceive of the love,--that man obtains A new truth; no conviction gains Of an old one only, made intense By a fresh appeal to his faded sense. (ll. 1045-1059.)

These the lines of divergence. Are there none of approach? asks the listener who is gradually learning from his night's experience to seek a common bond of sympathy between himself and his fellow men, rather than an increase of the repulsion so spontaneously awakened within the walls of Zion Chapel. At Rome he took his share in the ”feast of love,” which afforded little satisfaction to intellectual cravings; here he would fain accept all that may accrue to him from the pursuit of learning apart from love.

Unlearned love was safe from spurning-- Can't we respect your loveless learning? (ll. 1084-1085.)

Recognizing the zeal for truth which has instigated the critical investigations of the lecturer, he is prepared, with a liberality of which he is clearly sufficiently conscious, to allow to him and to his followers such benefit as may be derived from the acceptance of ”a loveless creed”; even conceding to them, so be it they still desire it, the name of Christian, which he too bears. With generosity yet greater he will refrain from all attempt to disturb that condition of stoical calm to which they have at length attained, by pointing out to them the weaknesses of their theory, which he has just so amply demonstrated to his own satisfaction.

V. Thus he leaves the lecture hall in a ”genial mood of tolerance,” of which the conclusions of Section XIX are the outcome. The element of truth existent in varying forms of creed, beneath all dissimilarities of outward expression, has at length become recognizable; carrying with it the prevision of that complete union ultimately to be effected before ”the general Father's throne.” When ”the saints of many a warring creed” shall have learned

That _all_ paths to the Father lead Where Self the feet have spurned.

Where

Moravian hymn and Roman chant In one devotion blend;

and all

Discords find harmonious close, In G.o.d's atoning ear.[65]

Of what n.o.bler conception, it may be asked, is the human imagination capable? Nevertheless, to certain natures (so holds the soliloquist, clearly recognizing his own as of this calibre) there is danger lest this generous comprehensiveness should prove inseparable from the ”mild indifferentism” fatal to action. Hence in Section XX, whilst engaged in watching his

Foolish heart expand In the lazy glow of benevolence, (ll. 1154-1155.)

he is not surprised to perceive, in the token of the receding vesture, indications of the divine disapproval of his position. And he is led to the conclusion that not only for the individual wors.h.i.+pper must there be some special form of creed best adapted to the individual needs of temperament, but (as ll. 1158-1159 would appear to suggest) some _absolute_ form of creed may possibly be discoverable. And to this ”single track”:

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