Part 2 (1/2)
CLEON
LECTURE II
CLEON
Between Caliban and Cleon a wide gulf is fixed: between the savage sprawling in ”the pit's much mire,” gloating over his powers of inflicting suffering, at once cowering before and insulting his G.o.d: and the cultured Greek, inhabitant of ”the sprinkled isles,” poet, philosopher, artist, musician, sitting in his ”portico, royal with sunset,” reflecting on the purposes of life, his own achievements and the design of Zeus in creation, which, though inscrutable, he yet must hold to have been beneficent. Could contrast be anywhere more striking than that suggested by these two scenes? And yet amidst outward dissimilarity there is a point towards which all their lines converge. On one subject of reflection alone, this man, the product of Greek intellectual life and culture, has hardly pa.s.sed beyond that of the savage awakening to a ”sense of sense.” To both alike death means the end of life, to neither does any glimpse of light reveal itself beyond the grave. And death to the Greek is infinitely more terrible than to the son of Sycorax. To Caliban the belief that ”with the life the pain will stop,” affords a feeling akin to relief in the present, when the mental discomfort arising from fear of Setebos temporarily over-powers the physical satisfaction to be derived from basking in the sun. To Cleon, possessed of the capacity for ”loving life so over-much,”
the idea of death affords so terrible a suggestion that its very horror forces upon him at times the necessity of the acceptance of some theory involving belief in the immortality of the soul. Thus we have moved onwards one step, though one step only, in the ladder of thought, of which Caliban's soliloquy const.i.tutes the lowest rung. The inert conjectures, the vague surmises of the savage are succeeded by the reflections and subsequent logical deductions of the man of intellectual culture, culminating in the anguished cry:
I, I the feeling, thinking, acting man.
Sleep in my urn. It is so horrible, I dare at times imagine to my need Some future state revealed to us by Zeus.
... But no!
Zeus has not yet revealed it, and alas, He must have done so, were it possible! (_Cleon_, 11. 321-335.)
Different as are the modes of contemplating death, differing as the character and environment of the soliloquist, one is yet in a sense the outcome of the other, an exemplification of Cleon's own a.s.sertion:
In man there's failure, only since he left The lower and inconscious forms of life. (ll. 125-126.)
Most progress is most failure. (l. 272.)
With the opening out of wider possibilities to the mind comes the consciousness of the gulf between actuality and ideality. To Caliban, whose pleasurable conceptions of life are bounded by the prospect of defrauding Prospero of his services, lying in the mire
Drinking the mash, with brain become alive, Making and marring clay at will; (_Caliban_, 11. 96-97.)
to such a being not long endowed with a capacity for the realization of his own individuality, with the ”sense of sense,” the Greek appreciation of life is a sheer impossibility. By the mind capable of entering into sympathy with Homer, Terpander, Phidias, the joys of life are felt too keenly to be relinquished without a struggle, and that a bitter one. Death and the grave cast a chilling shadow over the brightness of the present.
Before a.n.a.lysing the arguments contained in the reflections of Cleon, it may be well to inquire what were the influences to which the poet had been subjected, and which resulted in the condition of mind in which the messengers of Protus found him. The Greece in which Cleon lived was the Greece to which S. Paul addressed himself from the Areopagus, the character of which is sufficiently indicated by the circ.u.mstances leading to the a.s.sembly on that memorable occasion. The Athenians, we are told by the writer of the _Acts_, ”spent their time in nothing else but either to tell or to hear some new thing.”[17] The age was then, it would appear, not one of action or of practical thought. All had been done in the past that could be done in the departments of artistic achievement, of poetry, of philosophy. Now _creative_ power would seem to have disappeared from amongst Greek thinkers, all that remained being the natural restlessness which ultimately succeeds satiety. Much had been accomplished in the past: What remained to the future? It is in accordance with this spirit of the age that Cleon writes to Protus:
We of these latter days, with greater mind Than our forerunners, since more composite, Look not so great, beside their simple way, To a judge who only sees one way at once, One mind-point and no other at a time,-- Compares the small part of a man of us With some whole man of the heroic age, Great in his way--not ours, nor meant for ours. (ll. 64-71.)
Hence the poet of modern times, though he has left the ”epos on [the]
hundred plates of gold,” the property of the tyrant Protus, and the little popular song
So sure to rise from every fis.h.i.+ng-bark When, lights at prow, the seamen haul their net; (ll. 49, 50.)
yet admits freely that he has not ”chanted verse like Homer.” What though he has ”combined the moods” of music, ”inventing one,” yet has he never ”swept string like Terpander,” his predecessor by some seven centuries.
What though he has moulded ”the image of the sun-G.o.d on the phare,” or painted the Poecile its whole length, yet has he not ”carved and painted men like Phidias and his friend”--his forerunners by something like four hundred years. With these mighty achievements in poetry and art of those giants amongst men to be contemplated in retrospect, what hope remains for the future? What greater attainments may be possible to the human intellect? Here again life--this mortal life--would seem to have become all that it is capable of becoming; the powers of mind and body have alike been developed to the full. Thus on this side too is satiety. The yearning for growth, for progress, inherent in human nature, seeks instinctively further heights of attainment. When for the time being all visible peaks appear to have been scaled, then, in the phraseology of S. John, ”man [turns] round on himself and stands.”[18] And then arises the enquiry into the purposes of existence, an enquiry unheard in the earlier days of practical activity and struggle. Is this the end of all? No progress being possible along the old tracks, we must hear or see some new thing. The late Dr. Westcott in comparing the dramatic work of Euripides with that of aeschylus, and remarking that Euripides (only a generation younger) had to take account of all the novel influences under which he had grown up, adds, ”Once again Asia had touched Europe and quickened there new powers.
Greece had conquered Persia only that she might better receive from the East the inspiration of a wider energy.”[19] Once more in the days of Cleon might it be said that Asia had touched Europe and quickened there new powers. But this time the positions of conquered and conquerors were reversed. Asia was to conquer Europe, but the conquest effected by the sword of Alexander was to be avenged by weapons forged in another armoury.
This time Asia invaded Europe when Paul of Tarsus responded to the appeal ”Come over to Macedonia and help us.” So far that invasion had borne small fruit: ”certain men” had believed, including Dionysius the Areopagite, whilst others, whose att.i.tude Protus would appear to have shared, desired to hear further on the subject of the Resurrection.[20] Cleon is represented as ranking among the sceptics with reference to the new Christian teaching. The special influence of Greek thought upon his philosophy and creed, as expressed in the poem, may be best noticed in a closer consideration to which we now turn.
I. The opening lines (1-18) present, with Browning's usual power of delineation, the environment of the speaker. Cleon, the poet, as well as his correspondent, Protus, the tyrant, seem alike to be imaginary personages. With lines 19-42 the soliloquist at once strikes the key-note of the poem. By the act of munificence which showers gifts upon the poet, ”whose song gives life its joy,” the king evinces his ”recognition of the use of life”: and by this recognition proves himself no mere materialist.