Volume II Part 43 (1/2)
”In numerical strength his army so much exceeded that under General Lee that, after covering the entire Confederate front with double lines of battle, he had in reserve a large force with which to extend his flank and compel a corresponding movement on the part of his adversary, in order to keep between him and his coveted prize--the capital of the Confederacy.” [99]
On the 18th another a.s.sault was made upon our lines, but it produced no impression. On the 20th of May, after twelve days of skirmish and battle at Spottsylvania against a superior force, General Lee's information led him to believe that the enemy was about to attempt another flanking movement, and interpose his army between the Confederate capital and its defenders. To defeat this purpose Longstreet was ordered to move at midnight in the direction of Hanover Junction, and on the following day and night Swell's and Hill's corps marched for the same point.
The Confederate commander, divining that Grant's objective point was the intersection of the two railroads leading to Richmond at a point two miles south of the North Anna River, crossed his army over that stream and took up a line of battle which frustrated the movement.
Grant began his flanking movement on the night of the 20th, marching in two columns, the right, under General Warren, crossing the North Anna at Jericho Ford without opposition. On the 23d the left, under General Hanc.o.c.k, crossing four miles lower down, at the Chesterfield or County Bridge, was obstinately resisted by a small force, and the pa.s.sage of the river was not made until the 24th. After crossing the North Anna, Grant discovered that his movement was a blunder, and that his army was in a position of much peril.
The Confederate commander established his line of battle on the south side of the river, both wings refused so as to form an obtuse angle, with the apex resting on the river between the two points of the enemy's crossing, Longstreet's and Hill's corps forming the two sides, and Little River and the Hanover marshes the base. Ewell's corps held the apex or center.
The hazard of Grant's position appears not to have been known to him until he attempted to unite his two columns, which were four miles apart, by establis.h.i.+ng a connecting line along the river. Foiled in the attempt, he discovered that the Confederate army was interposed between his two wings, which were also separated by the North Anna, and that the one could give no support to the other except by a double crossing of the river. That the Confederate commander did not seize the opportunity to strike his embarra.s.sed foe and avail himself of the advantage which his superior generals.h.i.+p had gained, may have been that, concluding from past observation of Grant's tactics, he felt a.s.sured that the ”continuous hammering” process was to be repeated without reference to circ.u.mstances or position. If Lee acted on this supposition, he was mistaken, as the Federal commander, profiting by the severe lessons of Spottsylvania and the Wilderness, with cautious, noiseless movement, withdrew under cover of the night of the 26th to the north side of the North Anna, and moved eastward down to the Pamunkey River.
At Hanover Junction General Lee was joined by Pickett's division of Longstreet's corps, which had been on detached service in North Carolina, and by a small force under General Breckinridge from southwestern Virginia, twenty-two hundred strong. Hoke's brigade, of Early's division, twelve hundred strong, which had been on detached duty at the Junction, here also rejoined its division. On the 29th the whole of Grant's army was across the Pamunkey, while General Lee's army on the next day was in line of battle with his left at Atlee's Station. By another movement eastward the two armies were brought face to face at Cold Harbor on June 3d. Here fruitless efforts were made by General Grant to pierce or drive back the forces of General Lee. Our troops were protected by temporary earthworks, and while under cover of these were a.s.sailed by the enemy:
”But in vain. The a.s.sault was repulsed along the whole line, and the carnage on the Federal side was fearful. I[100] well recall having received a report, after the a.s.sault, from General Hoke--whose division reached the army just previous to this battle--to the effect that the ground in his entire front, over which the enemy had charged, was literally covered with their dead and wounded; and that up to that time he had not had a single man killed. No wonder that, when the command was given to renew the a.s.sault, the Federal soldiers sullenly and silently declined. 'The order[101] was issued through the officers to their subordinate commanders, and from them descended through the wonted channels; but no man stirred, and the immobile lines p.r.o.nounced a verdict, silent yet emphatic, against further slaughter. The loss on the Union side in this sanguinary action was over thirteen thousand, while on the part of the Confederates it is doubtful whether it reached that many hundreds.' After some disingenuous proposals, General Grant finally asked a truce to enable him to bury his dead. Soon after this he abandoned his chosen line of operations, and moved his army so as to secure a crossing to the south side of James River. The struggle from the Wilderness to this point covered a period of over one month, during which time there had been an almost daily encounter of arms, and the Army of Northern Virginia had placed _hors de combat_, of the army under General Grant, a number exceeding the entire numerical strength, at the commencement of the campaign, of Lee's army, which, notwithstanding its own heavy losses and the reinforcements received by the enemy, still presented an impregnable front to its opponent.”
By the report of the United States Secretary of War (Stanton), Grant had, on the 1st of May, 1864, two days before he crossed the Rapidan, 120,380 men, and in the Ninth Army Corps 20,780, or an aggregate with which he marched against Lee of 141,160. To meet this vast force, Lee had on the Rapidan less than 50,000 men. By the same authority it appears that Grant had a reserve upon which he could draw of 137,672.
Lee had practically no reserve, for he was compelled to make detachments from his army for the protection of West Virginia and other points, about equal to all the reenforcements which he received. In the ”Southern Historical Papers,” vol. vi, page 144, upon the very reliable authority of the editor, there appears the following statement:
”Grant says he lost, in the campaign from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor, 39,000 men; but Swinton puts his loss at over 60,000, and a careful examination of the figures will show that his real loss was nearer 100,000. In other words, he lost about twice as many men as Lee had, in order to take a position which he could have taken at first without firing a gun or losing a man.”
On June 12th the movement was commenced by Grant for crossing the James River. Pontoon-bridges were laid near Wilc.o.x's Wharf for the pa.s.sage of his army. J. C. Pemberton, who, after the fall of Vicksburg, was left without a command corresponding to his rank of lieutenant-general in the provisional army, in order that he might not stand idle, n.o.bly resigned that commission, and asked to be a.s.signed to duty according to his rank in the regular army, which was that of lieutenant-colonel. Ho was accordingly directed to report to General Lee for service with the Army of Northern Virginia. Being a skillful artillerist, he was directed to find a position where he could place a mortar so as to throw sh.e.l.ls on the enemy's bridge when it should be put into use. By a daring reconnaissance and exact calculation, he determined a point from which the desired effect might be produced by vertical fire, over a wood. At the proper moment he opened upon the bridge, and his expectations were verified by the sh.e.l.ls falling on the troops hara.s.singly. This, his first service with the Army of Northern Virginia, was interrupted by the failure to send promptly a cohering force to protect the mortar, the position of which was disclosed by its fire. The injury it inflicted caused the Federal commander to send a detachment which drove away the gunners and captured the mortar.
On the 14th and 15th of June the crossing of Grant's army was completed. It will be remembered that he had crossed the Rapidan on the 3d of May. It had therefore taken him more than a month to reach the south side of the James. In his campaign he had sacrificed a hecatomb of men, a vast amount of artillery, small-arms, munitions of war, and supplies, to reach a position to which McClellan had already demonstrated there was an easy and inexpensive route. It is true that the Confederate army had suffered severely, and, though the loss was comparatively small to that of its opponents, it could not be repaired, as his might be, from the larger population and his facility for recruiting in Europe. To those who can approve the policy of attrition without reference to the number of lives it might cost, this may seem justifiable, but it can hardly be regarded as generals.h.i.+p, or be offered to military students as an example worthy of imitation. After an unsuccessful attempt, by a surprise, to capture Petersburg, General Grant concentrated his army south of the Appomattox River and commenced the operations to be related hereafter.
[Footnote 95: ”Four Years with General Lee.”]
[Footnote 96: ”Four Years with General Lee.”]
[Footnote 97: Letter from Colonel C. S Venable, ”Southern Historical Society Papers,” vol. viii, p. 106, March, 1880.]
[Footnote 98: ”Memoir of the Last Year,” etc, by General Early.]
[Footnote 99: ”Four Years with General Lee.”]
[Footnote 100: Taylor, ”Four Years with General Lee.”]
[Footnote 101: Swinton, ”Army of the Potomac,” p. 487.]
CHAPTER XLVII.
Situation in the Shenandoah Valley.--March of General Early.--The Object.--At Lynchburg.--Staunton.--His Force.--Enters Maryland.-- Attack at Monocacy.--Approach to Was.h.i.+ngton.--The Works.-- Recrosses the Potomac.--Battle at Kernstown.--Captures.--Outrages of the Enemy.--Statement of General Early.--Retaliation on Chambersburg, Pennsylvania.--Battle near Winchester.--Sheridan's Force routed.--Attack subsequently renewed with New Forces.-- Incapacity of our Opponent.--Early falls back.--The Enemy retires.--Early advances.--Report of a Committee of Citizens on Losses by Sheridan's Orders.--Battle at Cedar Creek.--Losses, Subsequent Movements, and Captures.--The Red River Campaign.-- Repulse and Retreat of General Banks.--Capture of Fort Pillow.
Before the opening of the campaign of 1864, the lower Shenandoah Valley was held by a force under General Sigel, with which General Grant decided to renew the attempt which had been made by Crook and Averill to destroy the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad west of Lynchburg as a means to his general purpose of isolating Richmond; and a prompt movement of General Morgan had defeated those attempts and driven off the invaders. Sigel, with about fifteen thousand men, commenced his movement up the Valley of the Shenandoah. Major-General Breckinridge, commanding in southwestern Virginia, was notified, on the 4th of May, of the movement of Sigel, and started immediately with two brigades of infantry to Staunton, at which place he arrived on the 9th. The reserves of Augusta County, under Colonel Harmon, were called out, numbering several hundred men, and the cadets of the Military Inst.i.tute at Lexington, numbering two hundred, voluntarily joined him. With this force Breckinridge decided to march to meet Sigel. General Imboden, with a cavalry force of several hundred, had been holding, as best he might, the upper Valley, and joined Breckinridge in the neighborhood of New Market, informing him that Sigel then occupied that place. Breckinridge having marched so rapidly from Staunton that it was probable that his advance was unknown to the enemy, he determined to make an immediate attack. His troops were put in motion at one o'clock, and by daylight was in line of battle two miles south of New Market. Sigel seems to have been unconscious of any other obstruction to the capture of Staunton than the small cavalry force under Imboden. At this time Lee was engaged with the vastly superior force of Grant, which had crossed the Rapidan, and Sigel's was a movement to get upon our flank, and thus cooperate with Grant in his attempt to capture Richmond. Breckinridge had an infantry force not much exceeding three thousand. The hazard of an attack was great, but the necessity of the case justified it.
Breckinridge's force was only enough to form one line of battle in two ranks, the cadets holding the center between the two brigades.
There were no reserves, and Colonel Harmon's command formed the guard for the trains. Skirmish lines were promptly engaged, and soon thereafter the enemy fell back beyond New Market, where Sigel, a.s.suming the defensive, took a strong position, in which to wait for an attack. Our artillery was moved forward, and opened with effect upon the enemy's position; then our infantry advanced, ”with the steadiness of troops on dress parade, the precision of the cadets serving well as a color-guide for the brigades on either side to dress by... . The Federal line had the advantage of a stone wall which served as a breastwork.” [102] Sigel's cavalry attempted to turn our right flank, but was repulsed disastrously, and in a few moments the enemy was in full retreat, crossing the Shenandoah and burning the bridge behind him.
Breckinridge captured five pieces of artillery and over five hundred prisoners, exclusive of the wounded left on the field. Our loss was several hundred killed and wounded. General Lee, after receiving notice of this, ordered Breckinridge to transfer his command as rapidly as possible to Hanover Junction. The battle was fought on the 15th, and the command reached Hanover Junction on the 20th of May.
Before General Breckinridge left the Valley, he issued an order thanking his troops, ”particularly the cadets, who, though mere youths, had fought with the steadiness of veterans.”