Volume II Part 36 (2/2)

General Meade held the high ridge above described, along which he had ma.s.sed a large amount of artillery. General Ewell occupied the left of our line, General Hill the center, and General Longstreet the right. In front of General Longstreet the enemy held a position, from which, if he could be driven, it was thought that our army could gain the more elevated ground (Round-Top) beyond, and thus enable our guns to rake the crest of the ridge. That officer was directed to endeavor to carry this position, while General Ewell attacked directly the high ground on the enemy's right, which had already been partially fortified. General Hill was instructed to threaten the center of the line, in order to prevent reenforcements to either wing, and to avail himself of any opportunity that might present itself to attack. After a severe struggle Longstreet succeeded in getting possession of and holding the ground in his immediate front. Ewell also carried some of the strong positions which he a.s.sailed, and the result was such as to lead to the belief that he would ultimately be able to dislodge the force in his front. The battle ceased at dark. These partial successes determined Lee to continue the a.s.sault on the next day.

Pickett, with three of his brigades, joined Longstreet on the following morning, and our batteries were moved forward to the position gained by him on the day before. The general plan of attack was unchanged, except that one division and two brigades of Hill's corps were ordered to support Longstreet.

General Meade, in the mean time, had strengthened his line with earthworks. The morning was occupied in necessary preparations, and the battle recommenced in the afternoon of the 3d, and raged with great violence until sunset. Our troops succeeded in entering the advanced works of the enemy, and getting possession of some of his batteries; but, our artillery having nearly expended its ammunition, the attacking columns became exposed to the heavy fire of the numerous batteries near the summit of the ridge, and, after a most determined and gallant struggle, were compelled to relinquish their advantage and fall back to their original positions with severe loss.

Owing to the strength of the enemy's position and the exhaustion of our ammunition, a renewal of the engagement could not be hazarded, and the difficulty of procuring supplies rendered it impossible to continue longer where we were. Such of the wounded as could be removed and a part of the arms collected on the field were ordered to Williamsport. The army remained at Gettysburg during the 4th, and at night began to retire by the road to Fairfield, carrying with it about four thousand prisoners. Nearly two thousand had been previously paroled; but the numerous wounded that had fallen into our hands after the first and second day's engagements were left behind.

Little progress was made that night, owing to a severe storm, which greatly embarra.s.sed our movements. The rear of the column did not leave its position near Gettysburg until after daylight on the 5th.

The march was continued during that day without interruption by the enemy, except an unimportant demonstration upon our rear in the afternoon, when near Fairfield, which was easily checked. The army, after a tedious march, rendered more difficult by the rains, reached Hagerstown on the afternoon of the 6th and morning of the 7th of July.

The Potomac was so much swollen by the rains, that had fallen almost incessantly since our army entered Maryland, as to be unfordable. A pontoon-train had been sent from Richmond, but the rise in the river gave to it a width greater than was expected, so that additional boats had to be made by the army on its retreat. Our communication with the south side was thus interrupted, and it was found difficult to procure either ammunition or subsistence, the latter difficulty being enhanced by the high water impeding the working of the mills.

The trains with the wounded and prisoners were compelled to wait at Williamsport for the subsiding of the river or the construction of additional pontoon-boats. The enemy had not yet made his appearance, but, as he was in a condition to obtain large reenforcements and our want of supplies was daily becoming more embarra.s.sing, it was deemed advisable to recross the river. By the 13th a good bridge was thrown over at Falling Waters. On the 12th Meade's army approached. A position had been previously selected to cover the Potomac from Williamsport to Falling Waters, and an attack was awaited during that and the succeeding day. This did not take place, though the two armies were in close proximity, the enemy being occupied in fortifying his own lines.

General Meade, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, said that he ordered an attack on our forces on the morning of the 14th, and, if it had been made, it was his opinion that ”it would have resulted disastrously.” When asked the reasons for that opinion, he replied:

”If I had attacked the enemy in the position which he then occupied--he having the advantage of position, and being on the defensive, his artillery in position, and his infantry behind parapets and rifle-pits--the very same reasons and causes which produced my success at Gettysburg would have operated in his favor there, and be likely to produce success on his part.”

Our preparations being completed, and the Potomac, though still deep, being p.r.o.nounced fordable, the army commenced to withdraw to the south side on the night of the 13th. Ewell's corps forded the river at Williamsport, those of Longstreet and Hill crossed upon the bridge. Owing to the condition of the roads the troops did not reach the bridge until after daylight on the 14th, and the crossing was not completed until 1 P.M., when the bridge was removed. General Lee said that the enemy offered no serious interruption, and the movement was attended with no loss of material except a few disabled wagons and two pieces of artillery, which the horses were unable to move through the deep mud. During the slow and tedious march to the bridge, in the midst of a violent storm of rain, some of the men lay down by the way to rest. Officers sent back for them failed to find many in the obscurity of the night, and these, with some stragglers, a few of Heth's division most remote from the bridge, were captured. On the following day the army marched to Bunker Hill, in the vicinity of which it encamped for several days. Owing to the swollen condition of the Shenandoah River, the campaign which was contemplated when the Potomac was recrossed, could not be immediately commenced. Before the waters had subsided, the movements of the enemy required us to cross the Blue Ridge and take position south of the Rappahannock.

The strength of our army at Gettysburg is stated at 62,000 of all arms.[79] The report of the Army of the Potomac under General Meade, on June 30, 1863, states the force present at 112,988 men. Before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, General Meade, in reference to his force at Gettysburg, said, ”Including all arms of the service, my strength was a little under 100,000 men--about 95,000.”

If the strength of General Lee's forces, according to the last accessible report before the movement northward, be compared with that made after his return into Virginia, there is a decrease of nineteen thousand of the brave men who had set the seal of invincibility upon the Army of Northern Virginia.

General Lee, in his report, noticing the large loss of men and officers, says:

”I can not speak of these brave men as their merits and exploits deserve. Some of them are appropriately mentioned in the accompanying reports, and the memory of all will be gratefully and affectionately cherished by the people in whose defense they fell.

”The loss of Major-General Pender is severely felt by the army and the country... . Brigadier-Generals Armistead, Barksdale, Garnet, and Semmes, died as they had lived, discharging the highest duty of patriots with devotion that never faltered, and courage that shrank from no danger.”

The testimony of General Meade, above mentioned, contains this statement respecting his losses:

”On the evening of the 2d of July, after the battle of that day had ceased, and darkness had set in, being aware of the very heavy losses of the First and Eleventh Corps on the 1st of July, and knowing how severely the Third Corps, the Fifth Corps, and other portions of the army, had suffered in the battle of the 2d of July--in fact, as subsequently ascertained, out of the twenty-four thousand men killed, wounded, and missing, which was the amount of my losses and casualties at Gettysburg--over twenty thousand of them had been put _hors de combat_ before the night of the 2d of July.”

Thus closed the campaign in Pennsylvania. The wisdom of the strategy was justified by the result. The battle of Gettysburg was unfortunate. Though the loss sustained by the enemy was greater than our own, theirs could be repaired, ours could not.

Had General Lee been able to compel the enemy to attack him in position, I think we should have had a complete victory, and the testimony of General Meade quoted above shows that he was not at all inclined to make the experiment. If General Lee, by moving to the right, would only have led General Meade to fall back on his preferred position of Pipe Creek, his ability to wait and the impossibility under such circ.u.mstances for General Lee to supply his army for any length of time seem to me an answer to that point in the criticism to which our great Captain has been subjected. To compel Meade to retire would have availed but little to us, unless his army had first been routed. To beat that army was probably to secure our independence. The position of Gettysburg would have been worth nothing to us if our army had found it unoccupied. The fierce battle that Lee fought there must not be considered as for the position; to beat the great army of the North was the object, and that it was of possible attainment is to be inferred from the various successes of our arms. Had there been a concentrated attack at sunrise on the second day, with the same gallantry and skill which were exhibited in the partial a.s.saults, it may reasonably be a.s.sumed that the enemy would have been routed. This, from the best evidence we have, was the plan and the expectation of General Lee. These having failed, from whatever cause, and Meade having occupied in force the commanding position of Round-Top, it must be conceded that it would have been better to withdraw than to renew the attack on the third day. The high morale and discipline of our army, together with the unqualified confidence of the men in their commanding General, excluded the supposition that they would be demoralized by retreat. Subsequent events proved how little cause there was to fear it. It is not admitted that our army was defeated, and the enemy's claim to a victory is refuted by the fact that, when Lee halted on the banks of the Potomac, Meade, instead of attacking as a pursuing general would a defeated foe, halted also, and commenced intrenching.

The Battle of Gettysburg has been the subject of an unusual amount of discussion, and the enemy has made it a matter of extraordinary exultation. As an affair of arms it was marked by mighty feats of valor to which both combatants may point with military pride. It was a graceful thing in President Lincoln if, as reported, when he was shown the steeps which the Northern men persistently held, he answered, ”I am proud to be the countryman of the men who a.s.sailed those heights.”

The consequences of the battle have justified the amount of attention it has received. It may be regarded as the most eventful struggle of the war. By it the drooping spirit of the North was revived. Had their army been there defeated, those having better opportunities to judge than I or any one who was not among them, have believed it would have ended the war. On the other hand, a drawn battle, where the Army of Northern Virginia made an attack, impaired the confidence of the Southern people so far as to give the malcontents a power to represent the Government as neglecting for Virginia the safety of the more southern States.

In all free governments, the ability of its executive branch to prosecute a war must largely depend upon public opinion; in an infant republic, this, for every reason, is peculiarly the case. The volume given to the voice of disaffection was therefore most seriously felt by us.

Shattered, it is true, but not disheartened, the Army of Northern Virginia after recrossing the Potomac rose like the son of Terra, with renewed vigor, and entered on the brilliant campaign hereafter to be generally described.

Early in October General Lee, with two corps (Ewell's and Hill's), the First Corps of his army having been temporarily detached for service in Tennessee, crossed the Rapidan to attack the flank of the enemy, or to compel him to retreat. It resulted in the capture of fifteen hundred prisoners, and forced Meade's army back to Alexandria and Centreville. The campaign was an unbroken success, with the exception of a rash and ill-conducted affair at Bristoe Station, where our advance engaged a corps, and was repulsed, losing a number of men and five guns. Thus, without a general battle, a large portion of the State was for the time liberated.

On November 7th the enemy advanced upon our force at Kelly's Ford, of the Rappahannock River, effected a crossing, and, rus.h.i.+ng upon two brigades who were at Rappahannock Station defending the bridges, overwhelmed and captured most of them, taking between twelve and fifteen hundred men, and four pieces of artillery. The movements of the enemy were concealed by the darkness, and his attack was a surprise.

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