Volume II Part 34 (1/2)
”It was in the execution of this important duty, which could not have been confided to a fitter man, that the lamented General bravely lost his life.”
He was the officer whose devoted gallantry and self-sacrificing generosity were noticed in connection with the fall of Fort Henry.
This severe battle was signalized by so many feats of individual intrepidity that its roll of honor is too long for the limits of these pages.
Though some gave way in confusion, and others failed to respond when called on, the heroism of the rest shed l.u.s.ter on the field, and ”the main body of the troops retired in good order.” The gallant brigades of Green and c.o.c.kerell covered the rear.
The topographical features of the position at the railroad-bridge across the Big Black were such as, with the artificial strength given to it, made it quite feasible to defend it against a direct approach even of an army as much superior in numbers to that of Pemberton as was that of Grant; but the attack need not be made by a direct approach. The position could be turned by moving either above or below by fords and ferries, and thus advancing upon Vicksburg by other and equally eligible routes. From what has already been quoted, it will be understood that General Pemberton considered the occupation of Vicksburg vitally important in connection with the command of the Mississippi River, and the maintenance of communication with the country beyond it. It was therefore that he had been so reluctant to endanger his connection with that point as his base. Pressed as he was by the enemy, whose object, it had been unmistakably shown, was to get possession of Vicksburg and its defenses, the circ.u.mstances made it imperative that he should abandon a position, the holding of which would not effect his object, and that he should withdraw his forces from the field to unite them with those within the defenses of Vicksburg, and endeavor, as speedily as possible, to reorganize the depressed and discomfited troops.
One of the immediate results of the retreat from Big Black was the necessity of abandoning our defenses on the Yazoo, at Snyder's Mills; this position and the line of Chickasaw Bayou were no longer tenable.
All stores that could be transported were ordered to be sent into Vicksburg as rapidly as possible, the rest, including heavy guns, to be destroyed. During the night of the 17th nothing of importance occurred. On the morning of the 18th the troops were disposed from right to left on the defenses. On the entire line, one hundred and two pieces of artillery of different caliber, princ.i.p.ally field-guns, were placed in position at such points as were deemed most suitable to the character of the gun. Instructions had been given from Bovina that all the cattle, sheep, and hogs, belonging to private parties, and likely to fall into the hands of the enemy, should be driven within our lines. Grant's army appeared on the 18th.
The development of the intrenched line from our extreme right was about eight miles, the shortest defensible line of which the topography of the country admitted. It consisted of a system of detached works, redans, lunettes, and redoubts, on the prominent and commanding points, with the usual profile of raised field-works, connected in most cases by rifle pits. To hold the entire line there were about eighteen thousand five hundred infantry, but these could not all be put in the trenches, as it was necessary to keep a reserve always ready to reenforce any point heavily threatened.
The campaign against Vicksburg had commenced as early as November, 1862, and reference has been made to the various attempts to capture the position both before and after General Grant arrived and took command in person. He had now by a circuitous march reached the rear of the city, established a base on the Mississippi River a few miles below, had a fleet of gunboats in the river, and controlled the navigation of the Yazoo up to Haines's Bluff, and was relieved from all danger in regard to supplying his army. We had lost the opportunity to cut his communications while he was making his long march over the rugged country between Bruinsburg and the vicinity of Vicksburg. Pemberton had by wise prevision endeavored to secure supplies sufficient for the duration of an ordinary siege, and, on the importance which he knew the Administration attached to the holding of Vicksburg, he relied for the cooperation of a relieving army to break any investment which might be made. Disappointed in the hope which I had entertained that the invading army would be unable to draw its supplies from Bruinsburg or Grand Gulf, and be driven back before crossing the Big Black, it now only remained to increase as far as possible the relieving army, and depend upon it to break the investment. The ability of the Federals to send reenforcements was so much greater than ours, that the necessity for prompt action was fully realized; therefore, when General Johnston on May 9th was ordered to proceed to Mississippi, he was directed to take from the Army of Tennessee three thousand good troops, and informed that he would find reenforcements from General Beauregard. On May 12th a dispatch was sent to him at Jackson, stating, ”In addition to the five thousand men originally ordered from Charleston [Beauregard], about four thousand more will follow. I fear more can not be spared to you.” On May 22d I sent the following dispatch to General Bragg, at Tullahoma, Tennessee:
”The vital issue of holding the Mississippi at Vicksburg is dependent on the success of General Johnston in an attack on the investing force. The intelligence from there is discouraging. Can you aid him?”
To this he replied on the 23d of May, 1863:
”Sent thirty-five hundred with the General, three batteries of artillery and two thousand cavalry since; will dispatch six thousand more immediately.”
In my telegram to General Bragg, after stating the necessity, I submitted the whole question to his judgment, having full reliance in the large-hearted and comprehensive view which his self-denying nature would take of the case, and I responded to him:
”Your answer is in the spirit of patriotism heretofore manifested by you. The need is sore, but you must not forget your own necessities.”
On the 1st of June General Johnston telegraphed to me that the troops at his disposal available against Grant amounted to twenty-four thousand one hundred, not including Jackson's cavalry command and a few hundred irregular cavalry. Mr. Seddon, Secretary of War, replied to him stating the force to be thirty-two thousand. In another dispatch, of June 5th, the Secretary says his statement rested on official reports of numbers sent, regrets his inability to promise more, as we had drained our resources even to the danger of several points, and urged speedy action. ”With the facilities and resources of the enemy time works against us.” Again, on the 16th, Secretary Seddon says:
”If better resources do not offer, you must hazard attack.”
On the 18th, while Pemberton was inspecting the intrenchments along which his command had been placed, he received by courier a communication from General Johnston, dated ”May 17, 1863, camp between Livingston and Brownsville,” in answer to Pemberton's report of the result of the battles of Baker's Creek and Big Black, and the consequent evacuation of Snyder's Mills. General Johnston wrote:
”If Haines's Bluff is untenable, Vicksburg is of no value and can not be held. If, therefore, you are invested in Vicksburg, you must ultimately surrender. Under such circ.u.mstances, instead of losing both troops and place, we must, if possible, save the troops. If it is not too late, evacuate Vicksburg and its dependencies, and march to the northeast.”
Pemberton, in his report, remarks:
”This meant the fall of Port Hudson, the surrender of the Mississippi River, and the severance of the Confederacy.”
He recurs to a former correspondence with myself in which he had suggested the possibility of the investment of Vicksburg by land and water, and the necessity for ample supplies to stand a siege, and says his application met my favorable consideration, and that additional ammunition was ordered. Confident in his ability, with the preparations which had been made, to stand a siege, and firmly relying on the desire of the President and of General Johnston to raise it, he ”felt that every effort would be made, and believed it would be successful.” He, however, summoned a council of war, composed of all his general officers, laid before them General Johnston's communication, and desired their opinion on ”the question of practicability,” and on the 18th replied to General Johnston that he had placed his instructions before the general officers of the command, and that ”the opinion was unanimously expressed that it was impossible to withdraw the army from this position with such morale and material as to be of further service to the Confederacy.” He then announces his decision to hold Vicksburg as long as possible, and expresses the hope that he may be a.s.sisted in keeping this obstruction to the enemy's free navigation of the Mississippi River.
He closes his letter thus:
”I still conceive it to be the most important point in the Confederacy.”
While the council of war was a.s.sembled, the guns of the enemy opened on the works, and the siege proper commenced.
Making meager allowance for a reserve, it required the whole force to be constantly in the trenches, and, when they were all on duty, it did not furnish one man to the yard of the _developed line_. On the 19th two a.s.saults were made at the center and left. Both were repulsed and heavy loss inflicted; our loss was small. At the game time the mortar-fleet of Admiral Porter from the west side of the peninsula kept up a bombardment of the city.
Vicksburg is built upon hills rising successively from the river. The intrenchments were upon ridges beyond the town, only approaching the river on the right and left flanks, so that the fire of Porter's mortar-fleet was mainly effective upon the private dwellings, and the women, the children, and other noncombatants.
The hills on which the city is built are of a tenacious calcareous clay, and caves were dug in these to shelter the women and children, many of whom resided in them during the entire siege. From these places of refuge, heroically facing the danger of sh.e.l.ls incessantly bursting over the streets, gentlewomen hourly went forth on the mission of humanity to nurse the sick, the wounded, and to soothe the dying of their defenders who were collected in numerous hospitals.
Without departing from the softer character of their s.e.x, it was often remarked that, in the discharge of the pious duties a.s.sumed, they seemed as indifferent to danger as any of the soldiers who lined the trenches.
During the 20th, 21st, and the forenoon of the 22d, a heavy fire of artillery and musketry was kept up by the besiegers, as well as by the mortar- and gun-boats in the river. On the afternoon of the 22d preparation was made for a general a.s.sault. The attacking columns were allowed to approach to within good musket-range, when every available gun was opened with grape and canister, and our infantry, ”rising in the trenches, poured into their ranks volley after volley with so deadly an effect that, leaving the ground literally covered in some places with their dead and wounded, they [the enemy]