Volume II Part 28 (1/2)
About 3 P.M. the enemy, having ma.s.sed his troops in front of General Jackson, advanced against his position in strong force. His front line pushed forward until it was engaged at close quarters by Jackson's troops, when its progress was cheeked, and a fierce and b.l.o.o.d.y struggle ensued. A second and third line of great strength moved up to support the first, but in doing so came within easy range of a position a little in advance of Longstreet's left. He immediately ordered up two batteries, and, two others being thrown forward about the same time by Colonel S. D. Lee, the supporting lines were broken, and fell back in confusion under their well-directed and destructive fire. Their repeated efforts to rally were unavailing, and Jackson's troops, being thus relieved from the pressure of overwhelming numbers, began to press steadily forward, driving everything before them. The enemy retreated in confusion, suffering severely from our artillery, which advanced as he retired.
General Longstreet, antic.i.p.ating the order for a general advance, now threw his whole command against the center and left. The whole line swept steadily on, driving the opponents with great carnage from each successive position, until 10 P.M., when darkness put an end to the battle and the pursuit.
The obscurity of the night and the uncertainty of the fords of Bull Run rendered it necessary to suspend operations until morning, when the cavalry, being pushed forward, discovered that the retreat had continued to the strong position of Centreville, about four miles beyond Bull Run. The prevalence of a heavy rain, which began during the night, threatened to render Bull Bun impa.s.sable, and to impede our movements. Longstreet remained on the battle-field to engage attention and to protect parties for the burial of the dead and the removal of the wounded, while Jackson proceeded by Sudley's Ford to the Little River turnpike to turn the enemy's right, and intercept his retreat to Was.h.i.+ngton. Jackson's progress was r.e.t.a.r.ded by the inclemency of the weather and the fatigue of his troops. He reached the turnpike in the evening, and the next day (September 1st) advanced by that road toward Fairfax Court-House. The enemy in the mean time was falling back rapidly toward Was.h.i.+ngton, and had thrown a strong force to Germantown, on the Little River turnpike, to cover his line of retreat from Centreville. The advance of Jackson encountered him at Ox Hill, near Germantown, about 5 P.M. Line of battle was at once formed, and two brigades were thrown forward to attack and ascertain the strength of the position. A cold and drenching rain-storm drove in the faces of our troops as they advanced and gallantly engaged. They were subsequently supported, and the conflict was obstinately maintained until dark, when the enemy retreated, having lost two general officers, one of whom-- Major-General Kearney--was left dead on the field. Longstreet's command arrived after the action was over, and the next morning it was found that the retreat had been so rapid that the attempt to intercept was abandoned. The proximity of the fortifications around Alexandria and Was.h.i.+ngton was enough to prevent further pursuit. Our army rested during the 2d near Chantilly, the retreating foe being followed only by our cavalry, who continued to hara.s.s him until he reached the shelter of his intrenchments.
In the series of engagements on the plains of Mana.s.sas more than seven thousand prisoners were taken, in addition to about two thousand wounded left in our hands. Thirty pieces of artillery, upward of twenty thousand stand of small-arms, numerous colors, and a large amount of stores, besides those taken by General Jackson at Mana.s.sas Junction, were captured.
Major-General Pope in his report says:
”The whole force that I had at Centreville, as reported to me by the corps commanders, on the morning of the 1st of September, was as follows: McDowell's corps, 10,000 men; Sigel's corps, about 7,000; Heintzelman's corps, about 6,000; Reno's, 6,000; Banks's, 5,000; Sumner's, 11,000; Porter's, 10,000; Franklin's, 8,000--in all, 63,000 men... . The small fraction of 20,500 men was all of the 91,000 veteran troops from Harrison's landing which ever drew trigger under my command.”
Our losses in the engagement at Mana.s.sas Plains were considerable.
The number killed was 1,090; wounded, 6,154--total, 7,244. The loss of the enemy in killed, wounded, and missing was estimated between 15,000 and 20,000. The strength of our army in July and September is stated on a preceding page.
CHAPTER x.x.xV.
Return of the Enemy to Was.h.i.+ngton.--War transferred to the Frontier.--Condition of Maryland.--Crossing the Potomac.-- Evacuation of Martinsburg.--Advance into Maryland.--Large Force of the Enemy.--Resistance at Boonesboro.--Surrender of Harper's Ferry.--Our Forces reach Sharpsburg.--Letter of the President to General Lee.--Address of General Lee to the People.--Position of our Forces at Sharpsburg.--Battle of Sharpsburg.--Our Strength.-- Forces withdrawn.--Casualties.
The enemy having retired to the protection of the fortifications around Was.h.i.+ngton and Alexandria, Lee's army marched, on September 3d, toward Leesburg. The armies of Generals McClellan and Pope had now been brought back to the point from which they set out on the campaign of the spring and summer. The objects of those campaigns had been frustrated, and the hostile designs against the coast of North Carolina and in western Virginia, thwarted by the withdrawal of the main body of the forces from those regions.
Northeastern Virginia was freed from the presence of the invader. His forces had withdrawn to the intrenchments of Was.h.i.+ngton. Soon after the arrival of our army at Leesburg, information was received that the hostile troops which had occupied Winchester had retired to Harper's Ferry. The war was thus transferred from the interior to the frontier, and the supplies of rich and productive districts were made accessible to our army. To prolong a state of affairs, in every way desirable, and not to permit the season for active operations to pa.s.s without endeavoring to impose further check on our a.s.sailant, the best course appeared to be the transfer of our army into Maryland.
Although not properly equipped for invasion, lacking much of the material of war, and deficient in transportation, the troops poorly provided with clothing, and thousands of them without shoes, it was yet believed to be strong enough to detain the opposing army upon the northern frontier until the approach of winter should render its advance into Virginia difficult, if not impracticable.
The condition of Maryland encouraged the belief that the presence of our army, though numerically inferior to that of the North, would induce the Was.h.i.+ngton Government to retain all its available force to provide against contingencies which its conduct toward the people of that State gave reason to apprehend. At the same time it was hoped that military success might afford us an opportunity to aid the citizens of Maryland in any efforts they should be disposed to make to recover their liberty. The difficulties that surrounded them were fully appreciated, and we expected to derive more a.s.sistance in the attainment of our object from the just fears of the Was.h.i.+ngton Government than from any active demonstration on the part of the people of Maryland, unless success should enable us to give them a.s.surance of continued protection. Influenced by these considerations, the army was put in motion.
It was decided to cross the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge, in order, by threatening Was.h.i.+ngton and Baltimore, to cause the enemy to withdraw from the south bank, where his presence endangered our communications and the safety of those engaged in the removal of our wounded and the captured property from the late battle-field. Having accomplished this result, it was proposed to move the army into western Maryland, establish our communication with Richmond through the Valley of the Shenandoah, and, by threatening Pennsylvania, induce the enemy to withdraw from our territory for the protection of his own.
General D. H. Hill's division, being in advance, crossed the Potomac, between September 4th and 7th, at the ford near Leesburg, and encamped in the vicinity of Frederick. It had been supposed that this advance would lead to the evacuation of Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, thus opening the line of communication through the Shenandoah Valley. This not having occurred, it became necessary to dislodge the garrisons from those positions before concentrating the army west of the mountains. For this purpose General Jackson marched very rapidly, crossed the Potomac near Williamsport on the 11th, sent Hill's division directly to Martinsburg, and disposed of the rest of the command so as to cut off retreat to the westward. The enemy evacuated Martinsburg and retired to Harper's Ferry on the night of the 11th, and Jackson entered the former on the 12th. Meanwhile General McLaws had been ordered to seize Maryland Heights on the north side of the Potomac, opposite Harper's Ferry, and General Walker took possession of Loudon Heights, on the east side of the Shenandoah, where it unites with the Potomac, and was in readiness to open fire upon Harper's Ferry. But McLaws found the heights in possession of the foe, with infantry and artillery, protected by intrenchments. On the 13th he a.s.sailed the works, and after a spirited contest they were carried; the troops made good their retreat to Harper's Ferry, and on the next day its investment was complete.
At the same time that the march of these troops upon Harper's Ferry began, the remainder of General Longstreet's command and the division of D. H. Hill crossed the South Mountain and moved toward Boonsboro.
General Stuart with the cavalry remained east of the mountains to observe the enemy and r.e.t.a.r.d his advance. Longstreet continued his march to Hagerstown, and Hill halted near Boonsboro to support the cavalry and to prevent the force invested at Harper's Ferry from escaping through Pleasant Valley. The advance of the hostile army was then so slow as to justify the belief that the reduction of Harper's Ferry would be accomplished and our troops concentrated before they would be called upon to meet the foe. In that event it had not been intended to oppose his pa.s.sage through South Mountain, as it was desired to engage him as far as possible from his base. But a copy of Lee's order, directing the movement of the army from Frederick, happening to fall into the hands of McClellan, disclosed to him the disposition of our forces. He immediately began to push forward rapidly, and on the afternoon of the 13th was reported as approaching the pa.s.s in South Mountain on the Boonsboro and Frederick road.
General Stuart's cavalry impeded his progress, and time was thus gained for preparations to oppose his advance.
In Taylor's ”Four Years with General Lee” some facts relative to this lost order are stated. An order of battle was issued, stating in detail the position and duly a.s.signed to each command of the army:
”It was the custom to send copies of such orders, marked 'confidential,' to the commanders of separate corps or divisions only, and to place the address of such separate commander in the bottom left-hand comer of the sheet containing the order. General D.
H. Hill was in command of a division which had not been attached to nor incorporated with either of the two wings of the Army of Northern Virginia. A copy of the order was, therefore, in the usual course, sent to him. After the evacuation of Frederick City by our forces, a copy of General Lee's order was found in a deserted camp by a soldier, and was soon in the hands of General McClellan. The copy of the order, it was stated at the time, was addressed to 'General D. H Hill, commanding division.' General Hill has a.s.sured me that it could not have been his copy, because he still has the original order received by him in his possession.” [62]
General D. H. Hill guarded the Boonsboro Gap, and Longstreet was ordered to support him, in order to prevent a force from penetrating the mountains at this point, in the rear of McLaws, so as to relieve the garrison at Harper's Ferry. Early on the 14th a large body of the enemy attempted to force its way to the rear of the position held by Hill, by a road south of the Boonsboro and Frederick turnpike. The small command of Hill, with Garland's brigade, repelled the repeated a.s.saults of the army, and held it in check for five hours.
Longstreet, leaving a brigade at Hagerstown, hurried to the a.s.sistance of Hill, and reached the scene of action between 3 and 4 P.M. The battle continued with great animation until night. On the south of the turnpike the a.s.sailant was driven back some distance, and his attack on the center repulsed with loss. Darkness put an end to the contest.
The effort to force the pa.s.s of the mountain had failed, but it was manifest that without reenforcements Lee could not hazard a renewal of the engagement; for McClellan, by his great superiority of numbers, could easily turn either flank. Information was also received that another large body of his troops had, during the afternoon, forced its way through Crampton Gap, only five miles in rear of McLaws. Under these circ.u.mstances it was determined to retire to Sharpsburg, where we would be on the flank and rear of the enemy should he move against McLaws, and where we could more readily unite with the rest of our army. This movement, skillfully and efficiently covered by the cavalry brigade of General Fitzhugh Lee, was accomplished without interruption. The advance of McClellan's army did not appear on the west side of the pa.s.s at Boonsboro until about 8 A.M. on the following morning.
The resistance that our troops had offered there secured sufficient time to enable General Jackson to complete the reduction of Harper's Ferry. The attack on the garrison began at dawn on the 15th. A rapid and vigorous fire was opened by the batteries of General Jackson, in conjunction with those on Maryland and Loudon Heights. In about two hours, the garrison, consisting of more than eleven thousand men, surrendered. Seventy-three pieces of artillery, about thirteen thousand small-arms, and a large quant.i.ty of military stores fell into our hands. General A. P. Hill remained formally to receive the surrender of the troops and to secure the captured property.
The commands of Longstreet and D. H. Hill reached Sharpsburg on the morning of the 15th. General Jackson arrived early on the 16th, and General J. G. Walker came up in the afternoon. The movements of General McLaws were embarra.s.sed by the presence of the enemy in Crampton Gap. He retained his position until the 14th, when, finding that he was not to be attacked, he gradually withdrew his command toward the Potomac, then crossed at Harper's Ferry, and marched by way of Shepardstown. His progress was slow, and he did not reach the battle-field at Sharpsburg until some time after the engagement of the 17th began.