Volume II Part 24 (1/2)
The belligerent character of the Confederate States was thus fully acknowledged by the highest judicial tribunal of the United States.
This involved an acknowledgment of the Confederate Government as a Government _de facto_ having ”the sovereign rights of war,” yet the Executive Department of the United States Government, with reckless malignity, denounced our cruisers as ”pirates,” our citizens as ”insurgents” and ”traitors,” and the action of our Government as an ”insurrection.”
It has been stated that during the war of the colonies with Great Britain many of the prizes of the colonial cruisers were destroyed.
This was done by Paul Jones and other commanders, although during the entire period of the war some of the colonial ports were open, into which prizes could be taken. In that war Great Britain did not attempt to blockade all the ports of the colonies. Sailing-vessels only were then known, and with these a stringent blockade at all seasons could not have been maintained. But, at the later day of our war, the powerful steams.h.i.+p had appeared, and revolutionized the commerce and the navies of the world. During the first months of the war all the princ.i.p.al ports of the Confederacy were blockaded, and finally every inlet was either in possession of the enemy or had one or more vessels watching it. The steamers were independent of wind and weather, and could hold their positions before a port day and night. At the same time the ports of neutrals had been closed against the prizes of our cruisers by proclamations and orders in council.
Says Admiral Semmes:
”During my whole career upon the sea, I had not so much as a single port open to me, into which I could send a prize.”
Our prizes had been sent into ports of Cuba and Venezuela under the hope that they might gain admittance, but they were either handed over to the enemy under some fraudulent pretext, or expelled. Thus, by the action of the different nations and by the blockade with steamers, no course was left to us but to destroy the prizes, as was done in many instances under the Government of the United States Confederation.
The laws of maritime war are well known. The enemy's vessel when captured becomes the property of the captor, which he may immediately destroy; or he may take the vessel into port, have it adjudicated by an admiralty court as a lawful prize, and sold. That adjudication is the basis of t.i.tle to the purchaser against all former owners. In these cases the captor sends his prizes to a port of his own country or to a friendly port for adjudication. But, if the ports of his own country are under blockade by his enemy, and the recapture of the prizes, if sent there, most probable, and if, at the same time, all friendly ports are closed against the entrance of his prizes, then there remains no alternative but to destroy the prizes by sinking or burning. Courts of admiralty are established for neutrals; not for the enemy, who has no right of appearance before them. If, therefore, any neutrals suffered during our war for want of adjudication, the fault is with their own Government, and not with our cruisers.
Many other objections were advanced by the United States Government as evidence that we committed a breach of international law with our cruisers, but their principles are embraced in the preceding remarks, or they were too frivolous to deserve notice. Suffice it to say that, if the Confederate Government had been successful in taking to sea every vessel which it built, it would have swept from the oceans the commerce of the United States, would have raised the blockade of at least some of our ports, and, if by such aid our independence had been secured, there is little probability that such complaints as have been noticed would have received attention, if, indeed, they would have been uttered.
In January, 1871, the British Government proposed to the Government of the United States that a joint commission should be convened to adjust certain differences between the two nations relative to the fisheries, the Canadian boundary, etc. To this proposition the latter acceded, on condition that the so-called Alabama claims should also be considered. To this condition Great Britain a.s.sented. In the Convention the American Commissioners proposed an arbitration of these claims. The British Commissioners replied that her Majesty's Government could not admit that Great Britain had failed to discharge toward the United States the duties imposed on her by the rules of international law, or that she was justly liable to make good to the United States the losses occasioned by the acts of the cruisers to which the American Commissioners referred.
Without following the details, it may be summarily stated that the Geneva Conference ensued. That decided that ”England should have fulfilled her duties as a neutral by the exercise of a diligence equal to the gravity of the danger,” and that ”the circ.u.mstances were of a nature to call for the exercise, on the part of her Britannic Majesty's Government, of all possible solicitude for the observance of the rights and duties involved in the proclamation of neutrality issued by her Majesty on May 18, 1861.” The Conference also added: ”It can not be denied that there were moments when its watchfulness seemed to fail, and when feebleness in certain branches of the public service resulted in great detriment to the United States.”
The claims presented to the Conference for damages done by our several cruisers were as follows: The Alabama, $7,050,293.76; the Boston, $400; the Chickamauga, $183,070.73; the Florida, $4,057,934.69; the Clarence, tender of the Florida, $66,736.10; the Tacony, tender of the Florida, $169,198.81; the Georgia, $431,160.72; the Jefferson Davis, $7,752; the Nashville, $108,433.95; the Retribution, $29,018.53; the Sallie, $5,540; the Shenandoah, $6,656,838.81; the Sumter, $179,697.67; the Tallaha.s.see, $836,841.83.
Total, $19,782,917.60. Miscellaneous, $479,033; increased insurance, $6,146,19.71. Aggregate, $26,408,170.31.
The Conference rejected the claims against the Boston, the Jefferson Davis, and the Sallie, and awarded to the United States Government $15,500,000 in gold.
But the indirect damages upon the commerce of the United States produced by these cruisers were far beyond the amount of the claims presented to the Geneva Conference. The number of s.h.i.+ps owned in the United States at the commencement of the war, which were subsequently transferred to foreign owners by a British register, was 715, and the amount of their tonnage was 480,882 tons. Such are the laws of the United States that not one of them has been allowed to resume an American register.
In the year 1860 nearly seventy per cent. of the foreign commerce of the country was carried on in American s.h.i.+ps. But, in consequence of the danger of capture by our cruisers to which these s.h.i.+ps were exposed, the amount of this commerce carried by them had dwindled down in 1864 to forty-six per cent. It continued to decline after the war, and in 1872 it had fallen to twenty-eight and a half per cent.
Before the war the amount of American tonnage was second only to that of Great Britain, and we were competing with her for the first place.
At that time the tonnage of the coasting trade, which had grown from insignificance, was 1,735,863 tons. Three years later, in 1864, it had declined to about 867,931 tons.
The damage to the articles of export is ill.u.s.trated by the decline in breadstuffs exported from the Northern States. In the last four months of each of the following years the value of this export was as follows: 1861, $42,500,000; 1862, $27,842,090; 1863, $8,909,043; 1864, $1,850,819. Some of this decline resulted from good crops in England; but, in other respects, it was a consequence of causes growing out of the war.
The increase in the rates of marine insurance, in consequence of the danger of capture by the cruisers, was variable. But the gross amount so paid was presented as a claim to the Conference, as given above.
[Footnote 59: Wheaton's ”International Law” sixth edition, p. 571, 1855.]
[Footnote 60: Ken's ”Commentaries,” vol i, p. 145, 1854.]
CHAPTER x.x.xII.
Attempts of the United States Government to overthrow States.-- Military Governor of Tennessee appointed.--Object.--Arrests and Imprisonments.--Measures attempted.--Oath required of Voters.--A Convention to amend the State Const.i.tution.--Results.--Attempt in Louisiana.--Martial Law.--Barbarities inflicted.--Invitation of Plantations.--Order of General Butler, No. 28.--Execution of Mumford.--Judicial System set up.--Civil Affairs to be administered by Military Authority.--Order of President Lincoln for a Provisional Court.--A Military Court sustained by the Army.--Words of the Const.i.tution.--”Necessity,” the reason given for the Power to create the Court.--This Doctrine fatal to the Const.i.tution; involves its Subversion.--Cause of our Withdrawal from the Union.--Fundamental Principles unchanged by Force.--The Contest is not over; the Strife not ended.--When the War closed, who were the Victors?--Let the Verdict of Mankind decide.
On the capture of Nashville, on February 25, 1862, Andrew Johnson was made military Governor of Tennessee, with the rank of brigadier-general, and immediately entered on the duties of his office. This step was taken by the President of the United States under the pretense of executing that provision of the Const.i.tution which is in these words:
”The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government.”
The administration was conducted according to the will and pleasure of the Governor, which was the supreme law. Public officers were required to take an oath of allegiance to the United States Government, and upon refusal were expelled from office.
Newspaper-offices were closed, and their publication suppressed.