Volume I Part 44 (1/2)
It is not necessary here to discuss the question of the validity or nullity of the bonds. The object is merely to state the princ.i.p.al facts.
While these events were occurring, and until a period several years subsequent to their consummation, I, who had just resigned my commission in the army, was a private citizen, had never held any civil office, and took no part in political affairs. Indeed, I have never at any time before, during, or since those events, held any civil office under the State government, and neither had nor could have had any part in shaping the policy of the State. When brought out as a candidate for office, my nomination was opposed by that section of my party which advocated ”repudiation,” on account of my opinions in favor of the payment of the bonds.
As a private citizen, it may be stated that I held that the question of the validity of the bonds should be decided by the courts. The Const.i.tution of Mississippi authorized suit to be brought against the State in such cases in her own courts, and this I regarded as the proper course to be pursued by the bondholders, holding that the State would be bound by the judicial decision, if it should sustain the validity of the claim. This course, however, was not adopted until long afterward, when the question had become complicated with political issues, which rendered the effort to obtain a settlement entirely nugatory.
When I was a member of the Senate of the United States, my official influence was exerted to promote the objects of a citizen of Mississippi, who, with quasi-credentials from the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Buchanan, went to London to propose to the bondholders an arrangement by which the claim, or the greater portion of it, might be paid by private subscription, on consideration of the cancellation of the bonds. This effort failed, from a mistaken estimate on the part of some of the princ.i.p.al bondholders, to whom the proposition was made, of the extent to which State pride would induce our citizens to contribute, and to the belief in a power to coerce payment. The gentleman who bore the proposal, indignant at the offensive manner of its rejection, and conscious of the disinterestedness of his motives, abandoned the negotiation in disgust, and the opportunity was lost.
CHAPTER XIV.
Military Laws and Measures.-Agricultural Products diminished.-Manufactures flouris.h.i.+ng.-The Call for Volunteers.-The Term of Three Years.-Improved Discipline.-The Law a.s.sailed.-Important Const.i.tutional Question raised.-Its Discussion at Length.-Power of the Government over its own Armies and the Militia.-Object of Confederations.-The War-Powers granted.-Two Modes of raising Armies in the Confederate States.-Is the Law necessary and proper?-Congress is the Judge under the Grant of Specific Power.-What is meant by Militia.-Whole Military Strength divided into Two Cla.s.ses.-Powers of Congress.-Objections answered.-Good Effects of the Law.-The Limitations enlarged.-Results of the Operations of these Laws.-Act for the Employment of Slaves.-Message to Congress.-”Died of a Theory.”-Act to use Slaves as Soldiers pa.s.sed.-Not Time to put it in Operation.
The agricultural products were diminished every year during the war. Its demands diminished the number of cultivators, and their labors were more extensively devoted to grain-crops. The amount of the cotton-crop was greatly reduced, and numbers of bales were destroyed when in danger of falling into the hands of the enemy.
The manufacturing industry became more extensive than ever before, and in many branches more highly developed. The results in the ordnance department of the Government, stated elsewhere in these pages, serve as an ill.u.s.tration of the achievements in many branches of industry.
During the first year of the war the authority granted to the President to call for volunteers in the army for a short period was sufficient to secure all the military force which we could [pg 506] fit out and use advantageously. As it became evident that the contest would be long and severe, better measures of preparation were enacted. I was authorized to call out and place in the military service for three years, unless the war should sooner end, all white men residents of the Confederate States between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five years, and to continue those already in the field until three years from the date of their enlistment. But those under eighteen years and over thirty-five were required to remain ninety days. The existing organization of companies, regiments, etc., was preserved, but the former were filled up to the number of one hundred and twenty-five men. This was the first step toward placing the army in a permanent and efficient condition. The term of service being lengthened, the changes by discharges and by receiving recruits were diminished, so that, while additions were made to the forces already in the field, the discipline was greatly improved. At the same time, on March 13, 1862, General Robert E. Lee was ”charged with the conduct of the military operations of the armies of the Confederacy” under my direction. Nevertheless, the law upon which our success so greatly depended was a.s.sailed with unexpected criticism in various quarters. A const.i.tutional question of high importance was raised, which tended to involve the harmony of cooperation, so essential in this crisis, between the General and the State governments. It was advanced princ.i.p.ally by the Governor of Georgia, Hon. Joseph E. Brown, and the following extracts are taken from my reply to him, dated
Executive Department, Richmond, May 29, 1862.
”I propose, from my high respect for yourself and for other eminent citizens who entertain opinions similar to yours, to set forth somewhat at length my own views on the power of the Confederate Government over its own armies and the militia, and will endeavor not to leave without answer any of the positions maintained in your letters.
”The main, if not the only, purpose for which independent states form unions, or confederations, is to combine the power of the several members in such manner as to form one united force in all relations with foreign powers, whether in peace or in war. [pg 507] Each state, amply competent to administer and control its own domestic government, yet too feeble successfully to resist powerful nations, seeks safety by uniting with other states in like condition, and by delegating to some common agent the use of the combined strength of all, in order to secure advantageous commercial relations in peace, and to carry on hostilities with effect in war.
”Now, the powers delegated by the several States to the Confederate Government, which is their common agent, are enumerated in the eighth section of the Const.i.tution; each power being distinct, specific, and enumerated in paragraphs separately numbered. The only exception is the eighteenth paragraph, which by its own terms is made dependent on those previously enumerated, as follows: '18. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers,' etc.
”Now the war-powers granted to the Congress are conferred in the following paragraphs: No. 1 'gives authority to raise revenue necessary to pay the debts, provide for the common defense, and carry on the Government,' etc. No. 11, 'To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water.' No. 12, 'To raise and support armies, but no appropriations of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years.' No. 13, 'To provide and maintain a navy.' No. 14, 'To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.'
”It is impossible to imagine a more broad, ample, and unqualified delegation of the whole war power of each State than is here contained, with the solitary limitation of the appropriations to two years. The States not only gave power to raise money for the common defense, to declare war, to raise and support armies (in the plural), to provide and maintain a navy, to govern and regulate both land and naval forces, but they went further, and covenanted, by the third paragraph of the tenth section, not 'to engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.'
”I know of but two modes of raising armies within the Confederate States, viz., voluntary enlistment and draft, or conscription. I perceive, in the delegation of power to raise armies, no restriction as to the mode of procuring troops. I see nothing which confines Congress to one cla.s.s of men, nor any greater power to receive volunteers than conscripts into its service. I see [pg 508] no limitation by which enlistments are to be received of individuals only, but not of companies, or battalions, or squadrons, or regiments. I find no limitation of time of service, but only of duration of appropriation. I discover nothing to confine Congress to waging war within the limits of the Confederacy, nor to prohibit offensive war. In a word, when Congress desires to raise an army, and pa.s.ses a law for that purpose, the solitary question is under the eighteenth paragraph, viz., 'Is the law one that is necessary and proper to execute the power to raise armies?'
”On this point you say: `But did the necessity exist in this case? The conscription act can not aid the Government in increasing its supply of arms or provisions, but can only enable it to call a larger number of men into the field. The difficulty has never been to get men. The States have already furnished the Government more than it can arm,' etc.
”I would have very little difficulty in establis.h.i.+ng to your entire satisfaction that the pa.s.sage of the law was not only necessary, but that it was absolutely indispensable; that numerous regiments of twelve months' men were on the eve of being disbanded, whose places could not be supplied by raw levies in the face of superior numbers of the foe, without entailing the most disastrous results; that the position of our armies was so critical as to fill the bosom of every patriot with the liveliest apprehension; and that the provisions of this law were effective in warding off a pressing danger. But I prefer to answer your objection on other and broader grounds.
”I hold that, when a specific power is granted by the Const.i.tution, like that now in question, 'to raise armies,' Congress is the judge whether the law pa.s.sed for the purpose of executing that power is 'necessary and proper.' It is not enough to say that armies might be raised in other ways, and that, therefore, this particular way is not 'necessary.' The same argument might be used against every mode of raising armies. To each successive mode suggested, the objection would be that other modes were practicable, and that, therefore, the particular mode used was not 'necessary.' The true and only test is to inquire whether the law is intended and calculated to carry out the object; whether it devises and creates an instrumentality for executing the specific power granted; and, if the answer be in the affirmative, the law is const.i.tutional. None can doubt that the conscription law is [pg 509] calculated and intended to 'raise armies'; it is, therefore, 'necessary and proper' for the execution of that power, and is const.i.tutional, unless it comes in conflict with some other provision of our Confederate compact.
”You express the opinion that this conflict exists, and support your argument by the citation of those clauses which refer to the militia. There are certain provisions not cited by you, which are not without influence on my judgment, and to which I call your attention. They will aid in defining what is meant by 'militia,' and in determining the respective powers of the States and the Confederacy over them.
”The several States agree 'not to keep troops or s.h.i.+ps of war in time of peace.'194 They further stipulate that, 'a well-regulated militia being necessary for the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.'195
”'That no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual service in times of war or public danger.'196
”What, then, are militia? They can only be created by law. The arms-bearing inhabitants of a State are liable to become its militia, if the law so order; but, in the absence of a law to that effect, the men of a State capable of bearing arms are no more militia than they are seamen.
”The Const.i.tution also tells us that militia are not troops, nor are they any part of the land or naval forces; for militia exist in time of peace, and the Const.i.tution forbids the States to keep troops in time of peace, and they are expressly distinguished and placed in a separate category from land or naval forces in the sixteenth paragraph above quoted; and the words land and naval forces are shown by paragraphs 12, 13, and 14, to mean the Army and Navy of the Confederate States.
”Now, if militia are not the citizens taken singly, but a body created by law; if they are not troops; if they are no part of the Army and Navy of the Confederacy, we are led directly to the definition, quoted by the Attorney-General, that militia are 'a body of soldiers in a State enrolled for discipline.' In other [pg 510] words, the term 'militia' is a collective term meaning a body of men organized, and can not be applied to the separate individuals who compose the organization.
”The Const.i.tution divides the whole military strength of the States into only two cla.s.ses of organized bodies: one, the armies of the Confederacy; the other, the militia of the States.