Volume I Part 33 (2/2)
”Very early next morning, I sent Captain Gardner to look out for the generals, and get orders for my command. He went to Mana.s.sas, and found General Beauregard, who sent orders to me to remain where I was until further orders, and to send for the camp-equipage, rations, etc., of my command. A number of the men spread over the country in the vicinity of the battlefield, and picked up a great many knapsacks, India-rubber cloths, blankets, overcoats, etc., as well as a good deal of sugar, coffee, and other provisions that had been abandoned by the enemy....
”After I had received orders showing that there was no purpose to make a forward movement, I rode over a good deal of the field, north of the Warrenton pike, and to some hospitals in the vicinity, in order to see what care was being taken of the wounded. I found a hospital on the Sudley road, back of the field of battle, at which Colonel Jones, of the Fourth Alabama, had been, which was in charge of a surgeon of a Rhode Island regiment, whose name was Harris, I think. I asked him if he had what he wanted for the men under his care, and he told me he would like to have some morphine, of which his supply was short. I directed a young surgeon of our cavalry, who rode up at the time, to furnish the morphine, which he did, from a pair of medical saddle-pockets which he had. Dr. Harris told me that he knew that their troops had had a great deal of coffee and sugar mixed, ready for boiling, of which a good deal had been left at different points near the field, and asked if there would be any objection to his sending out and gathering some of it for the use of the wounded under his charge, as it would be of much service to them. I gave him the permission to get not only that, but anything else that would tend to the comfort of his patients. There [pg 380] did not come within my observation any instance of harsh or unkind treatment of the enemy's wounded; nor did I see any indication of a spirit to extend such treatment to them. The stories which were afterward told before the Committee on the Conduct of the War (appointed by the Federal Congress), in regard to 'rebel atrocities,' were very grossly exaggerated, or manufactured from the whole cloth....
”On the night following the battle, when I was looking for Generals Beauregard and Johnston, in riding over and to the rear of the battle-field, I discovered that the greater part of the troops that had been engaged in the battle were in a great state of confusion. I saw companies looking for their regiments, and squads looking for their companies, and they were scattered as far as I went toward Mana.s.sas. It was very apparent that no considerable body of those troops that had been engaged on the left could have been brought into a condition next day for an advance toward Was.h.i.+ngton....
”The dispute as to who planned the battle, or commanded on the field, General Johnston or General Beauregard, is a most unprofitable one. The battle which General Beauregard planned was never fought, because the enemy did not move as he expected him to move. The battle which was fought was planned by McDowell, at least so far as the ground on which it was fought was concerned. He made a movement on our left which was wholly unexpected and unprovided for, and we were compelled to fight a defensive battle on that flank, by bringing up reenforcements from other points as rapidly as possible. When Generals Johnston and Beauregard arrived on the field where the battle was actually fought, it had been progressing for some time, with the odds greatly against us. What was required then was to rally the troops already engaged, which had been considerably shattered, and hold the position to which they had been compelled to retire until reenforcements could be brought up. According to the statements of both generals, the command of the troops then on the field was given to General Beauregard, and he continued to exercise it until the close, but in subordination, of course, to General Johnston, as commander-in-chief, while the movements of all the reenforcements as they arrived were unquestionably directed by the latter. According to the statement of both, the movement of Elzey's brigade to the left averted a great danger, and both concur in [pg 381] attributing the turning of the tide of battle to the movement of my brigade against the enemy's extreme right flank (General Beauregard in a letter on the origin of the battle-flag, and General Johnston in his 'Narrative' recently published).
”General Beauregard unquestionably performed the duty a.s.signed him with great ability, and General Johnston gives him full credit therefor. Where, then, is there any room for a controversy in regard to the actual command, and what profit can there be in it?
”General Johnston a.s.sumes the responsibility for the failure to advance on Was.h.i.+ngton, and why, then, should an effort be made to s.h.i.+ft it on any one else? He certainly was commander-in-chief, and had the privilege of advancing if he thought proper. The attempt to show that the failure to advance was due to the want of transportation and rations for the army is idle. If the Bull Run bridge had not been burned on the 18th, our supplies could have been run to Alexandria, if we could have advanced, as easily as to Mana.s.sas, for the enemy had repaired the railroad to Fairfax Station as he moved up, and failed to destroy it when he went back. Moreover, we had abundant transportation at that time for all the purposes of an advance as far as Was.h.i.+ngton. In my brigade, the two Virginia regiments had about fourteen six-horse wagons each, and that would have furnished enough for the brigade, if the Seventh Louisiana had none. In 1862 we carried into Maryland only enough wagons to convey ammunition, medical supplies, and cooking-utensils, and we started from the battle-field of second Mana.s.sas with no rations on hand, being, before we crossed the Potomac, entirely dependent on the country, which, in July, 1861, was teeming with supplies, but in August and September, 1862, was nearly depleted. The pretense, therefore, that the advance in July, 1861, was prevented by the want of transportation and of supplies is wholly untenable.”
I will now make the promised extracts from reminiscences of Colonel (then Captain) Lay, which were sent to a friend, and handed to me for my use. The paper bears date February 13, 1878. After some preliminary matter, and stating that his force consisted of three cavalry companies, the narrative proceeds:
”I was under orders to be in the saddle at 6.30 A. M., July 21, 1861, and to report immediately to General Beauregard at his headquarters. About 7.30 A. M. I accompanied him and General Johnston [pg 382] to a position near to Mitch.e.l.l's Ford, where for some hours we remained under an active fire of the long-range guns of the enemy upon the opposite hills. When the unexpected flank movement of the enemy was developed, with the generals named, we rode at rapid speed to the left, when General Beauregard immediately rode to the front, General Johnston taking position near and to the left of the Lewis house.... About 3.15 P. M., Captain R. Lindsey Walker, with his battery, took position to the left and in front of the Lewis house and commenced firing. I was near him when the shot from his battery was fired, and watched its effect as it swept through the columns of the enemy, producing perfect confusion and demoralization.... I rode to join my brother, Colonel Lay, whom I saw going toward my command from General Johnston. He reported to me that General Johnston said: 'Now is your time; push the pursuit.' I started at once on a trot, was pa.s.sing General Johnston, who gave some orders, and I understood him to say, 'Salute the President in pa.s.sing.' ... I saluted, and pa.s.sed on at a gallop.
”I halted at Bull Run to water my horses-then suffering-and to confer a moment or two with my gallant old commander, General Philip St. George c.o.c.ke.
”I pa.s.sed on, ... when to my astonishment I saw the President near me in the orchard. I immediately rode up to him, and said that he was much farther forward than he should be; that the forces of the enemy were not entirely broken, and very few of our troops in front of the Run, and advised him to retire; that I was then about to charge....
”We made the charge; a small body of the enemy broke before we reached them, and scattered, and the larger body of troops beyond proved to be of our own troops rapidly advancing upon our left.... After parting from the President, I pushed on to Sudley Church, and far beyond. Sent my surgeon, Dr. Randolph Barksdale, to Captains Tillinghast, Ricketts, and other badly wounded United States officers, and was going on until a superior force should stop me, but was recalled by an order and returned over the field to my quarters at Mana.s.sas a little before daylight-I and my little gallant squadron-having been actively in the saddle, I think, more than twenty hours....
(Signed) ”John F. Lay,
”Late Colonel of Cavalry, C. S. A.
[pg 383]
”N.B.: It may be well to add that General R. Lindsey Walker (then Captain Walker, of the battery referred to) is now in my office, and confirms my recollection.... J. F. L.”
The quartermaster-general of General Beauregard's command, W. L. Cabell, states in a letter written at Dallas, Texas, on the 16th of August, 1880, in regard to the field transportation of General Beauregard's forces before the battle of Mana.s.sas, that as nearly as he could remember it was as follows, viz.:
One four-horse wagon to each company.
One for field and staff (regimental).
One for ammunition.
One for hospital purposes.
Two wagons for each battery of artillery.
Twenty-five wagons in a train for depot purposes.
One ambulance for each regiment.
Transportation belonging to General Johnston's army did not arrive until the day (or probably two days) after the battle.
If General Johnston, as stated, had nine thousand infantry, the field transportation reported above could surely have been distributed so as to supply this additional force, and have rendered, as General Early states, the pretense wholly untenable that the advance in July, 1861, was prevented by want of transportation.
The deep anxiety which had existed, and was justified by the circ.u.mstances, had corresponding gratification among all cla.s.ses and in all sections of our country. On the day after the victory, the Congress, then sitting in Richmond, upon receiving the dispatch of the President from the field of Mana.s.sas, adopted resolutions expressive of their thanks to the most high G.o.d, and inviting the people of the Confederate States to offer up their united thanksgiving and praise for the mighty deliverance. The resolutions also deplored the necessity which had caused the soil of our country to be stained with the blood of its sons, and to their families and friends offered the most cordial sympathy; a.s.suring them that in the hearts of our people would be enshrined ”the names of the gallant dead as the champions of free and const.i.tutional liberty.”
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