Volume I Part 31 (1/2)
”As to the order, to which I presume Mr. Davis refers in his note to you, I recollect the incident very distinctly.
[pg 354]
”The night of the battle, as I was about to ascend to your quarters over my office, Captain E. P. Alexander, of your staff, informed me that Captain --, attached to General Johnston's Army of the Shenandoah, reported that he had been as far forward as Centreville, where he had seen the Federal army completely routed and in full flight toward Was.h.i.+ngton.
”This statement I at once repeated to Mr. Davis, General Johnston, and yourself, whom I found seated around your table-Mr. Davis at the moment writing a dispatch to General Cooper.
”As soon as I had made my report, Mr. Davis with much animation a.s.serted the necessity for an urgent pursuit that night by Bonham, who, with his own brigade and that of Longstreet, was in close proximity to Centreville at the moment. So I took my seat at the same table with you, and wrote the order for pursuit, substantially at the dictation of Mr. Davis. But, while writing, either I happened to remember, or Captain Alexander himself-as I am inclined to believe-called me aside to remind me that his informant was known among us of the old army as -- --, because of eccentricities, and in contradistinction with others of the same name. When I repeated this reminder, Mr. Davis recalled the sobriquet, as he had a precise personal knowledge of the officers of the old army. He laughed heartily, as did all present.
”The question of throwing General Bonham forward that night, upon the unverified report of Captain --, was now briefly discussed, with a unanimous decision against it; therefore, the order was not dispatched.
”It is proper to add in this connection that, so far as I am aware-and I had the opportunity of knowing what occurred-this was the only instance during Mr. Davis's stay at Mana.s.sas in which he exercised any voice as to the movement of the troops. Profoundly pleased with the results achieved by the happy juncture of the two Confederate armies upon the very field of battle, his bearing toward the generals who commanded them was eminently proper, as I have testified on a former occasion; and, I repeat, he certainly expressed or manifested no opposition to a forward movement, nor did he display the least disposition to interfere by opinion or authority touching what the Confederate forces should or should not do.
”You having at the close of the day surrendered the command, which had been left in your hands, over both Confederate armies [pg 355] during the engagement, General Johnston was that night in chief command. He was decidedly averse to an immediate offensive, and emphatically discountenanced it as impracticable.
”Very truly, your friend,
(Signed) ”Thomas Jordan.
”General P. G. T. Beauregard, New Orleans, Louisiana.”
General Beauregard, in his letter forwarding the above, wrote, ”The account given herewith by General Jordan of what occurred there respecting further pursuit that night agrees with my own recollection.”
It was a matter of importance, as I regarded it, to follow closely on the retreating enemy, but it was of no consequence then or now as to who issued the order for pursuit, and, unless requested, I should not have dictated one, preferring that the generals to whom the operations were confided should issue all orders to the troops. I supposed the order, as modified by myself, had been sent. I have found, however, since the close of the war, that it was not, but that an order to the same effect was sent on the night of the 21st of July, for a copy of which I am indebted to the kindness of that chivalrous gentleman, soldier, and patriot, General Bonham. It is as follows:
”Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
”Mana.s.sas, July 21, 1861.
”(Special Orders, No. 140.)
”I. General Bonham will send, as early as practicable in the morning, a command of two of his regiments of infantry, a strong force of cavalry, and one field-battery, to scour the country and roads to his front, toward Centreville. He will carry with him abundant means of transportation for the collection of our wounded, all the arms, ammunition, and abandoned hospital stores, subsistence, and baggage, which will be sent immediately to these headquarters.
”General Bonham will advance with caution, throwing out an advanced guard and skirmishers on his right and left, and the utmost caution must be taken to prevent firing into our own men.
”Should it appear, while this command is occupied as directed, that it is insufficient for the purposes indicated, General Bonham will call on the nearest brigade commander for support.
[pg 356]
”II. Colonel P. St. George c.o.c.ke, commanding, will dispatch at the same time, for similar purposes, a command of the same size and proportions of infantry, artillery, and cavalry on the road via Stone Bridge; and another command of two companies of infantry and one of cavalry on the road by which the enemy retreated toward and via Sudley's Mills.
”By command of Brigadier-General Beauregard:
(Signed) ”Thomas Jordan, A. A. Adjutant-General.
”To Brigadier-General Bonham.”
Impressed with the belief that the enemy was very superior to us, both in numbers and appointments, I had felt apprehensive that, unless pressed, he would recover from the panic under which he fled from the field, rally on his reserves, and renew the contest. Therefore it was that I immediately felt the necessity for a pursuit of the fugitives, and insisted that the troops on the extreme left should retain their position during the night of the 21st, as has been heretofore stated. In conference with the generals that night, this subject was considered, and I dictated an order for a movement on the rear of the enemy at early dawn, which, on account of the late hour at which it was given, differed very little from one for an immediate movement. A rainfall, extraordinary for its violence and duration, occurred on the morning of the succeeding day, so that, over places where during the battle one could scarcely get a drink of water, rolled torrents which, in the afternoon of the 22d, it was difficult to cross.
From these and other causes, the troops were scattered to such an extent that but few commands could have been a.s.sembled for immediate service. It was well for us that the enemy, instead of retiring in order, so as to be rallied and again brought to the attack, left hope behind, and fled in dismay to seek for safety beyond the Potomac.
Each hour of the day following the battle added to the evidence of a thorough rout of the enemy. Abandoned wagons, stores, guns, caissons, small-arms, and ammunition, proved his complete demoralization. As far as our cavalry went, no hostile force was met, and all the indications favored the conclusion that the purpose of invasion had for the time been abandoned.